



Structural Racism and the Explanation of Durable Racial Inequality 
 



















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
under the Executive Committee 


























































Structural Racism and the Explanation of Durable Racial Inequality 
César Gherardo Cabezas Gamarra 
 
 I argue that structural racism offers a unique explanation of durable racial inequality. 
However, the lack of consensus over the meaning of structural racism makes it difficult to theorize 
its explanatory power. To overcome this challenge, I develop an account of structural racism in 
terms of racially oppressive social structures. Structural racism explains durable racial inequality 
insofar as it motivates agents who benefit from relations of race-based advantage/disadvantage to 
act in ways that preserve those advantages. This motivational effect of structural racism ensures 
the support of enough advantaged agents to maintain racial inequality. I develop this explanatory 
claim with reference to a recent sociological case study of a U.S. high school in which white 
parents support social practices that reinforce racial disparities in students' educational attainments. 
Given its explanatory power, structural racism is key for developing a comprehensive analysis of 
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 The concept of structural racism is paramount in contemporary discourse on race. Claims 
such as “racism is a structural problem”, “racism is a system of privilege and domination”, and 
“structural racism explains anti-black police brutality" are now common currency in conversations 
about race. Those who employ the concept of structural racism regard it as a helpful tool for 
expanding the traditional lay understanding of racism as individual race-based prejudice and 
discrimination. The claim that racism is structural entails that a full-fledged understanding of this 
phenomenon ought to consider the role that institutions and social structures play in its 
reproduction.  
Despite its promise in helping us attain a better understanding of racial matters, structural 
racism remains an elusive and vague concept. Part of the problem is that structural racism has 
become a catch-all term for a variety of positions that challenge the traditional conceptualization 
of racism as individual race-based prejudice and discrimination. To list only a few examples, the 
concept of structural racism has been used to refer to:  
a) A system of racial oppression that has negative effects on people of color (e.g. mass 
incarceration of black people in the U.S., the racial achievement gap in education, the racial 
wealth gap). 
b) The negative effects themselves.  
c) A property of institutions and social structures (e.g. the Ferguson Police Department as 
a structurally racist institution).  
d) An explanation of racial inequality in societies with a history of racial injustice.  
All of these conceptualizations of structural racism contribute to a better understanding of how 
racism operates today. However, the lack of consensus over the meaning of structural racism has 
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led to conceptual confusion, which has caused some to question its usefulness in the context of 
anti-racist theory and practice. Moreover, the lack of a unified account of structural racism has led 
to criticisms that misconstrue how anti-racist activists employ the concept in their political 
practice.  
For instance, Adolph Reed Jr. has criticized 'structural racism' as an abstract neologism that 
works to promote a professional-managerial class politics in non-white communities.  According 
to Reed, the concept of 'structural racism' is part of a brand of anti-racist politics that foregoes the 
need for a cross-racial transformative agenda in order to pursue racial parity for non-white elites 
within neoliberalism. Pace Reed, I argue that structural racism is best understood as a concept that 
shed light on the structural mechanisms behind the reproduction of racial disadvantage, whose 
effects are most devastating for non-white non-elites. The concept of structural racism is a useful 
tool for anti-racist activists that seek to denounce the vast inequalities in education, health care, 
housing, employment, and so on, that systematically harms non-white and working-class 
communities. Pace Reed, social criticism that draws on the concept of structural racism often calls 
for a transformation of the economic, social, political and juridical structures characteristic of 
neoliberalism. The concept of structural racism comes out of a brand of anti-racist politics that 
aims to describe the workings of these structures as a first step towards disarticulating them. 
Surely, the neoliberal brand of anti-racist politics that Reed describes does exist, but it is a mistake 
to associate it with the concept of structural racism. 
Unfortunately, the diverse and often contradictory understandings of structural racism in 
the collective imagination make it a common target of critiques that misconstrue its contribution 
to anti-racist theory and practice. Just like the concept of structural racism has become a catch-all 
term for a variety of non-individualist conceptualizations of racism, it has also become the go-to 
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target for arguments (straw-man and otherwise) against such views. As things stand, the concept 
of structural racism is at risk of becoming an empty concept without a generally agreed upon or 
intelligible definition. This lack of conceptual clarity makes it difficult to employ 'structural racism' 
as a tool for theorizing about race. In addition, the conceptual fog surrounding it invites misplaced 
criticisms that further delegitimize its use in anti-racist practice.   
 In response to this dilemma, the overarching aim of this dissertation is to vindicate the 
usefulness of the concept of structural racism for anti-racist theory and practice. I take up this 
project in two parts—the first conceptual and the second explanatory. In chapters 1-5, I show that 
structural racism is an internally coherent concept that need not lead to conceptual confusion. To 
this end, I develop a unified and clearly articulated definition of structural racism. In doing so, I 
take up the tradition of critical theory as the "self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the 
age."  In this respect, my articulation of the concept of structural racism incorporates as much as 
possible the insights of several generations of anti-racist activists and engaged scholars who have 
developed the concept in their political practice. One limitation of this approach is that there are 
multiple accounts of structural racism in the conceptual reservoir, which do not necessarily form 
a coherent whole. Moreover, since the concept of structural racism was (and continues to be) 
developed in the context of political practice, existing accounts sometimes sacrifice theoretical 
precision for the sake of political expediency (and rightly so). For this reason, the work of offering 
a self-clarification of the political tradition that developed the concept of structural racism also 
involves piecing together the best insights from this tradition to form a precise and internally 
coherent account. The goal of this project is not merely theoretical, however. Offering an internally 
coherent account of structural racism will also serve to prevent further misguided criticisms of the 
anti-racist tradition that has developed this concept in the context of their political practice. 
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Furthermore, if one contribution of the concept of structural racism to anti-racist praxis is to 
enhance our understanding of racially oppressive social structures with an eye towards 
disarticulating them, the account that I develop here also furthers that goal.  In particular, I offer 
an explanation of what motivates well-meaning agents to support racially oppressive social 
structures.  
In my view, structural racism refers primarily to a global system (or social structure) of 
race-based oppression.  In this sense, 'structural racism' is another label to refer to the phenomenon 
otherwise known as global white supremacy.  However, 'structural racism' can also refer to other 
racially oppressive social structures at the national and sub-national levels. For instance, it is 
common to refer to U.S. police departments, the U.S. educational system, and to the United States 
as a whole as racist social structures. In this more general sense, the concept of structural racism 
refers to racially oppressive social structures at the global, national, or sub-national levels. While 
a full-fledged account of structural racism would require analysis at the global level—i.e. global 
white supremacy—such a complex and demanding task is outside the scope of this dissertation. 
Instead, I will clarify the concept of structural racism by elucidating how it operates at the national 
and sub-national levels in the U.S. context. In other words, I will examine what it means to describe 
the United States, as well as U.S. institutions such as police departments and the educational 
system, as racially oppressive social structures. In this way, I hope to offer a theoretical apparatus 
that can serve as a starting point for analyzing structural racism in other contexts—global, national, 
or sub-national.  
In chapter 6, I spell out the distinct contribution of the concept of structural racism for 
racial theorizing—namely, its explanatory power. To put it simply, structural racism offers a 
structural explanation for the durability of racial inequality in racialized societies, such as the 
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United States. Durable racial inequality is the result of a dynamically stable system of racially 
oppressive social structures that organizes social agents in racially oppressive social relations. In 
the United States (and elsewhere), racially oppressive social structures influence the agency of 
individuals such that they organize their social activity in ways that harm non-whites while 
simultaneously benefitting whites. This racially disparate allocation of harms and benefits, which 
structural racism makes possible by virtue of its effects on human agency, partially explains the 
persistence of racial inequality in the United States and other racialized societies. The task of 
chapter 6 is to spell out this structural explanation of durable racial inequality and to show that it 
fills an explanatory gap in alternative explanations of durable inequality.   
In Chapter 1, I situate my conceptual project of defining structural racism within the larger 
debate over the meaning of racism. I distinguish between conceptual disagreements in public 
discourse and in philosophy. At the level of philosophical disagreement, I follow Tommie Shelby's 
reconstruction of the debate in terms of three first-order questions and a meta-debate over how to 
adjudicate between first-order disputes. The first-order questions are "what is racism?", "what 
makes racism morally objectionable?", and "what is the appropriate practical response to racism?" 
After presenting my position on the meta-debate, I clarify that the conceptual project of my 
dissertation does not directly address first-order debates about the morality of racism or the 
appropriate practical response to it. Rather, the focus of my conceptual project is closer to the 
"what is racism?" question. However, the aim of my conceptual project is not to define racism 
simpliciter, nor is it to adjudicate whether we ought to use the term 'racism' in an individualist or 
structuralist sense. The scope of my conceptual project is more specific. My overarching aim is to 
answer the question "what is structural racism?"  
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In Chapters 2 and 3, I give an account of two concepts that are central to my theory of 
structural racism: social structure and oppression. In Chapter 2, I build on theories of social 
structure in the holist and practice theory traditions to develop a theory of social structures as 
networks of social relations that are recursively reproduced by individual agents through their 
participation in social practices. I also discuss the role that social structures play in social 
explanation. In particular, I explain how social structures influence individuals by constraining, 
enabling, and motivating their actions. In chapter 3, I build on the work of Ann Cudd to define 
oppression as an intergroup relation whereby a social structure (or a system of social structures) 
harms one group (or groups), while simultaneously benefitting another group (or groups).  
 Chapter 4 builds on the conceptual building blocks developed in chapters 2 and 3 to offer 
a detailed account of structural racism in terms of racially oppressive social structures. My account 
highlights the features that distinguish structural racism from other systems of oppression—
namely, the centrality of the process of racialization, the creation and reproduction of racialized 
groups, and the constant evolution and adaptation of ideas about racial hierarchy.  
In chapter 5, I discuss the connection between my account of structural racism and other 
influential conceptualizations of racism in the literature. I discuss in detail various philosophical 
accounts of racism at the level of individuals, ideologies and institutions. In doing so, I show that 
my account of structural racism incorporates the main insights from existing theories of individual, 
ideological and institutional racism. I also show why a full-fledged structural racism explanation 
of durable racial inequality must examine the causal mechanisms between racially oppressive 
social structures on the one hand, and racist individuals, ideologies, and institutions on the other. 
This will turn out to be crucial when I move on to the explanatory project of my dissertation.  
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In Chapters 6, I substantiate my claim that structural racism contributes to a better 
explanation of the durability of racial inequality in racialized societies. In order to narrow down 
the explanandum, I focus on a single representative case: racial inequality in education (otherwise 
known as the racial achievement gap). To add even more specificity, I introduce a recent 
sociological case study of the racial achievement gap at a middle-class Midwestern suburban 
public school (Riverview High). My task in this chapter is to give a concrete example of the 
explanatory power of the concept of structural racism backed up by empirical research. In this 
case, I will show that theorizing Riverview High as a racially oppressive social structure is key for 
explaining the persistence of its racial achievement gap.  
I briefly revisit the debate between individualist and holist (or structural) accounts of social 
explanation. I distinguish between strong and weak accounts of structural explanations, and I 
identify my structural racism explanation as a weak structural explanation. In a nutshell, my 
explanation argues that the persistence of the racial achievement gap at Riverview High is partially 
explained by the interest of white parents in maintaining school practices that benefit their children 
to the detriment of non-white students. To clarify this explanatory claim, I introduce the concept 
of positional interests, which are interests that stem from an agent's position in a social structure 
and motivate them to act to secure their social position. In the case of Riverview High, white 
parents and their children occupy a position in the school structure whereby they benefit from 
practices of disciplining and educational tracking that simultaneously disadvantage non-white 
students. As the case study makes clear, the persistence of the racial achievement gap at Riverview 
High is largely explained by white parents acquiring a stake in these inequality-producing practices 
and blocking any attempts at changing them.  
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I also explain the connection between structural racism and the positional interests of white 
parents at Riverview High. I argue that white parents' positional interests are an emergent property 
of racially oppressive social structures. By emergent properties, I mean properties that social 
structures have in virtue of the social relations among their members. Emergent properties are the 
result of the social relations among the individuals that make up the structure. These properties are 
not possessed by the individual members apart from their participation in the social structure. 
Emergent properties, such as positional interests, are an example of the distinct explanatory power 
of social structures. Thus, one of the causal mechanisms whereby structural racism ensures the 
durability of racial inequality is via positional interests that motivate privileged agents to act (or 
fail to act) in ways that maintain practices that reproduce racial inequality.  
Following weak methodological holism, I argue that positional interests are a causally 
efficacious feature of structural racism, which nevertheless operates non-deterministically through 
the agency of individuals. The positional interests of white parents at Riverview High are emergent 
properties of structural racism that influence but do not determine the behavior of individual 
parents. Thus, this dissertation shows that structural racism is an internally coherent concept that 
plays a distinctive role in the explanation of durable racial inequality, and is therefore a valuable 




Chapter 1: Conceptualizing (Structural Racism) 
1.1. Racism in Public Discourse 
As mentioned in the introduction, the concept of structural racism has gained prominence 
in everyday discourse on race in the United States and elsewhere. Claims such as “racism is a 
structural problem”, “racism is a system of privilege and domination”, and “structural racism 
explains anti-black police brutality" are now common currency in conversations about race. Of 
course, the idea that racism is a structural phenomenon is not a new one. The structural view of 
racism has a longstanding pedigree in anti-racist activism and scholarship, as well as in the lay 
discourse of blacks and other non-white groups. The conceptualization of racism as a structural 
phenomenon is grounded in the everyday experiences of people of color, who face an array of 
institutional, cultural and interpersonal dynamics that systematically subject them to unjustly 
inflicted harms (e.g. violence, psychological harms, unjust disadvantage—economic and 
otherwise) on account of their race. To people of color who face these race-based constraints on a 
systematic basis, it is not difficult to embrace the view that racism operates, to paraphrase Rawls, 
at the level of the basic structure of society.  
 And yet, the mainstream view of racism in the everyday discourse continues to focus on 
individuals rather than social structures. In lay discourse, racism is still taken to refer primarily to 
individuals and their beliefs, intentions, actions, and the like. In this dissertation, I will sometimes 
refer to this mainstream view of racism in public discourse as the racism-as-prejudice view. I have 
chosen this designation because it best captures the diverse (and yet limited) range of phenomena 
that the mainstream view of racism picks out. I will expand upon the concept of prejudice in 
chapter 5. For now, I will just note that the psychological concept of prejudice refers to individual-
level attitudes that have cognitive, affective and behavioral components. Together, the three 
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components of the psychological concept of prejudice capture all the instances of racism on the 
mainstream view in public discourse. In other words, in this view, racism amounts to race-based 
prejudice, which may take cognitive, affective or behavioral forms. The cognitive component of 
racism (or race-based prejudice) refers to mental states of individuals, such as explicitly held 
beliefs or doctrines of racial difference and hierarchy, racial stereotypes, and implicit associations 
between members of a racially oppressed group and a negative attribute (e.g. associations of black 
people with criminality). The affective component of racism-as-prejudice captures the range of 
negative emotions (e.g. hostility, disgust fear, indifference) that racially prejudiced individuals 
have towards members of a different race. Finally, the behavioral component captures the behavior 
or behavioral dispositions that stem from standing in the aforementioned cognitive and affective 
states. In most contexts, this component of race-based prejudice refers to racially discriminatory 
behavior.  
In recent years, there has been a healthy development away from the traditional fixation on 
overt racial bigotry as the mark of racism. For most of the twentieth century, the representation of 
racist individuals in the public imagination was that of an overtly bigoted (often working-class 
and/or uneducated) person.1 The recent popularization of research on implicit bias has allowed for 
a more subtle understanding of how racism operates at the level of individuals. Implicit bias 
research has shown that racism need not always be explicit, consciously held, or even actualized 
in discriminatory behavior. Instead, it is possible (and in fact common) to hold racist attitudes and 
act on them without conscious awareness—perhaps even in an automatic fashion. 
                                                 
1 As David Wellman aptly points out, the association of individual racism with working-class and uneducated whites 
allowed middle-and-upper class whites (including the white researchers who developed the psychological concept of 
racial prejudice in the second half of the twentieth century) to distance themselves from the problem of racism. See 
David Wellman, Portraits of White Racism, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).  
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Despite its contribution to our understanding of the intricacies of individual racism, implicit 
bias research has little to say about how racism works at the level of social structures.2 In this 
context, talk of racist social structures is often misunderstood and even ridiculed in public 
discourse. The dismissal of the concept of structural racism comes from both the right (e.g D'Souza 
1995) and left (e.g. Reed 2018) ends of the political spectrum. Part of the challenge of offering a 
viable account of structural racism in public discourse is that it goes against the foundational 
assumptions of the racism-as-prejudice view. Whereas the mainstream view conceptualizes racism 
as an attribute of individuals and their beliefs, emotions, and actions, a structural account moves 
beyond the level of individuals in order to theorize how social structures contribute to the 
reproduction of race-based oppression. Whereas the mainstream account focuses on blaming or 
exculpating individuals for their racist beliefs, emotions and actions, a structural account focuses 
on the structural effects of racial oppression on the life chances of people of color. Given these 
discrepancies in foundational assumptions, attempts to cash out the structural view of racism in 
mainstream discourse often end up with proponents of both views talking past each other.3   
1.2. The Philosophical Debate on Racism: Three First-Order Questions and 
Two Second-Order Questions 
Thankfully, the task of vindicating an account of structural racism becomes less onerous 
once we leave the domain of lay discourse for that of philosophy. This is not to say that the 
                                                 
2 In fact, even the small gains that implicit bias research has attained for our understanding of racism have come under 
criticism. Given implicitly biased agents' lack of conscious awareness or intentionality, some deny that implicit 
attitudes and discriminatory behavior based on them are racist. There are philosophers who come close to taking this 
position. E.g. Neil Levy, "Am I Racist? Implicit Bias and the Ascription of Racism," The Philosophical Quarterly 67, 
no. 268 (2017): 524-551. However, this line of argumentation is most often found in everyday discourse as a form of 
defending one's moral purity from the "sin of racism". As I will show later, the debate over racism has gone astray due 
to a focus on individual moral condemnation and exculpation.  




structural view of racism is paramount in philosophy. In fact, many of the early philosophical 
attempts to conceptualize racism share the assumptions of the racism-as-prejudice view. It is only 
recently that the wave of the debate has shifted in favor of the structural racism view. Even then, 
none of the current offerings in the philosophical literature put forth a full-fledged account of 
structural racism. One of the goals of this dissertation is to fill that gap. At this point, it would be 
helpful to clarify what I take to be the central questions in the philosophical literature on racism, 
and how my conceptual project of developing an account of structural racism fits therein. 
In this regard, Tommie Shelby offers a helpful starting point.4 According to Shelby, the 
philosophical literature on racism revolves around three first-order questions:  
1. What is racism?  
2. What makes racism objectionable?  
3. What is the appropriate practical response to racism?  
The first question has to do with the conceptual task of articulating a precise definition of racism. 
The second question has to do with the normative task of identifying what is morally troubling 
about racism. Finally, the third question has to do with anti-racist practice—in other words, it is a 
question about kinds of response to racism are justified, permissible or praiseworthy.  
In addition, Shelby identifies two further methodological or second-order theoretical 
disagreements. In his words, "[the first] second-order disagreement [is] about how to settle first-
order disputes over the meaning of the term "racism" […] The other second-order disagreement is 
over whether the three core questions about racism are best approached from the standpoint of 
personal morality or political morality. This debate is sometimes thought to come down, 
                                                 
4 Tommie Shelby, "Racism, Moralism and Social Criticism", Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 11, 
no. 158 (2014): 58.  
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ultimately, to a choice between treating individual racism or institutional racism (sometimes called 
"structural racism") as the primary unit of analysis in (normative, not explanatory) matters of 
race".5 
While Shelby's layout of the philosophical terrain is illuminating, I need to clarify how it 
fits with my project in this first part of the dissertation. Given that my task is conceptual, my project 
comes closest to Shelby's "what is racism?" question. However, I do not intend to define the 
concept of racism simpliciter. Rather, my particular interest is in answering the narrower question 
"what is structural racism?" My project does not presuppose that we ought to analyze racism from 
a structuralist perspective, nor does it discount alternative conceptualizations of racism. 
Developing accounts of individual racism or ideological racism are equally important projects for 
furthering our understanding of race. Although the focus of my conceptual project is to answer the 
question "what is structural racism?", I also take a position on the normative question of what 
makes structural racism morally objectionable. On this question, I adopt the standpoint of political 
morality, which highlights the relation between structural racism and unjust social relations—in 
particular, relations of race-based oppression and domination.  
Adopting Shelby's layout of the philosophical terrain is also helpful because it allows me 
to take a stance on two important second-order debates in the philosophical literature on racism. 
While my focus is on answering the first-order question "what is structural racism?", I will briefly 
present my position on the second-order questions of how to adjudicate between competing 
conceptualizations of racism, and whether to take individual racism or structural racism as the 
primary unit of analysis. Clarifying my views on these second-order debates will enable me to 
                                                 
5 Ibid. In order to avoid confusion, I cash out this distinction in terms of individual racism vs. structural racism from 
now on. Later, I will show that there are important differences between institutional and structural racism.  
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better situate my project within the larger philosophical literature on racism. After doing so, I will 
offer a first sketch of my first-order account of structural racism, which I will develop into a full-
fledged theory over the course of this dissertation.  
1.2.1. Shelby's First Second-Order Question: A Pluralist and Ameliorative Proposal 
Shelby's first meta-question is about how we should resolve first-order disagreements over 
the meaning of the term racism. In other words, it is a second-order debate over how to assess the 
correctness or superiority of a particular answer to the "what is racism?" first-order question—or 
in my case, the "what is structural racism?" question. In this regard, I take a pluralist stance 
according to which the success of any given account of racism depends on whether it successfully 
addresses the theorist's interests and aims in asking the question. Taking a pluralist stance does not 
mean that anything goes when it comes to defining racism. On the contrary, pluralism allows us 
to make our pre-theoretical assumptions and interests explicit. Once the theorist's project is fixed, 
particular answers to the question may prove to be inadequate if they fail to meet that project's 
goals. Moreover, getting clear on the scope and aims of our theoretical projects may help prevent 
potential misunderstandings. In my case, it is important to highlight that the scope of my project 
is limited to defining the concept of structural racism and not that of racism simpliciter. Moreover, 
my particular interest lies in developing an account of structural racism that can contribute to racial 
theorizing because of its explanatory power. Thus, my pluralistic stance allows me to regard other 
projects that focus on defining individual racism or ideological racism as potentially correct and 
equally important for racial theorizing. Likewise, I have no in-principle reason to object to other 
accounts of structural racism whose aims differ from mine—for instance, if they were to focus on 
the normative rather than the explanatory implications of structural racism.  
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Sally Haslanger distinguishes three kinds of projects a philosopher may be up to when 
asking a question of the form "what is X?"6 First, an analytic project aims at articulating and 
clarifying our concept of X by exploring its nuances.7 This project often follows the method of 
reflective equilibrium. In the first stage, we identify the range of typical applications of the concept, 
as well as the generally agreed-upon principles that are thought to govern its use. In the second 
stage, we seek to arrive at a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the concept, that 
accommodate both the applications and the principles. The method allows for cases and principles 
to be weighted according to their centrality or importance to the concept in order to arrive at a 
reflective equilibrium. This methodology is what usually goes by the name of "conceptual 
analysis" in the analytic tradition in philosophy. Jorge Garcia's work exemplifies the analytic 
approach to answering the "what is racism?" question. Garcia identifies principles that (he thinks) 
govern our use of the concept of racism (e.g. racism is always immoral).8 He then proceeds to 
analyze how current applications of the concept of racism—as a group of beliefs, as a system of 
social subjugation, as a field of discourse, as a mode of behavior, and as ill-will or disregard—fit 
with these principles. After discarding other accounts of racism that fail to accommodate the 
principles, he concludes that the only viable application of the concept is that of racism as race-
based ill-will or disregard. While Garcia's method of reflective equilibrium leans heavily on the 
                                                 
6 Sally Haslanger, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 
223-225, 342-354.  
7 Haslanger's typology labels this first type of project as "conceptual projects". Given that I am already using the term 
'conceptual' to characterize my overarching aim of answering the question "what is structural racism?", I have chosen 
to label this particular approach to answering a "what is x?" question as an "analytic project". The reason is that this 
project follows the methodology of "conceptual analysis" in analytic philosophy.  
8 J.L.A. Garcia, "Current Conceptions of Racism: A Critical Examination of Some Recent Social Philosophy," Journal 
of Social Philosophy 29, no. 2 (1997): 5-42.  
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side of the principles, he does consider several applications of the concept in his conceptual 
analysis.   
A second approach to answering questions of the form "what is X?" is the descriptive 
project. In this approach, the focus is not on capturing the nuances of our concept of X, but on the 
extension of the concept. A descriptive project seeks to clarify the phenomena that we track in our 
everyday use of the concept by drawing on empirical or quasi-empirical methods. For this reason, 
Haslanger also refers to this project as a naturalistic one. One example of the descriptive or 
naturalistic approach in the philosophical literature on racism is the work of Luc Faucher and 
Edouard Machery. In "Against Jorge Garcia's Moral and Psychological Monism," Faucher and 
Machery argue against a division of labor in which philosophers focus on conceptual analysis and 
psychologists are concerned with empirical methods. Instead, Faucher and Machery argue that 
psychology (and the empirical sciences more generally) can play a central role in philosophical 
debates about the racism concept. As an example, they draw on psychological research on 
emotions to show the limitations of Garcia's account of racism. According to Faucher and 
Machery, Garcia's account of racism does not offer a sufficiently rich description of the range of 
emotions that characterize racism. Garcia's conceptual analysis focuses exclusively on the 
emotions of hate and malevolence. By contrast, Faucher and Machery, following a naturalistic 
approach, draw on empirical psychological research to show that racism also stems from other 
emotions, such as fear, disgust, anger and envy. Their project employs empirical methods to clarify 
the phenomena (in this case, the emotional states) that we track with the lay concept of racism.  
Finally, an ameliorative project to answering a "what is x?" question focuses on the 
pragmatics of our conceptual practices. This approach foregrounds pragmatic considerations such 
as: What is the point of having this concept? What cognitive and practical tasks do we want the 
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concept to accomplish? Are our current concepts effective in accomplishing these goals? 
Ameliorative projects aim at improving our conceptual resources by developing a better 
understanding of our (legitimate) purposes for having a concept, and changing our conceptual 
practices accordingly. Of course, ameliorative projects must be informed by our ordinary usage of 
the concept (after all, we want the concept to remain recognizable), as well as by empirical 
research, so there is a limit to its revisionary implications. At the same time, given its pragmatic 
nature, an ameliorative project to a "what is x?" question also has a stipulative element: given our 
purposes, we can stipulate that this is the phenomenon that we need to be talking about when we 
use X. As a result, considerations of ordinary usage and empirical research are important but not 
overriding.  
As I mentioned earlier, I take a pluralist stance regarding the adequacy of particular 
answers to the "what is racism?" question—or more specifically, to the "what is structural racism?" 
question. In my view, an answer to questions of this sort is successful if it meets the goals of the 
theorist's project. Analytic, descriptive and ameliorative projects may all yield correct and equally 
satisfying answers as long as they meet the theorist's respective aims. In my view, analytic, 
descriptive and ameliorative projects can all contribute to our understanding of the concept of 
structural racism (and racism, more generally).  
Apart from this pluralist stance regarding the adequacy of competing accounts of racism, 
my own project follows an ameliorative approach. In my view, the point of having a concept of 
racism (or in my case, a concept of structural racism) is to help us understand the dynamics of 
race-based oppression in order to devise better practical interventions. In other words, my interest 
in developing an account of structural racism stems from a desire to make sense of the array of 
oppressive harms faced by people of color (e.g. mass incarceration, police violence, race-based 
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disparities in wealth, education, and health care). In this sense, my ameliorative project is driven 
by practical anti-racist considerations—I aim to develop an account of racism that can contribute 
to the emancipatory project of overcoming racial oppression by granting us a more nuanced 
understanding of how it operates. For the purposes of this project, an adequate account of structural 
racism must seek to identify the phenomena that contribute to durable racial inequality and explain 
the causal paths whereby they do so. For this reason, I devote chapter 6 to issues of social 
explanation. In that chapter, I clarify how structural explanations work and I develop my own 
structural explanation of the durability of racial inequality In line with my ameliorative project, I 
do not stay at an abstract level of explanation. Instead, I focus on a highly specific case of racial 
inequality—the racial achievement gap in education—and seek to unveil the causal mechanisms 
that contribute to its reproduction.  
Since my practical focus is on understanding the role that structural racism plays in the 
reproduction of race-based oppression, it is key to employ social theory and empirical social 
science to acquire a better understanding of the causal mechanisms whereby structural racism has 
these effects. In this sense, my project is also partially descriptivist insofar as I draw on empirical 
research to unveil the nature of racism. Like Faucher and Machery, I draw on psychological 
research—group position theory, in particular. In addition, I incorporate insights from sociological 
research on racism, as well as Charles Tilly's work on durable inequality. Drawing on these 
empirical and quasi-empirical resources is crucial for developing an account of structural racism 
that can satisfy the ameliorative goal of explaining the durability of racial inequality. 
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1.2.2. Shelby's Second Second-Order Question: Clarifying Personal v. Political Morality and 
Individual v. Structural Racism 
Before taking a stance on Shelby's second meta-theoretical debate, I must make some 
clarificatory remarks. In explaining this second-order debate, Shelby identifies two distinct 
discussions that often run together. First, there is a debate over whether we should approach racism 
from the perspective of personal morality or political morality. Second, there is a question as to 
whether we should favor individual racism or structural racism as the primary unit of normative 
analysis. Shelby regards these debates as one and the same: proponents of personal morality favor 
individual racism, whereas proponents of political morality favor structural racism.  
The disagreement between proponents of personal morality and political morality tends to 
follow disciplinary lines between moral and political philosophers, respectively. Shelby, aware of 
this sociological fact, argues that moral philosophers tend to tackle the first-order questions about 
racism "through the normative lens of personal morality, whose central subject is the ethics of 
individual character and interpersonal conduct", whereas political philosophers like himself tend 
to take the perspective of "political morality, […] whose principal subject is the justice of 
institutional arrangements."9 In setting up the dispute in this way, Shelby follows what Charles 
Larmore calls a moralist conception of political philosophy.10 In this conception, political 
philosophy is a sub-discipline of moral philosophy, the latter of which deals with the good and the 
right more generally—not only in the political domain. As a sub-discipline of moral philosophy, 
political philosophy is primarily interested in elucidating the nature of justice as a moral ideal. 
Following this framework, I interpret Shelby as arguing that political philosophers focus on 
                                                 
9 Shelby, "Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism", 58 (emphasis in original).  
10 Charles Larmore, "What is Political Philosophy?" Journal of Moral Philosophy 10, no. 3 (2013): 276-306. 
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political morality, where the emphasis is on the justice of the social institutions that govern our 
social life, whereas (non-political) moral philosophers are primarily interested in personal 
morality, where the focus is on individual moral character and moral principles for interpersonal 
conduct. 
Philosophers who favor the perspective of personal morality often presuppose that the most 
important normative task for an account of racism is to capture the strong moral condemnation 
implied in ascriptions of racism to individuals and their beliefs, emotions, actions and the like. 
Following this assumption, these philosophers define racism in terms of what makes all instances 
of racism a severe moral wrong: disrespect (Glasgow 2009), inferiorization and antipathy (Blum 
2003), and vices like malevolence, injustice and moral disregard (Garcia 1996). Unlike advocates 
of personal morality, those who take the perspective of political morality do not take the fact of 
meriting strong moral condemnation to be the most important feature of racism. In fact, some 
defenders of the political view explicitly deny that all instances of racism are necessarily morally 
wrong (Shelby 2014, Mills 2003). Importantly, their point is not to trivialize the moral significance 
of racism, but rather to set the normativity of racism in the right context given their overarching 
philosophical interests. Those who favor political morality focus their interest on the deleterious 
effects of racism on social justice. In other words, they take the normative task of a philosophical 
account of racism to be a matter of clarifying the relation between racism and oppression, 
domination, and other forms of unjust social relations. 
Given this breakdown, it is easy to see why Shelby claims that the personal v. political 
morality dispute maps onto the individual v. structural racism dispute. Personal morality's focus 
on individual moral character and the ethics of interpersonal conduct invites a normative focus on 
individual racism, whereas political morality's focus on the justice of institutional arrangements 
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invites a normative focus on structural racism. However, it is important to remember—as Shelby 
himself points out—that the personal/political morality debate maps onto the individual/structural 
racism debate only to the extent that we understand the latter as a normative debate over whether 
the moral significance of racism lies primarily at the level of individuals or social structures. There 
is a separate explanatory (or descriptive) issue that divides proponents of individual racism and 
structural racism, which has to do with which kinds of causal mechanisms (individual/micro-level 
or structural/macro-level) best explain the origin and persistence of racial inequality.11 In this 
explanatory sense, the debate between the individual racism view and the structural racism view 
is orthogonal to that between personal and political morality. For instance, one could embrace the 
view that what matters most from the perspective of morality is individual moral character and the 
ethics of interpersonal conduct (i.e. personal morality), while simultaneously holding that the best 
explanation for durable racial inequality lies at the level of social structures (i.e. structural racism 
view). Pace Shelby, the personal v. political morality debate does not always map onto the 
individual v. structural racism debate. These come apart when the latter is understood as an 
explanatory rather than a normative debate. Thus, we should distinguish between two second-
order debates regarding the primary unit of analysis for first-order accounts of racism. First, there 
is a normative dispute over whether considerations of personal morality or political morality have 
taken precedence when assessing the moral implications of racism. Second, there is an explanatory 
dispute over whether individual racism or structural racism provides a better explanation for the 
durability of racial inequality. 
                                                 
11 Charles Mills, "Heart Attack: A Critique of Jorge Garcia's Volitional Conception of Racism," The Journal of Ethics 
7, no. 1 (2003): 59. Also see Alex Madva, "A Plea for Anti-Anti-Individualism: How Oversimple Psychology Misleads 
Social Policy," Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3, no. 27 (2016): 701-728.  
22 
 
The second-order normative dispute between personal morality and political morality is 
supposed to bear on all three of the first-order questions in the racism debate: 
1) What is racism?  
2) What makes racism morally objectionable? 
3) What is the appropriate practical response to racism? 
It is easy to see how the debate between personal and political morality bears on the 
normative question about what makes racism morally objectionable. To recap, that would be a 
matter of whether we prioritize individuals or social structures when assessing the morally 
troublesome features of racism. But how does this second-order normative dispute bear on the 
first-order debates over how to define racism and how respond to it appropriately? Without going 
into too much detail, the dispute between personal and political morality bears on the "what is 
racism?" question insofar as the moral wrongness (or at least, the moral significance) of racism is 
often taken as key for defining the concept. Thus, one's position on whether the most salient 
morally wrongful features of racism take place at the level of individuals or at the level of social 
structures will have implications for how one defines the concept. Finally, one's stance on the 
personal morality v. political morality dispute may have effects on the kinds of political activism 
and individual responses to racial oppression one regards as justified. For instance, if we take 
personal morality to be of utmost importance, we may be inclined to regard certain forms of 
political resistance to racism, such as disrupting public events or vandalizing racist monuments, as 
unjustified because they breach norms of interpersonal conduct. However, we may come to see 
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these practical responses to racism as potentially appropriate once we adopt a political morality 
perspective that highlights how our society has failed to secure just social relations.12  
Having shown that Shelby's second meta-theoretical debate should be divided into two 
separate (one normative, the other explanatory) debates, I am now in a position to state my views 
on both debates. Insofar as my project takes up normative issues, I embrace the perspective of 
political morality. The focus of my normative concerns lies on how racism (and structural racism 
more specifically) contributes to unjust social relations, such as oppression and domination. 
However, this dissertation does not focus on normative issues. Since my ameliorative project aims 
at developing a better understanding of the workings of racial oppression, the emphasis of my 
account of structural racism will be on explanatory issues. Regarding this explanatory second-
order debate, I embrace the structural racism view as the better framework for explaining the 
durability of racial inequality. As I show in later chapters, racially oppressive social structures play 
a crucial role in the maintenance of racial inequality. However, I do not deny the importance of 
individualist explanations of durable racial inequality. As I go on to show, a full-fledged structural 
explanation of the mechanisms of racial inequality requires an understanding of the interaction 
between individuals and social structures. At its best, a structural racism explanation of durable 
racial inequality must bring together explanatory factors at the macro-level (e.g. social structures) 
and micro-level (e.g. individuals).13 
To recap, there are three second-order debates in the philosophical literature on racism that 
bear on my first-order project of defining the concept of structural racism. First, there is a debate 
                                                 
12 Shelby undertakes this normative project in Dark Ghettos: Injustice, Dissent and Reform (Cambridge: Belknap 
Press, 2016).  
13 See Lawrence Bobo, "Reclaiming a Du Boisian Perspective on Racial Attitudes," The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 568, no. 1 (2000): 186-202.   
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over how to assess the correctness and superiority of competing first-order accounts. Regarding 
this question, I advanced a pluralistic stance, according to which the success of any given account 
of racism (or in my case, structural racism) depends on whether the account adequately addresses 
the particular interests and aims of the theorist. In addition, I clarified that my interest in answering 
the "what is structural racism?" question stems from an ameliorative project driven by anti-racist 
considerations. The goal of my project is to develop an account of structural racism that contributes 
to a better understanding of the mechanisms behind the reproduction of racial inequality. In 
particular, my goal is to show that structural racism (the phenomenon, not the concept) plays a key 
explanatory role in the reproduction of racial inequality in racialized societies, such as the United 
States. The second meta-theoretical debate is a normative dispute over whether considerations of 
personal morality or political morality taken precedence when assessing the moral implications of 
racism. On this question, I take the perspective of political morality. Finally, the third meta-
theoretical debate is an explanatory dispute over whether individual racism or structural racism 
provides a better explanation for the durability of racial inequality. On this question, I favor a 
structural racism framework, with the caveat that a full-fledged structural racism explanation of 
durable racial inequality must incorporate individual-level explanations. I address the explanatory 
issues raised by this meta-theoretical debate in chapter 6.  
Having clarified the nature of my intervention in the philosophical debate on racism, I now 
turn to developing the conceptual tools required to unpack my definition of structural racism in 
terms of racially oppressive social structures. This definition has three main components, which I 
clarify in turn. First, structural racism refers to a subset of social structures. In chapter 2, I develop 
an account of social structure as networks of social relations that are recursively reproduced by 
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individual agents through their participation in social practices. Second, structural racism refers to 
a subset of oppressive social structures. 
Thus, I clarify the concept of oppression in chapter 3. As I go on to argue, one sense in 
which social structures "structure" the lives of agents is by arranging them in patterned social 
relations. I refer to social structures as oppressive when they "structure" (i.e. arrange) social groups 
in oppressive social relations. In my view, oppressive social structures reliably organize social 
groups in patterned social relations whereby some group (or groups) suffers from an unjustly 
inflicted harm, while another group (or groups) benefits from the same harm. Third, structural 
racism refers to racially oppressive social structures. Thus, I must show what distinguishes 
structural racism from other kinds of oppressive social structures. Armed with the concepts of 
social structure and oppression that I develop in chapters 2 and 3, I discuss the distinctly racial 
features of structural racism in chapter 4. At that point, I will be in a position to give a full-fledged 




Chapter 2: What are Social Structures? 
The concept of social structure is both central to social philosophy and extremely difficult 
to pin down. There are several competing accounts of social structure in the literature and no clear 
indication of a consensus within reach. In fact, much of the conceptual confusion surrounding the 
concept of structural racism stems from the social structure concept itself. However, the account 
of social structure I develop here is not meant to solve long-lasting disputes between holism, 
practice theory, and other competing theories of social structure. Rather, my guiding aim is to 
elaborate a working account of social structure that can help me unpack my definition of structural 
racism as racially oppressive social structures. Moreover, since I take structural racism to explain 
the durability of racial inequality, my working account of social structure must also clarify the 
ways in which social structures feature in social explanation.  
I define social structures as networks of social relations that are recursively reproduced by 
individual agents through their participation in social practices. I arrive at this definition via a 
critical engagement with the work of Sally Haslanger. I have three reasons for using Haslanger's 
work on social structure as an anchor point. First, she brackets the theoretical minutiae of the social 
structure debate for the sake of developing a theory of social structure that can shed light on 
structural oppression. This approach is compatible with my guiding aim of developing a theory of 
social structure that contributes to our understanding of structural racism, rather than getting 
bogged down in the intricacies of the social structure debate.  
Second, although she does not immerse herself in the social structure debate, her work 
replicates the divide between two important frameworks for theorizing social structure—holism 
and practice theory. In fact, Haslanger advances two distinct theories of social structure, which 
correspond to the aforementioned traditions in the social structure debate. However, Haslanger has 
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yet to unify her two theories of social structures into a comprehensive account. Starting from 
Haslanger's disjunctive account of social structure will allow me to discuss the key features of both 
traditions and to offer my proposal for bringing them together.   
My third reason for engaging with Haslanger's work is that she highlights the role that 
social structures play in social explanation. Clarifying the link between social structure and social 
explanation is crucial because, as I argue in later chapters, the distinctive theoretical contribution 
of the concept of structural racism is its role in explaining the durability of racial inequality in the 
U.S. and other racialized societies. While I disagree with Haslanger's particular views on this point, 
I find her framing helpful for introducing my own views on the matter. To put it simply, while 
Haslanger argues that social structures feature in social explanation by constraining the agency of 
individuals, I claim that a complete account of the explanatory role of social structures must also 
consider the ways in which they enable and motivate individual agency. In particular, the idea that 
social structures motivate individual agents to act (or fail to act) in certain ways is crucial for 
properly theorizing structural racism and its role in reproducing durable racial inequality. 
In developing my working account of social structure, I will make constant reference to a 
specific example of a social structure—namely, a school. I adopt this strategy for two reasons. 
First, I aim to complement the inevitable theoretical abstractness of discussing the concept of social 
structure with a concrete description of the phenomena to which the concept refers. Second, 
theorizing a school as a social structure will prove helpful for future chapters, where I will focus 
on structural racism taking place in the realm of education.   
2.1. The Holist Conception of Social Structure 
According to Haslanger, social structures are networks of social relations. This includes 
relations between people and relations to material things. For instance, a school is a social structure 
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made up of a network of social relations between teachers, administrators, custodians, students, 
parents and so on. In addition, a school structure includes the relations between the aforementioned 
agents and the material world (e.g. students reading textbooks, a chemistry teacher using lab 
materials to explain a concept). This definition of social structure follows a longstanding tradition 
in social theory of describing social structures as complex wholes made of interconnected parts.14 
This holist conception of social structure relies on the analogy of society with biological 
organisms, which dates back at least to Plato and whose modern iteration can be traced to 19th-
century sociologists like Comte, Spencer, and Durkheim. According to the holist tradition, human 
societies—as well as other social structures, such as the U.S. health care system, corporations or 
schools—have a general structure similar to that of biological organisms. Most importantly for our 
purposes, social structures—like biological organisms—are wholes whose normal functioning 
relies on its parts relating to one another in relatively stable ways. 
A common way to develop the holist conception today is to theorize the parts that make up 
the structural whole as nodes standing in complex relations to other nodes in a network. In the case 
of social (as opposed to biological) structures, nodes are often theorized in terms of social 
positions. To go back to my guiding example, a school qua social structure is a complex whole 
made up of social positions (i.e. nodes) standing in complex relations to one another. The social 
positions of 'parent', 'teacher', 'administrator', 'custodian' and 'student' are the nodes, and the whole 
network of relations among them (e.g. student-to-teacher, parent-to-teacher, teacher-to-
administrator) constitutes the school as a social structure. In addition, each social position stands 
in particular relations to material resources that contribute to the proper functioning of the social 
structure. For instance, students and teachers make use of school facilities, such as furniture, 
                                                 
14 Sally Haslanger, "What is a (Social) Structural Explanation?," Philosophical Studies 173, no. 1 (2016): 118.  
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supplies, and equipment, on a day-to-day basis. Custodians clean and maintain these facilities to 
ensure the seamless functioning of the school structure. If social structures are networks of social 
relations, these include relations among social positions, as well as relations between social 
positions and material resources.   
In addition, there are rules, duties and prerogatives associated with each social position in 
the social structure. Among other things, the social position of 'teacher' entails a duty to submit 
students' grades to school administrators, a prerogative to discipline 'students', as well as rules that 
govern the application of that prerogative (e.g. corporal punishment is not an acceptable form of 
disciplining). As this example makes clear, it is impossible to describe the rules, duties and 
prerogatives associated with each position in the structure without making reference to the whole 
network of social relations. Being a teacher in a school structure is to occupy a social position 
whose rules, duties and prerogatives stem from the network of social relations among teachers, 
students, administrators, custodians, parents and the school's material resources.  
It is important to distinguish between the social positions in the structure and the 
individuals who occupy such positions. Individuals may partake in different social structures and 
therefore occupy several social positions. The person that occupies the position of 'parent' in their 
family, may also occupy the position of 'administrator' in a school, and the position of 'goalkeeper' 
in their amateur soccer team. Moreover, the rules, duties and prerogatives associated with a social 
position do not necessarily attach to individuals apart from their occupying the position in question. 
While an individual may have the authority to discipline others qua schoolteacher, they probably 
will not have the same prerogative qua goalkeeper of their amateur soccer team. Thus, when we 
speak of social structures as complex wholes made of interrelated parts, the parts in question are 
social positions, not the individuals who happen to occupy the position at any given time. To return 
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to our running example, Mark, a substitute teacher, literally acts as a stand-in for Ricardo, the 
regular teacher, when the latter is unable to enact the social position of the schoolteacher. In 
principle, whether Mark or Ricardo occupy the node of 'teacher' on any given day does not matter 
for the normal functioning of the school structure as long as they observe the rules, duties and 
prerogatives associated with the social position. To sum up the holist view, social structures are 
complex wholes consisting of a network of social positions standing in relatively stable relations 
to one another and to material resources. Or, to go back to Haslanger's definition, social structures 
are networks of social relations.    
2.2. The Practice Theory Conception of Social Structure 
 Haslanger offers an alternative definition of social structures—namely as networks of 
interdependent social practices.15 Even though she does not make it explicit, this alternative 
account of social structure stems from a different tradition of structuralist thinking; one that 
emphasizes the interdependence between structure, culture, and agency. While Anthony Giddens' 
structuration theory is the starting point of this 'practice theory' approach to social structures, 
Haslanger draws most explicitly on the work of William Sewell—albeit with some revisions. 
Following Sewell, Haslanger defines social practices as interdependent schemas and resources 
when they mutually imply and sustain each other over time.16 Building on this account of social 
practice, Haslanger defines social structures as networks of interdependent social practices. In 
order to unpack Haslanger's second account of social structure, I must first clarify the concepts of 
'schema', 'resource' and 'social practice'.   
                                                 
15 Sally Haslanger, "What is a Social Practice?," Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82 (2018): 246, fn. 41.  
16 Sally Haslanger, Critical Theory and Social Practice (Amsterdam: Koninklijke Van Gorcum, 2017), 21.  
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Haslanger defines schemas as “clusters of culturally shared mental states and processes, 
including concepts, attitudes, dispositions and such, that enable us to interpret and organize 
information and coordinate action, thought and affect.”17 On a psychologistic reading of this 
definition, schemas refer to the psychological states of individuals that form the basis of our 
interaction with the world via cognitive, affective and behavioral dispositions. One example of 
such psychological schemas is our association of sharks with danger, as well as the mental states 
and processes that stem from that association. If we are swimming in open water and we spot a 
triangular object, we will tend to associate it with a shark fin and hence, with danger. Here, the 
schema is the psychological association [triangular object in open water  danger]. This 
psychological association guides our interaction with the world in many ways. Among other 
things, it elicits an affective reaction (i.e. fear), a cognitive reaction (i.e. the belief "I am in 
danger!"), and a concomitant behavioral reaction (i.e. fleeing). Psychological schemas inform how 
we interpret the world and how we respond to it.  
Importantly, not all psychological schemas are explicitly or consciously held. Research on 
implicit bias shows that humans make psychological associations and act on them without 
conscious awareness—perhaps even in an automatic fashion. As the Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) shows, white people tend to associate black people with criminality. This association elicits 
affective (e.g. fear) and behavioral (e.g. avoidance, alertness) reactions even if they don't explicitly 
hold the belief "black people are dangerous". Thus, psychological schemas can (and in fact, often 
do) guide people's interpretation of and interaction with the world without their conscious 
awareness.  
                                                 
17 Ibid.  
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While this psychological interpretation offers a helpful explanation of how schemas guide 
the behavior of social agents, the schemas that partially make up social practices are not reducible 
to mental states and processes, whether explicit or implicit. In addition to psychological schemas, 
there are cultural schemas at the level of the social environment. Cultural schemas include shared 
social meanings, conceptual repertoires and symbolic resources. One way to spell out the relation 
between psychological schemas and cultural schemas is to think of the former as an instantiation 
of the latter at the level of individual psychology. For example, cultural schemas about blackness 
in the U.S. include narratives, media representations, and social imaginaries that associate black 
people with criminality. These cultural schemas at the level of the social environment trickle down 
to individuals in the form of psychological associations between black people and criminality, 
which then guide their interpretation of and interaction with black people.   
Resources refer to “things of all sorts—human, nonhuman, animate or not—that are taken 
to have some (positive or negative) value (practical, moral, aesthetic, religious, etc.).”18 For 
Haslanger, something is a resource to the extent that participants in a social practice interpret it as 
having (positive or negative) value. The value assigned to a resource varies according to the 
practice in question. For instance, in the context of the practice of agriculture, a grasshopper may 
be seen as a negative resource (i.e. a pest), but in a culinary context, it may be seen as a positive 
resource (i.e. a delicacy). The example above shows how resources are constitutively and causally 
dependent on schemas; grasshoppers are only interpreted as a (positive) resource to the extent that 
agents operate with culinary schemas. Moreover, the stable production of grasshoppers as a 
culinary delicacy causally depends on the existence of culinary schemas that frame them as a 
valuable resource in a market economy. This causal and constitutive dependence goes both ways. 
                                                 
18 Haslanger, Critical Theory and Practice, 22.  
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As Sewell argues, “resources are embodiments of schemas [and] therefore inculcate and justify 
the schemas as well”.19 The recurring presence of grasshoppers in high-end cuisine influence 
participants in that practice to adopt the psychological schema or association [grasshopper  
delicacy]. To recap, Haslanger offers a second account of social structure as networks of social 
practices, which she defines as sets of interdependent schemas and resources. 
2.3. Some Clarifying Remarks on the Practice Theory Tradition 
Earlier I argued that the practice theory tradition emphasizes the interdependence between 
structure, culture and agency. I am now in a position to substantiate this claim. In this view, social 
structures are "relatively stable frameworks for social agency" that are at the same time the 
"product of coordinated behavior".20 Social structures make it possible for large groups of 
individuals to coordinate their behavior by means of social practices. How do social practices 
contribute to human coordination? The answer lies in an important (if sometimes 
underemphasized) tenet of the practice theory tradition; namely, that social practices can enable 
human coordination because they are embodied in individual agents. That Haslanger thinks of 
social practices as embodied in individuals is clear from the following quote:  
"Social practices are patterns of learned behavior that enable us […] to coordinate as members of a 
group in creating, distributing, managing, maintaining and eliminating a resource […] due to 
mutual responsiveness to each other's behavior and the resource[s] in question, as interpreted 
through shared meanings/cultural schemas."21   
                                                 
19 William H. Sewell, Jr., "A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation," American Journal of 
Sociology 98, no. 1 (1992): 13. 
20 Haslanger, "Social Practice," 246. 
21 Ibid., 245.  
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Social structures, qua networks of social practices, enable human coordination over the 
management of collective resources because the schemas that guide our interpretation and 
interaction with those resources are embodied in us in the form of patterns of learned behavior and 
dispositions. It is because similar schemas guide our behavior, that we can coordinate our action 
in a relatively stable way. In other words, culture—which Haslanger sometimes refers to as shared 
meanings, cultural schemas, or techne—is the embodied feature of social structures (and social 
practices, in particular) that enables large groups of individual agents to coordinate their 
behavior.22   
 But how does culture become embodied in individual agents as patterns of learned behavior 
and dispositions? The precise mechanism whereby culture influences individual behavior is a 
matter of contention among practice theorists. Earlier, I provided one explanatory account 
influenced by implicit bias research. In that story, exposure to anti-black cultural schemas (e.g. 
media representations, popular narratives, social imaginaries) leads individuals to adopt anti-black 
implicit (and sometimes explicit) attitudes, which in turn elicit racially discriminatory behavior.   
A potentially complementary explanation of how culture becomes embodied in individual 
agents emphasizes the role of rules. As I discussed earlier, there are rules, duties and prerogatives 
that attach to each social position in a structural whole. We may think of cultural schemas as rules 
that regulate the behavior of agents occupying particular social positions. In fact, in Giddens' 
original formulation, social structures consist of rules and resources. It was Sewell who revised 
the theory in terms of schemas and resources. These rules need not be formally stated prescriptions. 
They may also include informal precepts, as well as unspoken and taken-for-granted assumptions 
                                                 
22 Anthony Greenwald and Linda Krieger, "Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations," California Law Review 94 (July 
2006): 945-967.  
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about how socially positioned agents ought to behave. In this view, individuals absorb culture 
through their adoption of the rules that regulate the network of social practices in which they are 
enmeshed. Since the rules are not always formally stated (in fact, they seldom are), social 
coordination relies on socially positioned agents' tacit knowledge of the rules and the routinized 
character of social life.23 It through their day-to-day participation in social practices that agents 
acquire tacit (and sometimes explicit) knowledge of the rules and patterns of behavior associated 
with their social position, and become disposed (as if out of habit) to follow them.  
To return to our running example, a school is a social structure that organizes the collective 
action of students, teachers, custodians, parents and administrators in a relatively stable way. 
Students attend classes, study and take exams. Teachers prepare lessons, teach, discipline students, 
and attend parent-student conferences. Administrators schedule classes, process teacher payrolls 
and student tuition payments, and so on. The amount of social coordination that is required for a 
school to function normally cannot be overstated. Qua social structure, a school is a network of 
interconnected social practices, which include the practice of classroom learning, the practice of 
disciplining students, the practice of organizing class schedules, among others. To simplify our 
analysis, let us focus on the practice of classroom learning.  
In this social practice, there are a few features of social coordination that often remain 
unnoticed, but which are nevertheless crucial for a class to take place at all. Students must be 
responsive to the teacher's instructions. The teacher must be able to enforce some degree of 
authority to enforce their instructions. Even if not all students are paying attention, there must be 
a minimum degree of orderliness and quietness for a class to take place at all. The normal 
                                                 
23 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1986).  
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functioning of the class depends on teachers and students reliably following these unspoken and 
taken-for-granted rules.    
But what ensures that students and teachers who participate in the classroom coordinate 
their actions such that these minimum requirements are reliably met?  The answer lies in the 
patterns of learned behavior and dispositions that the social practice of classroom learning 
inculcates in its participants. As a result of participating in this social practice, students and 
teachers come to adopt similar cultural schemas, which help them in coordinating their behavior 
so as to create a functional classroom. Thus, students who are acquainted with the practice of 
classroom learning will be disposed to follow the teacher's instructions and to contribute to 
maintaining a minimum level of orderliness and quietness.24 By continuously participating in the 
practice of classroom learning, students come to interiorize these rules (e.g. sitting at their desks 
upon entering the classroom, obeying the teacher's instructors, keeping quiet during lectures) as 
psychological schemas that guide their behavior and interactions with other participants and 
material resources in the practice. It is these schemas, qua instilled patterns of learned behavior 
and dispositions to act them out, that reliably ensure that a classroom with dozens of students 
attains the degree of coordinated agency necessary for the practice of classroom learning to be 
possible at all.   
While social structures enable coordinated human agency via embodied cultural schemas, 
the relation of dependence also goes the other way around. Social structures are recursively 
constituted by the repeated coordinated behavior of individuals acting in accordance with the 
                                                 
24 The fact that these patterns of learned behavior are inculcated by the social practice of classroom learning becomes 
evident when we consider how students from non-traditional backgrounds find it difficult to act according to these 
expected patterns of action, and are therefore regarded as "disruptive" to the classroom. Certainly, from the perspective 
of those already involved in the practice, they do disrupt what is otherwise a seamless (but also impressive) social 
coordination effort. However, as I show later on, racist cultural schemas may also influence teachers' perceptions of 
what counts as "disruptive behavior".   
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structure's cultural schemas. This is the central idea in Anthony Gidden's theory of social structure, 
which he describes as the duality of structure. Put simply, the duality of structure points to the fact 
that social structure is both the precondition and the outcome of collective human agency. It is the 
precondition insofar as embodied cultural schemas (which are one feature of social structures and 
social practices) enable coordinated human action, but social structure is also the recursive 
outcome of human agency insofar as individual agents constantly reproduce the structure by 
organizing their behavior in accordance with the structure's schemas. Giddens' notion of 
recursivity aims to capture the fact that social structures are constantly being reproduced by the 
repeated coordinated behavior of individual agents guided by cultural schemas. Thus, social 
structures are part of a recursive—that is, a constantly repeated—process whereby individual 
agents rely on a structure's cultural schemas to organize their action with respect to resources, 
while simultaneously reproducing that very social structure that "structures" their action. As 
mentioned earlier, students and teachers rely on embodied cultural schemas to coordinate their 
collective action in the classroom. By the same token, when students and teachers employ these 
schemas as guiding frames for their behavior in the classroom, they further entrench those very 
schemas as informal and taken-for-granted rules of the practice. By participating in the practice of 
classroom learning and following its cultural schemas, students and teachers effectively reproduce 
the practice, as well as reinforce the schemas that make it possible. While this example corresponds 
to the social practice of classroom learning, we can understand the recursivity of a school structure 
as a whole in a similar way. As a network of interrelated social practices, a school's functioning 
requires even more complex coordination of human agency. Still, cultural schemas help students, 
teachers, parents, administrators, and custodians who participate in the network of social practices 
that constitute the school structure to coordinate their actions accordingly. In addition to classroom 
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cultural schemas, there are cultural schemas that guide agent's behavior in parent-teacher 
conferences, disciplining practices, class scheduling, school recesses, among other social practices 
that jointly constitute the school as a social structure.  
 Of course, social structures are not only embodied in individual agents; they are also 
embodied in the material world. After all, social structures allow agents to coordinate their 
behavior with respect to resources, which includes material resources. As such, social structures 
are not just frameworks for collective agency—they also have a material reality.25 To return to our 
running example, a school structure includes buildings and learning facilities, recreational spaces, 
books, teachers, among other material resources. Cultural schemas not only guide school agents 
in their interaction with other participants in the structure, they also impact how they interact with 
the material resources of the school structure. Some of the schemas that govern students' behavior 
in the classroom are explicitly linked to the classroom's material resources.26 For example, think 
of students' disposition to sit at their desks (as opposed to sitting on the floor, or standing up) upon 
entering the classroom; or their tendency to face the teacher and/or blackboard during class.   
Importantly, social structures (and cultural schemas, in particular) may lead agents to 
manage resources in ways that lead to alarming inequalities, not only within the structure in 
question but also across multiple structures. It is well-known that the U.S. educational system 
allocates—and here it is crucial to remember that the structure is only able to "act" through our 
recursive collective agency—resources in ways that lead to alarming inequalities between white, 
and black and Latinx students with respect to grades, dropout rates, and college completion rates. 
                                                 
25 Haslanger, "Social Practice," 246.  
26 Notice that here I am counting teachers as a material resource that contributes to the school structure's goal of 
educating students. In this sense, teachers may be considered akin to books and learning facilities, in that they are 
resources that the school structure relies on to fulfill its educational goal. 
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While problematic in itself, this so-called racial achievement gap in education also has a significant 
impact on other social structures, such as the U.S. labor market and the criminal justice system. 
The racial disparity in educational attainment puts black and Latinx people at a disadvantage in a 
highly competitive U.S. labor market and contributes to high unemployment and 
underemployment rates among these groups. As a result, cash-strapped Latinx and black people in 
the U.S. are at an increased risk of getting involved with the criminal justice system—a problem 
compounded by various racist dynamics within this social structure, such as racial disparities in 
policing, arrests and sentencing.27 I will have more to say about the U.S. education system and the 
racial achievement gap in future chapters. For now, I will tie up the remaining loose ends in my 
account of social structure.  
With that in mind, I want to clarify my mention of the U.S. educational system as a social 
structure. So far, I have illustrated my account of social structure with reference to a school. By 
contrast, the U.S. educational system is a much more complex social structure that encompasses 
all K-12 schools, technical schools and universities across the country. It also includes several 
governmental and non-governmental organizations at the local and national level that operate in 
the education sector (e.g. the US department of education, the Barnard Contingent Faculty union). 
Still, both the school that I have been describing so far, as well as the U.S. educational system are 
examples of social structure. This is because social structures exist at various scales of social reality 
(e.g. global, national, sub-national level, and even local).28 The school structure that I have been 
describing so far is an example of a social structure at a local scale. By contrast, the U.S. education 
                                                 
27 In addition, the school-to-prison pipeline exacerbates the risk of black students to become involved in the criminal 
justice system by setting up school practices that disproportionately target black students for discipline, punishment 
and police intervention.   
28 Moon-Kie Jung, Beneath the Surface of White Supremacy: Denaturalizing U.S. Racisms Past and Present (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2015), 35.  
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system is a social structure at a sub-national scale. Further examples of social structures at a sub-
national scale include the aforementioned U.S. labor market and the US criminal justice system. I 
will not dwell on what I take to be the boundaries between global, national, sub-national and local 
scales of social structure. The key point is that social structures exist at varying degrees of social 
complexity. Therefore, it is equally reasonable to conceptualize a local school and the global 
financial system as social structures. Of course, the more complex the structure, the more difficult 
it is to lay out the network of social relations that constitute it. Still, just like the local schools that 
partially comprise it, the U.S. educational system is also a network of social relations among 
teachers, students, custodians, parents, administrators, as well as the material resources that agents 
occupying these social positions employ in order to advance the structure's educational goal.29  For 
the sake of clarity, I will continue to illustrate my account of social structure with reference to a 
relatively simple local school structure. The reader should keep in mind, however, that it is possible 
to analyze social structures of a larger scale with the same theoretical framework.     
2.4. A Working Account of Social Structure: Bringing Together the Two 
Traditions 
Earlier, I praised Haslanger's analytical reconstruction of two important traditions for 
thinking about social structure—holism and practice theory. However, Haslanger's work on social 
structure remains as fragmented as the two traditions that she draws on. Up to this point, I have 
discussed her two accounts of social structures—one in terms of networks of social relations, the 
other in terms of networks of social practices—separately. But how do these two seemingly 
                                                 
29 Given its complexity, we should probably also add politicians, investors, and philanthropists (among others) to the 
list of social positions that make up the U.S. educational system. Of course, educating the citizenry is not the goal of 
all agents who occupy social positions in the U.S. educational system. Politicians aim to earn votes for upcoming 
elections, and investors in for-profit schools aim to get returns on their investments.   
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competing definitions come together into an internally coherent account of social structure? After 
all, these two definitions of social structure correspond to two sides of a protracted debate between 
the organicist tradition—which emphasizes social relations—and the practice theory tradition—
which emphasizes the interaction between social structure, culture and agency. While Haslanger 
offers a helpful reconstruction of both traditions, she does not give a direct answer as to how to 
merge them into a unified account. However, she does leave a helpful hint—namely, to 
conceptualize social practices as constituting social relations.30    
In my view, it is through their participation in social practices that individual agents relate 
to each other and to material resources so as to constitute the network of social relations that is 
social structure. In other words, social practices situate individual agents as nodes in the networks 
of social relations that make up social structures. If social structures are networks of social relations 
among socially positioned agents and the material world, social practices (and cultural schemas in 
particular) are the means through which agents enmesh themselves in these social relations.  
 In addition, social practices contribute to the stability of the social relations that make up 
the social structure. Social structures (and social relations) are relatively stable because they are 
embodied in individual agents as patterns of learned behavior that enable them to coordinate their 
collective action with respect to the structure's resources—in other words, because of our 
involvement in social practices. Agents tend to follow the rules, duties and prerogatives associated 
with their social position in the network of social relations because the structure's cultural schemas 
motivate them to coordinate their behavior in that way. Furthermore, social practices themselves 
are relatively stable because of the aforementioned looping effects between schemas and resources. 
                                                 
30 Haslanger, "Structural Explanation", 125. 
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To recap, social structures are networks of social relations. Social relations situate 
individual agents as occupants of social positions that stand in particular relations to one another 
and to the structure's resources. Social structures, qua networks of social practices, are relatively 
stable because the cultural schemas that partially constitute them become embodied in individual 
agents—whether it be via implicit and explicit psychological attitudes, or via rule-following. 
Cultural schemas guide socially positioned agents' relations to one another and to the structure's 
resources. Together, schemas and resources make up social practices. It is through their 
participation in (i.e. acting in accordance with the schemas of) social practices that individual 
agents reproduce the networks of social relations that make up social structures. In short, social 
structures are networks of social relations that are recursively reproduced by individual agents 
through their participation in social practices. I arrived at this working account of social structure 
by synthesizing the two strains of Haslanger's work on social structure. However, where I part 
ways with Haslanger is in how we conceive of the explanatory power of social structures.  
2.5. What Role do Social Structures Play in Social Explanation? 
Haslanger's account of social structure not only seeks to describe what social structures are. 
It also aims to clarify the role that social structures play in social explanation. For Haslanger, the 
distinctive explanatory role of social structures is that they impose social constraints on our 
action.31 In this respect, Haslanger follows other philosophers who theorize the effects of social 
structures on agents in terms of agential constraints. In particular, Haslanger argues that social 
structures constrain the agency of individuals by altering their choice architecture. This account 
presupposes a rational choice model of individual behavior, and theorizes social structures as 
constraining an individual's choices by altering the expected utility of the strategies available to 
                                                 
31 Ibid.  
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them. Haslanger—following Susan Moller Okin and Ann Cudd—illustrates this point with the 
case of Lisa, a woman who is effectively forced (from the perspective of a utility-maximizing 
agent) to quit her job after having a baby. Sexist social structures—such as the labor market, the 
caregiving system, the corporation she works for, and the heteropatriarchy more generally—make 
Lisa's other options less attractive or even outright unavailable (e.g. having her male partner quit 
his job instead, leaving the baby in daycare). For instance, faced with the need to procure 
caregiving for the baby, Lisa could take maternity leave. However, like 88% of U.S. women, Lisa 
would have to forego her salary for the duration of her leave.32 Moreover, since the U.S. 
government only guarantees 12 weeks of unpaid maternity leave, the solution would only be 
temporary. This option becomes even less attractive once she factors in the negative impact it 
would have on her career advancement prospects. Given that sexist social structures limit the 
options available, Lisa finds herself in a situation where the most rational (i.e. utility-maximizing) 
decision is to quit her job after having a baby.  
Not all accounts of structural constraint presuppose a rational model of the actor, however. 
Amie Thomasson argues that social structures can also constrain the behavior of individuals by 
means of social norms. According to Thomasson, social norms can guide the behavior of socially 
positioned agents by channeling the ways in which they navigate the social world. Social norms 
not only inform which options we are inclined to pursue, but they also affect which options show 
up to us as "live options" for pursuing, and which options are not noticed at all.33 This filtering of 
options often happens in ways that are not consciously chosen or even acknowledged by the agents 
                                                 
32 Rebecca Traister, "Why Women Can't Break Free from the Parent Trap," New Republic, February 2, 2015, 
https://newrepublic.com/article/120939/maternity-leave-policies-america-hurt-working-moms.  
33 Amie Thomasson, "Structural Explanation and Norms: Comments on Haslanger," Philosophical Studies 173, no. 1 
(2016): 137.  
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themselves. Thus, social norms and habits of perception and engagement with the world can 
structurally constrain the behavior of individuals whether or not individuals operate according to 
the rational model of the actor. In fact, Thomasson's discussion of social norms is reminiscent of 
the action-guiding rules that I discussed earlier, and is perfectly compatible with my working 
account of social structure. 
Less discussed in the philosophical literature is the way in which social structures influence 
the agency of individuals by enabling them to act in particular ways. To the extent that individuals 
partake in social structures, they occupy a particular position in the structure's network of social 
relations. As I mentioned earlier, there are roles, duties and prerogatives that attach to social 
positions in a social structure. Social structures enable individual agency insofar as they make it 
possible for socially positioned agents to perform certain roles and to have certain prerogatives. In 
other words, social structures open possibilities for action for individuals, which they would not 
have outside of the social relations that make up the structure. For instance, a university is a social 
structure that enables those socially positioned as professors to perform certain actions that are not 
available to those outside the structure. The university structure enables professors to give lectures, 
hold office hours, assign coursework to their students, etc. The university structure also gives 
professors access to certain prerogatives and powers. Professors have the prerogative of assigning 
grades to their students. They also have some degree of authority over their students within the 
context of the university structure. As a result, professors stand in an asymmetrical power relation 
with respect to their students—a position they would not occupy were it not for the university 
structure. This example illustrates how social structures do not merely constrain the agency of 
those who participate in them, but also open new possibilities for action. In short, social structures 
also enable human agency.  
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If the idea that social structures enable human agency is rarely discussed in the 
philosophical literature on social structure, the claim that social structures motivate individual 
behavior is absent altogether. Here, it helps to contrast structural constraint with structural 
motivation. While structural constraints make certain options unavailable or less desirable, 
structural motivation leads socially positioned agents towards specific ways of acting. In some 
instances, these structural effects on agency are really two sides of the same coin. To go back to 
Lisa's case, it is because sexist structures constrained her other options that she was rationally 
motivated to quit her job after having a baby. In this case, the structural motivation to quit her job 
after having a baby is the result of a rational decision-making process in which sexist social 
structures effectively foreclosed her other options for action (e.g. lack of affordable daycare in her 
community).  
In some cases, however, social structures can motivate individuals to take a particular 
course of action even if other options for action remain easily available. In such cases, structural 
motivation is not reducible to structural constraint as in Lisa's case. In fact, these cases of structural 
motivation constitute a distinct way in which social structures influence human agency. There are 
several mechanisms whereby social structures can motivate individual agents. In this dissertation, 
I focus on structural motivation that stems from the interests that attach to agents' social positions. 
Thus, a foundational thesis of this dissertation is that agents who occupy a privileged position in 
an oppressive social structure are structurally motivated to act in ways that sustain their 
advantages. Agents who benefit from oppressive social structures acquire an interest in 
safeguarding those privileges, as well as the structures that bring them about. I refer to interests of 
this kind as positional interests because they attach primarily to privileged social positions in 
oppressive social structures, and only attach to individual agents insofar as they occupy such 
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positions. These positional interests motivate privileged agents to act (or fail to act) in ways that 
sustain oppressive structures, even if such agents are not constrained by the structure and could act 
otherwise.34    
I have now discussed three ways in which social structures influence the behavior of 
individual agents. Social structures exert their influence on individuals by constraining, enabling 
and motivating their agency. These effects of social structure on individual agency constitute the 
explanatory power of social structures. Whereas Haslanger limits her account of the explanatory 
power of social structures to structural constraint, I argue that a full-fledged account of the role 
that social structures play in social explanation must also consider how they enable and motivate 
individual agency.  
This expanded account of the explanatory power of social structures turns out to be crucial 
for my analysis of structural racism. As I claimed earlier, the distinctive contribution of the concept 
of structural racism for racial theorizing is that it helps to explain durable racial inequality in 
racialized societies like the United States. As I go on to argue in later chapters, a key causal 
mechanism whereby structural racism (i.e. racially oppressive social structures) contributes to the 
durability of racial inequality is by motivating agents who benefit from such inequality to act (or 
fail to act) in ways that sustain it. This feature of structural racism remains hidden if we only think 
in terms of structural constraints, as Haslanger seems to do. Instead, we must take seriously the 
idea that racial inequality is largely sustained by the actions (and omissions) of individual agents 
motivated to sustain their race-based privileges, which depend on the maintenance of the racial 
status quo. In future chapters, I substantiate these claims by drawing on empirical and theoretical 
                                                 
34 I develop my account of positional interests in chapter 6. 
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research in the social sciences. In addition, I expand on my account of the role of social structures 
and positional interests in social explanation.  
Here, my aim was to introduce an important difference between my working account of 
social structure and Haslanger's—namely, the idea that social structures not only constrain, but 
also enable and motivate individual agency. In addition, I developed a working account of social 
structure that brings together the key insights from the organicist and practice theory traditions. In 
this view, social structures are networks of social relations that are recursively reproduced by 
individual agents through their participation in social practices. Individual agents recursively 
constitute social structures through their collective action. At the same time, their collective action 
is influenced by those very social structures. Social structures are not mere epiphenomena of 
human activity; they also have the power to influence that activity by constraining, enabling and 
motivating human agency. As Marx wrote in The Eighteenth Brumaire, "men make their own 
history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected 
circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past".35 
Social structures are a human creation, but they also partially constitute the social circumstances 
within which humans exercise their agency. With this working account of social structure in place, 
I can now continue to spell out my theory of structural racism as racially oppressive social 
structures. The next step is to clarify the concept of oppression.  
                                                 
35 Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte", in The Marx-Engels Reader, second edition, ed. Robert 
C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1978), 595. 
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 Chapter 3: What is Oppression? 
 Earlier I claimed that a social structure is oppressive when it organizes social groups in 
oppressive social relations. More specifically, oppressive social structures reliably organize social 
groups in social relations whereby some group (or groups) suffers from an unjustly inflicted harm, 
while another group (or groups) benefits from the same harm. 36 This definition of oppressive 
social structures closely resembles Ann Cudd's influential account of oppression.37 Cudd defines 
oppression as a situation in which four conditions are satisfied:38  
1) The harm condition: there is harm that comes out of an institutional practice. 
2) The social group condition: the harm is perpetrated through a social institution or practice on 
a social group whose identity exists apart from the oppressive harm in (1). 
3) The privilege condition: there is another social group that benefits from the institutional 
practice in (1). 
4) The coercion condition: there is unjustified coercion or force that brings about the harm. 
I am sympathetic to Cudd's framework for theorizing oppression. In this chapter, I 
complement her theory of oppression with a detailed discussion of three central features of 
oppression: its structural nature, its relationality, and its durability. In other words, I develop an 
account of oppression as a structural phenomenon that denotes a durable social relation between 
                                                 
36 Of course, given the duality of structure, we should always keep in mind that social structures are both the 
precondition and the outcome of collective human action. Thus, when I attribute social structures with the ability to 
"organize" social groups, there is no need to posit social structures as self-standing supra-individual entities. At the 
level of ontology, it is individual agents who organize themselves in oppressive social relations. And yet, they are only 
able and motivated to do so because they coordinate their collective action within the context of a social structure. I 
expand on my views on this matter in chapter 6, where I discuss the individualism-holism debate as it pertains to 
ontology and social explanation.   
37 Ann E. Cudd, Analyzing Oppression (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
38 Ibid., 25.  
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social groups. I choose to focus on these features of oppression because they play a key role in 
how racially oppressive social structures operate. While these three features are present in Cudd's 
theory of oppression to varying degrees, the focus of her analysis lies elsewhere. This chapter 
complements her account by elaborating on—and sometimes revising—her remarks on these three 
features of oppression.  
Cudd's overall framework highlights the structural nature of oppression. Although she does 
not employ the language of relationality, I show how Cudd's social group condition and privilege 
condition address two aspects of the relationality of oppression. First, oppression is a relation 
between social groups. Second, oppression is relational because the oppression of one group entails 
a corresponding privilege for another group. Finally, one of the aims of Cudd's coercion condition 
is to explain the durability of oppression. According to Cudd, oppressive social structures are 
durable because they constrain the agency of the oppressed in ways that lead them to reproduce 
their own oppression. While my remarks on the structural and relational nature of oppression 
complement Cudd's, I disagree with her explanation of the durability of oppression. This may seem 
to entail that I reject Cudd's coercion condition. However, this is not entirely true.  
In Cudd's theory of oppression, the coercion condition has normative and explanatory 
implications. On the normative side, coercion explains why oppression is unjust. On the 
explanatory side, coercion explains why oppression is so enduring. For Cudd, oppression is unjust 
by definition. To make a claim of oppression is to show that the harms involved are unjustified. 
Cudd's coercion condition offers a particular theory of the injustice of oppression. It claims that 
oppression is unjust because it is caused by coercion. In other words, oppression is unjust insofar 
as it results from social structures that constrain agents' possibilities for action. As I show in 3.4., 
Cudd considers coercion (and therefore oppression) to be unjust because it violates the autonomy 
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of agents, as well as egalitarian principles of justice. I am sympathetic with Cudd's explanation of 
the injustice of oppression. Therefore, I endorse her coercion condition to the extent that it deals 
with normative considerations.  
On the explanatory side, the coercion condition aims to explain why oppression is so 
enduring. According to Cudd, the key to explaining the durability of oppression are indirect 
psychological and material forces that coerce the oppressed to act in ways that sustain their own 
oppression—she calls this process "oppression by choice".39 From this perspective, explaining the 
durability of oppression is a matter of showing how oppressive social structures enlist the coerced 
cooperation of agents who should be the first to resist them. Earlier I stated that I disagree with 
Cudd's explanation of the durability of oppression. This is not because I reject that coercion plays 
a role in the reproduction of oppression. Rather, I take issue with Cudd's claim that coercing the 
oppressed to sustain their own oppression is the key to explaining the durability of oppression. As 
I show in 3.3., it is equally important to consider how the voluntary choices of privileged agents 
contribute to the durability of oppression. On this explanatory question, I disagree with Cudd's 
focus on coercion.  
To sum up, this chapter builds on Cudd's theory of oppression in order to offer a descriptive 
account of oppression as a structural, relational and durable social process. I start with Cudd 
because her Analyzing Oppression is the most comprehensive take on this issue available in the 
literature. Along the way, I also refer to other accounts of oppression that bear on important issues 
under consideration. In fact, as the ensuing discussion will make clear, my description of 
oppression as a structural, relational and durable social process follows the general philosophical 
consensus on the nature of oppression. As with my discussion of the social structure concept, my 
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goal here is not to offer a novel theory of oppression or to adjudicate on lingering philosophical 
debates on oppression. Rather, my aim is to articulate a working account of oppression that can 
serve as the basis for making sense of structural racism in terms of racially oppressive social 
structures. If I take issue with Cudd's explanation for the durability of oppression, it is only because 
this turns out to be crucial for understanding the resilience of structural racism.  
3.1. Oppression is Structural 
In this dissertation, I treat oppression as primarily a structural phenomenon. In other words, 
I take oppressive social structures as the basic unity of analysis. To clarify my position, it is helpful 
to follow Haslanger's distinction between agential and structural theories of oppression.40 While 
agential (or individualist) accounts of oppression focus on acts of moral wrongdoing by individual 
agents, structural accounts of oppression focus on unjust collective arrangements that distribute 
power unjustly. According to Haslanger, agent oppression involves an agent or agents (i.e. the 
oppressor(s)) abusing their power to harm others (i.e. the oppressed) wrongfully.41 By contrast, 
structural oppression involves social structures that organize social relations in ways that lead to 
illegitimate power imbalances.42 Inevitably, such power imbalances are the breeding ground for 
an unjust social environment in which dominant agents can exact benefits from their advantageous 
social position at the expense of subordinate agents.  
Haslanger's distinction between agential and structural accounts of oppression is 
reminiscent of the meta-theoretical debate between personal morality and political morality (see 
1.2.2). As a brief reminder, the focus of personal morality is the ethics of individual character and 
                                                 
40 Sally Haslanger, "Oppressions: Racial and Other," in Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 311-338.  
41 Ibid., 312.  
42 Ibid., 316.  
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interpersonal conduct, whereas the focus of political morality is the justice of institutional 
arrangements. If we understand Haslanger's distinction through this lens, the difference between 
agential and structural accounts of oppression boils down to the theorist's particular normative 
interests. The choice between an agential and a structural approach depends on whether we 
prioritize individual wrongdoing or political injustice as the morally troublesome feature of 
oppression.43 For agential accounts of oppression, the focus of moral assessment are individual 
agents, their actions, intentions, and the like. Thus, these accounts are most interested in questions 
of personal morality such as: who counts as an oppressive agent? Does oppression require 
intentionality on the part of the oppressor? Is this particular agent or group morally blameworthy 
for enacting or contributing to oppression? By contrast, structural accounts of oppression focus on 
questions of political morality such as: what makes oppression an unjust collective arrangement? 
What is the relation between oppression and illegitimate power imbalances in society? How is 
oppression linked with the everyday injustices that oppressed people face in their interaction with 
the major structures of society?  
Looking through the lens of the personal/political morality distinction clarifies that the 
choice between agent oppression and structural oppression is a question of normative priorities. I 
do not deny the importance of agential accounts that emphasize questions of oppression and 
individual wrongdoing. However, given my interest in structural racism, I choose to focus on the 
political aspects of the normativity of oppression and thus I embrace a structural approach to 
analyzing oppression. So far, I have offered a normative explanation for my focus on structural 
oppression. Oppression is structural insofar as some (but certainly not all) of its normatively salient 
                                                 
43 Haslanger articulates this normative distinction in terms of moral theory v. political theory. However, she fails to 
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features bear on the justice of our collective arrangements. The second sense in which oppression 
is a structural phenomenon has to do with explaining how it operates. In this second sense, 
oppression is structural because social structures are crucial to explain how oppression functions 
and why it is so durable.   
Oppression often operates in the interactions between the oppressed and the major social 
structures of society. For instance, black people in the United States experience their oppression 
in their encounters with social structures such as the criminal justice system, the health care system, 
the housing market, the education system, and the state more generally. To stick to the first 
example, for black people in the United States, being oppressed partially means that they must 
face a criminal justice system that reliably ensures over-policing of majority-black neighborhoods, 
subjecting black people to unnecessary police stops, searches and excessive force, as well as race-
based disparities in arrests, convictions and length of prison sentences. This example illustrates 
how oppression often operates through social structures that systematically subject members of 
oppressed groups to unjust harms. Thus, if we are to understand how oppression operates, we must 
pay attention to the causal role of social structures in subjecting the oppressed to unjust harms.  
My focus on oppressive social structures does not deny that oppression causally depends 
on the actions of individual agents. The oppression of black people in the criminal justice system 
stems from the joint (but not necessarily concerted) action of many (but not necessarily all) police 
officers, juries, judges, politicians, and so on. An adequate theory of oppression must recognize 
that oppressive social structures play a causal role only because individual agents participate in 
and reproduce those structures. In fact, this follows from my account of social structures. In chapter 
2, I defined social structures as networks of social relations that are recursively reproduced by 
individual agents through their participation in social practices. Following this definition, we can 
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think of the U.S. criminal justice system as a network of social relations among individual agents 
occupying the social positions of police officer, juror, judge, politician, citizen, and so on. The 
U.S. criminal justice system is a racially oppressive social structure insofar as it subjects black 
citizens to over-policing, unnecessary stops, searches and excessive force, as well as race-based 
disparities in arrests, convictions and length of prison sentences. However, this social structure can 
only have these effects because agents who occupy social positions within the structure act 
according to racialized schemas, such as the association of black people with criminality. The 
action-guiding schema [black person  criminality] partially explains why agents that occupy the 
position of police officer tend to subject black citizens to over-policing, unnecessary stops, 
searches, arrests and excessive force. The same schema helps explain why agents that occupy the 
positions of juries and judges tend to make decisions that perpetuate racial disparities in 
convictions and length of prison sentences.  
This example illustrates the benefits of taking a structural approach to explain the workings 
of oppression. Focusing on the causal role of social structures in reproducing oppression is key 
because social structures, such as the criminal justice system, the education system, and the health 
care system have an enormous impact on the life chances of all members of society. Unfortunately, 
these social structures are often guided by schemas that encourage agents to act in ways that 
unjustly harm members of oppressed groups. In other words, the aforementioned social structures 
are a focal point in the causal reproduction of oppression. Moreover, analyzing oppression from a 
structural perspective helps explain the participation of individual agents in the reproduction of 
oppression. As I mentioned earlier, social structures are causally efficacious only because of 
human agency. At the same time, in order to explain the actions of individual agents who reproduce 
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oppression within the structure, we must pay attention to their position in the structures and the 
action-guiding schemas that govern the structure.   
I have proposed two reasons to adopt a structural approach to analyzing oppression—one 
normative and one explanatory. I will now show that Cudd also chooses to emphasize structural 
oppression. Her definition makes it clear that she thinks of oppression as a fundamentally 
institutional phenomenon. She summarizes her view on oppression as "an institutionally structured 
harm perpetrated on groups by other groups using direct and indirect material and psychological 
forces that violate justice".44 For Cudd, institutions are the primary source of oppression. However, 
it is equally plausible to read Cudd as proposing a theory of oppression as a fundamentally 
structural phenomenon. For one thing, it is common for philosophers and social theorists to use 
the terms 'institution' and 'social structure' without drawing a clear distinction between the two. 
This practice is linked to the lack of consensus regarding the concept of social structure. Cudd 
herself uses 'social structure' and 'institution' interchangeably throughout her book. Moreover, she 
defines institutions as "formal and informal social structures and constraints, such as law, 
convention, norms, practices and the like".45  
If I am correct that Cudd uses 'institution' and 'social structure' interchangeably, it turns out 
that three out of four of her conditions for oppression shed further light on its structural nature.46 
Oppression is (1) a harm caused by social structures, (2) perpetrated on a social group through 
social structures, and which (3) benefits another group through social structures. Even the fourth 
condition (i.e. oppression results from unjustified coercion or force) sometimes involves social 
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46 If my reading of Cudd on this point is mistaken and she rejects theorizing oppression as a fundamentally structural 
phenomenon, I am happy to part ways with her in this respect.   
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structures. Oppression may result from an agent exercising unjustified force or coercion on others. 
However, oppression may also obtain from social structures arranging the social environment in 
ways that unjustly constrain the actions of the oppressed.47 Sometimes, the constraining power of 
social structures may effectively force the oppressed to act in ways that sustain their own 
oppression, even in the absence of overt violence or coercion. As we discussed earlier, social 
structures may have this constraining effect on agents by altering their choice architecture, or by 
affecting their habits of perception and action via social norms. Thus, this fourth condition 
specifies a key causal mechanism whereby social structures perpetuate oppression. As such, I will 
get back to it when I discuss the durability of oppression in 3.3. In 3.2., I will dig deeper into 
Cudd's second and third conditions of oppression, as well as how they relate to her account of 
social groups. Before that, I will sum up my position vis-à-vis agential and structural accounts of 
oppression.  
Like Cudd, I adopt a structuralist approach to analyzing oppression. Thus, I focus on social 
structures that organize social groups in asymmetrical power relations. Still, my account of 
oppression also has an agential component. This is because the maintenance of oppressive social 
structures relies on the actions (and omissions) of individual agents who partake in such structures. 
This goes beyond the claim that oppression involves individuals abusing their power to harm 
others. Individual agents' contribution to oppression may also take the form of unintentional 
actions, unintended consequences of past actions, or even omissions (e.g. lack of action in the face 
of injustice). Still, even when I pay attention to the causal role of individual agents in reproducing 
oppression, I do so from a structural perspective. That is, I analyze the ways in which oppressive 
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course, given my account of social structure, the only way in which social structures can "arrange" and "constrain" is 
through the actions of individual agents. 
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social structures constrain, enable and motivate individual agents to act (or fail to act) in ways that 
reproduce those very structures.  
3.2. Oppression is Relational 
Another key feature of oppression is its relational nature. Oppression is fundamentally a 
social relation between people. More precisely, oppression is a social relation between social 
groups. This is captured by the second and third conditions in Cudd's account of oppression. 
Oppression denotes an intergroup relation whereby (2) one group suffers from a structurally caused 
harm, which at the same time (3) benefits another social group. In other words, oppression is a 
social relation that involves oppressed groups and privileged groups. Thus, oppression is relational 
in at least two ways. First, it denotes a social relation between social groups. Second, oppression 
is relational insofar as it always entail a correlative social process—namely privilege.  
3.2.1 Oppression is a Social Relation between Social Groups 
The claim that oppression is a social relation among social groups entails that social 
groups—rather than individual agents—are the basic unit for analysis of oppression. When we 
think of the oppressed, we often have oppressed social groups in mind. Oppressed social groups 
in the United States include black people, women, LGBTQ people, Muslims, Latinxs, and so on. 
Given the importance of social groups for analyzing oppression, it is crucial to clarify what I mean 
by social groups. Once again, I will take Cudd's theory of social groups as a starting point. Cudd 
defines social groups as "collection[s] of persons who share (or would share under similar 
circumstances) a set of social constraints on action".48 For Cudd, constraints include "facts that 
one does or ought to rationally consider in deciding how to act or how to plan one's life, or facts 
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that shape beliefs and attitudes about other persons".49 As this definition suggests, Cudd's account 
of social groups hinges on a more general theory of explaining human action—namely, rational 
choice theory. Cudd considers social group membership as a social constraint that affects 
individuals' rational decision-making and consequent behavior via penalties and rewards.  
It is important to highlight that Cudd uses the term 'constraint' in a normatively neutral 
sense.50 Cudd urges us to think of constraints as guides or frames for human behavior, which may 
be positive or negative, just or unjust. Thus, both penalties and rewards may be considered 
'constraints' on agency insofar as they shape agents' intentions and actions. While some constraints 
are biological, psychological, and physical, social group membership belongs to the class of social 
constraints. Social constraints are social in virtue of their social origin—that is, the fact that they 
result from social action, whether intentional or not. Examples of social constraints include "legal 
rights, obligations and burdens, stereotypical expectations, wealth, income, social status, 
conventions, norms, and practices".51 Insofar as members of socially significant groups share 
similar social constraints (e.g. stereotypes of women as overly emotional, associations of black 
people with criminality, harsher disciplinary methods for black and Latinx students), their action 
is also affected by a similar structure of rewards and penalties. For instance, given the systematicity 
of anti-black police violence, black people in the US have an incentive to be extremely cautious in 
their interactions with the police. Following Cudd, black people in the US count as a social group 
insofar as they face similar social constraints on their action, such as long-lasting racial inequality, 
anti-black attitudes, stereotypes, violence, and marginalization.   
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Social groups are collections of individuals that share similar social constraints, which alter 
the rewards and penalties that form the background of action. According to Cudd, group 
membership need not be voluntary or even acknowledged, nor do group members need to identify 
with the group. What makes an agent a member of a social group is whether they face the same 
social constraints on their action. To continue with the previous example, there are Caribbean 
immigrants in the US who do not identify as black, but who are nevertheless treated as black and 
are therefore subject to anti-black police violence. In their case, their membership in the social 
group "black in the US" is non-voluntary. And yet, they face similar social constraints in their 
encounter with police officers as those who voluntarily identify as black. Moreover, for new 
immigrants who are not acquainted with the US racial landscape, they may even be unaware that 
they count as black in the US. Still, they will face similar social constraints as other members of 
the group.  
In fact, oppressed social groups tend to be non-voluntary insofar as membership in these 
groups is often socially rather than individually determined. To continue with the example of black 
people in the US, membership in this social group is the result of recursive social practices that 
categorize and sort individuals into "races" primarily on the basis of phenotypical traits. Thus, to 
be a member of the social group "black in the US" is the result of being labeled as such by society 
and to be treated accordingly—for instance, to be at a higher risk of suffering from police violence. 
As discussed earlier, whether one identifies with the social group "black in the US" does not 
change how one will be perceived and treated by the criminal justice system and society more 
generally. This is not to deny that many black people in the U.S. do self-identify as black, which 
makes their group membership become voluntary. The key point is that, insofar as we are 
interested in oppression and the constraints it places on social agents, the focus is on socially 
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imposed group membership. Thus, when I refer to social groups as the basic unit for analyzing 
oppression, I have in mind the thin sense of social groups as collections of people who share 
socially imposed constraints on their action—regardless of their attitude (e.g. identification, 
rejection, ignorance) towards the group.  
Even though oppression is a relation between social groups, its effects manifest themselves 
at the level of agents' personal experiences. The experience of being oppressed includes a variety 
of harms such as exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and 
violence.52 Although personal, the experience of being oppressed involves harms that agents suffer 
qua members of an oppressed social group. In other words, we do not relate to oppression as 
atomistic individuals. Rather, our relation to oppression is mediated by our social positioning, 
which is influenced by our membership in socially significant social groups. This is because 
oppression targets social groups. Part of what it means for oppression to target social groups is that 
the harms of oppression affect members of a social group systematically. Earlier I argued that 
oppression often takes place in the everyday interactions between members of oppressed groups 
and the major social structures of society. Being oppressed entails that one's personal experience 
of oppression is not an isolated incident, but a part of a wider social structure that makes it likely 
that other members of the group are similarly affected.  
To return to an earlier example, the criminal justice system in the United States 
systematically targets black people for over-policing, unnecessary stops, searches and excessive 
force, as well as race-based disparities in arrests, convictions and length of prison sentences. The 
countless and recurring examples of black people being subject to police brutality are not isolated 
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incidents, but rather an indication of the systematic targeting of black people as a group by a 
racially oppressive criminal justice system. The systematicity of anti-black police violence does 
not mean that every black person will be subject to police brutality during their lifetime. However, 
it does mean that black people are at a higher risk of having violent or even deadly encounters with 
the police in virtue of their membership in an oppressed social group. Once again, given the 
relationality of oppression, social groups are the basic unity of analysis. Oppression targets 
individual agents on the basis of their social group membership.   
Importantly, the criminal justice system is not only a racially oppressive social structure. 
Other social groups also suffer from systematic police violence. For instance, transgender people 
are 3.7 times more likely to experience police violence compared to cisgender people.53 They too 
are members of a social group harmed by systematic police violence. Thus, the criminal justice 
system reproduces both anti-black and anti-trans oppression. There are individual agents who are 
oppressed by the criminal justice system in virtue of being black and in virtue of being trans. In 
such cases, their oppression is exacerbated by their membership in two oppressed social groups. 
In fact, transgender people of color are 6 times more likely to experience physical violence from 
the police than white cisgender people.54 Offering a full-fledged analysis of intersectionality is 
beyond the purview of this dissertation. However, given my emphasis on oppression as a 
probabilistic relation (one which raises the chances of members of oppressed social groups to 
suffer from unjust harms), I must make one clarification. The intersectionality of oppression is not 
merely a quantitative question of how much one's membership in multiple oppressed groups 
increases one's probabilities to suffer unjust harm. An intersectional analysis of the criminal justice 
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system—to take one example of an oppressive social structure—must pay attention to the 
qualitative differences in how black trans people experience police violence, as opposed to both 
black cisgender people and white trans people.55 The intersectionality of oppression highlights the 
importance of analyzing oppression primarily as a relation among social groups. In order to 
understand the complexity of oppression, we must explore the ways in which agents' multiple 
group memberships affect their interactions with the major social structures of society.  
3.2.2. Privilege: The Correlate of Oppression 
 The second sense in which oppression is relational is that it always entails a correlative 
phenomenon—namely, privilege. That is to say, for every oppressed social group, there is a 
correlative social group that benefits from that oppression. To put it differently, oppression is 
always correlated with privilege. Every oppressive social structure is simultaneously a social 
structure of privilege. The difference between the two lies in the agent's relation to the structure, 
which stems from their membership in the oppressed or privileged group, respectively. If 
oppression is a social relation among social groups, the groups in question are an oppressed 
group—the one that is harmed by the oppressive social structure—and a privileged group—the 
one that benefits from that harm.      
According to Cudd, the existence of a privileged group is a necessary condition for 
oppression. In Cudd's view, to be privileged is to be a member of a social group that gains 
materially or psychologically from oppression. 56 Importantly, the privileged do not always seek, 
want or even notice their benefits. In fact, oftentimes these benefits are unavoidable for them. Cudd 
illustrates this claim with the example of John Stuart Mill's attempt to give up his oppressive male 
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conjugal rights upon marrying Harriet Taylor. Despite Mill's grand gesture, he was effectively 
unable to give up these rights because the law did not recognize such an act, which meant that he 
could always reclaim them in the future. Despite his feminist commitments, Mill was unable to 
renounce his male privileges. Of course, the benefits of privilege are not restricted to rights. These 
benefits also include material resources such as wealth, income, access to affordable health care 
and housing, as well as psychological resources such as positive social stereotypes about one's 
group. 
Privilege is the flip side of oppression because one group's preferential access to material 
and psychological resources is contingent on denying equal access to those same resources to other 
groups. This is because resources, such as access to affordable health care, are scarce. When the 
health care system allocates its scarce resources in ways that privilege one social group, other 
social groups become unable to access those same resources. Moreover, group-based inequalities 
in access to health care lead to group-based unequal health outcomes, which further harms 
members of oppressed groups. Earlier I defined social structures as networks of social relations 
that enable human coordination over the management of collective resources. One feature of 
oppressive social structures is that they arrange the distribution of scarce resources unequally in 
ways that advantage privileged group members and disadvantage oppressed group members. This 
systematic conferral of advantages and disadvantages is at the root of group-based inequality and 
is a mark of oppressive social structures.  
  Alison Bailey clarifies the connection between privilege and advantage.57 In her view, to 
have an advantage is "to have a skill, talent, asset, or condition acquired—either by accident of 
                                                 




birth or by intentional cultivation—that allows a person or a group to […] bring themselves 
forward."58 Privilege is a subset of advantage. In particular, privileges are unearned advantages 
that are conferred systematically to members of dominant groups. By contrast, earned advantages 
are the result of intentional cultivation by the agent. Examples of earned advantages include 
learning a second language and working hard in order to afford to live in a neighborhood with a 
good school system.59  
However, the line between privilege and earned advantage is not always clear. Oftentimes, 
privilege makes it easier to earn advantages. Being able to afford a house in a middle or upper-
class neighborhood may be an earned advantage that stems from years of hard work, but it is also 
contingent on several factors, such as student loans, financial literacy, and getting a well-paying 
job. Given the existence of a racial wage gap, being white increases one's chances of getting a 
well-paying job. This is particularly true for middle and upper-class whites who can rely on 
personal connections to land a good job. This (admittedly simplified) example illustrates how race 
and class privilege can make it easier for members of those groups to earn advantages. By contrast, 
being a member of an oppressed group can constrain one's ability to earn advantages despite one's 
hard work. The racial wage gap and the importance of personal connections in hiring increase the 
difficulty of finding a well-paying job for black people. Even those who are able to find stable and 
well-paying work may not be able to benefit from their years of hard work. Redlining makes it 
difficult for families of color that can afford to live in middle or upper-class neighborhoods to 
move into those areas. Racial biases among mortgage lenders and landowners increase the barriers 
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of entry for families of color, which in many cases prevents them from actualizing their earned 
economic advantage.  
To recap Bailey's definition, privilege refers to unearned advantages that are granted 
automatically to members of dominant groups, and which other agents had to earn. Advantages 
such as assets, skills, or statuses, allow agents to advance their interests in the relevant social 
contexts. Having access to unearned advantages improves the life chances of members of 
privileged groups. However, even earned advantages often bear the mark of privilege and 
oppression. This last point is important to address the common misconception that a person is not 
privileged if they worked to earn some of the advantages that they have. One benefit of being a 
member of a privileged group is that one's unearned advantages in one domain will make it easier 
to earn advantages in other domains. By the same token, being oppressed entails that one's group 
membership will oftentimes make it more difficult to earn advantages and to use them to advance 
one's interests.   
One important lesson from Cudd and Bailey is that privilege and oppression have to do 
with control over resources. Here we find another connection between oppression and social 
structures. Earlier I argued that social structures enable human coordination over the management 
of collective resources. To have an advantage is to have control over resources that are positively 
valued within a given social structure, and which allow the owner to advance their interests within 
that structure. Having control over resources that allow one to advance one's life goals is not 
necessarily problematic. However, there is cause for concern when social structures are set up in 
ways that make it easier for some groups to accumulate resources and the advantages the come 
along with them. Being privileged allows one access to unearned advantages and makes it easier 
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to earn further advantages. Being oppressed makes it more difficult to earn advantages and to 
benefit from the advantages one manages to earn.  
Economic resources, such as wealth, are a powerful source of advantage in multiple social 
structures. Wealthy agents have access to better quality health care, are able to afford to live in a 
safe neighborhood with a good school system, can afford better legal representation, and so on. In 
addition, other types of resources—or capital—also serve as a source of advantage in many social 
contexts.60 Social capital, such as having access to a network of personal connections, can be a key 
advantage in the job market. Cultural capital is another source of advantage. For instance, having 
practical knowledge of the bodily dispositions, modes of self-presentation and manners of speech 
characteristic of a corporate environment gives agents an edge in that particular social structure. 
Finally, human capital such as skills that are positively valued in the job market can also give 
agents an advantage in securing a job.  
The varieties of capital that allow agents to advance their life goals partially explain why 
privilege is often invisible to its beneficiaries.61 The advantages conferred by economic capital are 
tangible and easy to quantify in most social contexts. By contrast, other resources such as social 
and cultural capital are similarly advantageous, but are often ignored or outright invisible to 
members of privileged groups. To take the example of class privilege, having privileged access to 
influential social networks and cultural know-how is seldom a matter of reflection for upper class 
agents. For many such agents, being able to rely on these resources is taken for granted and almost 
expected. Accordingly, when they draw on these resources to secure a high-paying job or a 
business opportunity, they seldom reflect on the role that class privilege played in their 
                                                 
60 Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 31ff.  
61 Bailey, "Privilege," 112.  
67 
 
achievement. As I mentioned earlier, privileged agents not only benefit from their unearned 
advantages, but can also draw on their privileges to earn further advantages in several aspects of 
their life. Thus, one reason why privilege often remains invisible to its beneficiaries is that it can 
mask itself as an earned advantage. In addition, many forms of privilege are not easy to trace or 
quantify. Privilege often works as an "invisible weightless knapsack" that allows one to navigate 
the world more easily, but which one takes for granted and therefore fails to reflect upon.62 
So far, I have described privilege in terms of special access to resources that improve the 
life chances of members of privileged groups. Bailey categorizes these as positive privileges 
because they benefit privileged agents by granting them additional opportunities than those 
available to oppressed agents.63 The additional opportunities granted to privileged agents have a 
correlative effect on oppressed agents—it puts them at a disadvantage in the competition for scarce 
resources. For instance, the positive privileges accorded to men in the workplace (e.g. the "boy's 
club" phenomenon) put women at a disadvantage in the competition for career advancement, and 
partially explain the gender wage gap. Thus, positive privileges are a key source of durable 
inequalities based on gender, race and other salient social categories. The existence of positive 
privileges harms members of oppressed groups by putting them at an unfair disadvantage in the 
competition for resources needed to advance their life projects. Moreover, benefitting from 
unequal access to resources places privileged agents in a good position to acquire more resources 
over the course of their lives. Privilege breeds privilege to the point where the lines between earned 
and unearned advantages becomes blurred.  
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Securing special access to resources is not the only way whereby privileged agents acquire 
unearned advantages over the oppressed. Bailey also considers negative privileges, which refer to 
privileged agents' immunities to the systematic barriers imposed on the oppressed.64 The unearned 
advantages of the privileged are not reducible to the additional opportunities granted to them. 
Privileged agents also benefit from not having to deal with the barriers that constrain the agency 
of oppressed agents. Men have an unearned advantage over women in the competition over career 
advancement not only because of their additional opportunities (e.g. privileged access to informal, 
all-men networking opportunities), but also because they are immune to the barriers that hamper 
women's career development (e.g. negative stereotypes of women as unreliable workers who value 
family over career). Thus, privilege is the flip side of oppression in at least two senses. Positive 
privileges grant additional opportunities to privileged agents, which are not available to oppressed 
agents. Negative privileges shield privileged agents from the barriers that constrain the life chances 
of the oppressed. In both cases, privileges are unearned advantages that members of dominant 
groups can rely upon to get an edge in advancing their life projects.  
Let us now return to the example of Lisa (see 2.5), the working mother, to illustrate the 
points I have made about the relationality of oppression. Oppression is a social relation between 
social groups—one which suffers a structurally caused harm, and another which benefits from that 
same harm. Oppressive intergroup relations have correlative effects on the groups involved. Under 
conditions of oppression, the social structures that harm members of oppressed groups are the very 
same structures that benefit members of privileged groups.  
The harm that Lisa faces is an instance of a larger problem afflicting working mothers (and 
women, more generally) as a social group—namely, the gender pay gap. In the U.S. (and 
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elsewhere), women are paid less than men, even after accounting for differences in hours worked, 
occupations chosen, education, and job experience. The gender pay gap harms women by 
reinforcing gender economic inequality. However, the harms associated with the gender pay gap 
are not restricted to the economic realm. Differences in pay also affect the relations of power within 
heterosexual households. The gender pay gap makes many women become economically 
dependent on their men partners, which grants the latter significant leverage in decision-making 
regarding household division of labor, household expenses, as well as the life projects household 
members. In addition, women's economic dependence on their men partners makes it easier for the 
latter to behave abusively with little to no consequences. Outside the household, men benefit from 
the gender pay gap by earning higher salaries than their women co-workers. In other words, men 
as a group benefit from the very same social structures that harm women as a group—this is a 
paradigmatic feature of oppressive intergroup relations.  
Women as a social group are harmed by the gender pay gap. Women constitute a social 
group insofar as they face similar constraints on their action due to the effects of the gender pay 
gap. Moreover, the gender pay gap is largely caused by social structures. While the gender pay 
gap may have its origin in individual gender-based discrimination in the workplace, today most of 
the gap is explained by structural factors.65 Whether it be inflexible hours in the workplace (which 
harms women the most), cultural norms regarding who takes time off when children arrive, or lack 
of affordable daycare, sexist social structures contribute to the reproduction of the gender pay gap 
by constraining women's options in the workplace. Thus, women like Lisa are members of an 
oppressed social group insofar as they face similar social constraints on their action, which are 
                                                 




imposed by sexist social structures. At the same time, men as a group benefit from women's 
oppression. To focus on economic oppression only, men in the workplace derive many privileges 
from the gender pay gap. On average, men get paid more than women for the same work, which 
gives them an edge in realizing their financial goals. The unearned advantages of men in the 
workplace are not limited to salary differentials among peers. Men also benefit from gender 
inequality in hiring, promotion, and retention, all of which amount to a significant unearned 
advantage in their career advancement. Finally, as Lisa's case illustrates, our society's sexist social 
structures make it highly difficult for women to have children and advance their career. Men are 
also negatively privileged insofar as they do not face the same obstacles as Lisa and other working 
mothers.  
3.3. Oppression is Durable   
Earlier I claimed that the harms of oppression are systematic, rather than one-off 
occurrences. One reason for the systematicity of oppression is that, once it is in place, it tends to 
endure over time. Cudd tackles this feature of oppression under the guise of the endurance 
question—that is, "how oppression endures over time in spite of human's rough natural 
equality?"66 According to Cudd, oppression theorists have always tried to answer this question by 
showing how the oppressed are induced to participate in reproducing their own oppression rather 
than resist it. From this perspective, answering the endurance question is a matter of explaining 
how oppressive social structures co-opt those agents who should in principle be the first to resist 
them. Cudd embraces this victim-centric explanation for the durability of oppression. In her view, 
the endurance of oppression is best explained by material and psychological forces that coerce the 
                                                 
66 Cudd, Analyzing Oppression, 21.  
71 
 
oppressed to act in ways that further their own oppression.67 Thus, Cudd's answer to the endurance 
question is linked to her fourth condition of oppression—the coercion condition. This condition 
states that oppression is always caused by unjustified force or coercion.68 On her view, oppressive 
social structures are long-lasting because they manage to coerce oppressed agents to act in ways 
that reproduce their own oppression. Cudd argues that the coercion of oppressed agents functions 
primarily through indirect economic and psychological forces.69 She develops this view in her 
explanation of the durability of women's economic oppression, which she illustrates with the 
aforementioned case of Lisa, the working mother (see 2.5).70   
Lisa's decision to quit her job after having a baby was influenced by her membership in an 
oppressed social group,  which constrained her other options (e.g. having her husband quit his job 
instead, leave the baby in daycare). An important source of her constrained choice is the fact that, 
given the existence of a gender pay gap, it made financial sense for her, rather than her husband, 
to quit her job to take care of the baby. In making this constrained choice, Lisa not only incurs the 
harms associated with becoming economically dependent on her husband, she also unwittingly 
contributes to the reproduction of the gender pay gap. By quitting her job, Lisa reinforces the 
stereotype that women are unreliable workers who value family over career. As Cudd argues, there 
is evidence that the stereotype of women as unreliable workers constitutes a significant obstacle 
to closing the gender pay gap.71 Moreover, given that most working mothers in our society share 
Lisa's agential constraints, they also tend to make the same constrained choice of quitting their job, 
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which further entrenches their economic oppression. Cudd focuses her attention on this vicious 
cycle whereby women face structural constraints that coerce them into making individually 
rational choices (i.e. quitting their job after having a baby) that have suboptimal results for them 
as a group (i.e. reinforcing the gender pay gap).  
The vicious cycle works as follows. Sexist social structures constrain the options available 
to working mothers in a way that effectively coerces them into the choice of quitting their job after 
having a baby. In turn, the aggregate effect of working mothers making this constrained choice is 
to reinforce sexist stereotypes that partially maintain the gender pay gap. According to Cudd, this 
vicious cycle is an example of the indirect economic forces that explains the durability of 
oppression—in this case the economic oppression of women.72 This explanation emphasizes how 
oppressive social structures become durable by constraining members of oppressed social groups 
to act in ways that reproduce the very structures that oppress them. As Haslanger puts the point, 
Lisa's choice is the result of a larger system of social structures that oppresses women (and working 
mothers, in particular) by altering their "choice architecture" so that "it is rational for them to 
choose options that keep them subordinate".73 At the same time, this very same system of social 
structures benefits men by further entrenching their economic advantage over women, along with 
the power advantages that stem from the economic dependence of their women partners. In her 
view, this vicious cycle is an example of the indirect economic forces that explains the durability 
of oppression—in this case the economic oppression of women.74 
According to Cudd, indirect forces of oppression reproduce group-based inequalities 
through the choices and decisions of members of oppressed groups, who are co-opted into making 
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individual choices that bolster their own oppression.75 By contrast, direct forces of oppression 
work through the intentional actions of members of dominant groups on members of subordinate 
groups. The distinction between direct and indirect forces of oppression boils down to a distinction 
between constraints on the oppressed that come from the outside (i.e. direct) or from the inside 
(i.e. indirect). Accordingly, Cudd also refers to the indirect forces of oppression as "oppression by 
choice".76 The gender pay gap is an example of an indirect economic force of oppression because 
it co-opts the oppressed by making it rational (from the perspective of a utility-maximizing agent) 
for them to make choices that reinforce the ongoing economic inequality between dominant and 
oppressed groups. In addition, there are are psychological indirect forces of oppression. These 
forces also operate by enlisting the cooperation of oppressed agents to ensure the durability of 
oppression. In contrast to indirect economic forces, indirect psychological forces operate by 
coercing subordinate agents—via indoctrination, manipulation and adaptation to unfair social 
circumstances—to adopt noxious schemas and stereotypes that reinforce their oppression.77 Cudd 
cites shame, low self-esteem, belief in sexist and racist schemas, and adaptive preferences as 
examples of indirect psychological forces of oppression. Indirect forces of oppression, both 
economic and psychological, are key in Cudd's explanation of the durability of oppression. In her 
view, oppressive social structures are durable because they coerce the oppressed into reproducing 
the very structures that oppress them, thus rendering resistance to oppression difficult to motivate 
or maintain.78  
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Thus, Cudd's explanation for the durability of oppression focuses on the causal mechanisms 
(i.e. the indirect economic and psychological forces of oppression) that undermine the prospect of 
resistance to oppression among its victims. In other words, oppressive social structures are 
enduring because they make it difficult for the oppressed to resist them. Here the focus is on the 
structural constraints (i.e. constrained choices, internalized noxious schemas and stereotypes, 
among others) that the oppressed face when trying to overcome oppression. Cudd's focus on the 
victims of oppression is consistent with other explanations of the durability of oppression. Marilyn 
Frye's metaphor of the birdcage similarly illustrates how oppressed agents often face "double 
binds" that reduce their options to a very few, all of which "expose them to penalty, censure or 
deprivation".79 Like Cudd, Frye is interested in how oppressive social structures constrain the 
choices of the oppressed to the point where all the options available to them end up further 
entrenching their oppression in one way or another. Titus Stahl agrees with Frye and Cudd that the 
durability of oppression stems from the structural constraints that it imposes on oppressed agents 
and which make it "disproportionately costly for them to change or leave the practice (compared 
to other groups)."80 In fact, Stahl argues that a defining feature of oppressive social structures is 
that they make it particularly difficult for their victims to struggle against their oppression.  
I agree with Cudd, Frye and Stahl that oppressed agents face many obstacles in their 
struggle against oppression. Of particular interest are those obstacles that work through the choices 
and desires of subordinate agents under conditions of oppression. Whether it be by setting up 
double binds, altering their choice architecture, or imbuing the minds of the oppressed with 
noxious schemas and stereotypes, oppressive social structures regularly enlist the cooperation of 
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oppressed agents, which makes it especially difficult to mount an effective resistance against it. 
Certainly, oppression by choice, which results from indirect economic and psychological forces of 
oppression that operate through the choices and decisions of the oppressed, contributes to the 
resilience of oppression. However, I disagree with Cudd's claim that oppression by choice is the 
key to explaining why oppression is so enduring.  
This particular claim stems from a very sensible intuition. Since oppression harms 
oppressed agents the most, they should be the most interested in resisting it. However, if oppressive 
social structures can somehow enlist the cooperation of oppressed, then it is easy to understand 
why it is so enduring. Privileged agents benefit from oppression and therefore have no material 
interest in resisting it. Since we can presuppose that privileged agents will support oppression 
actively or passively, the key to explaining the endurance of oppression is to explain how 
"oppression by choice" is possible. Cudd is not alone in following this intuition. In the preface to 
Power: A Radical View, Steven Lukes frames his influential account of power as an answer to the 
classic puzzle of why subordinate groups comply with (i.e. fail to resist) their subordination.81 Like 
Cudd, his explanation of the resilience of unjust social processes such as oppression and 
domination hones in on the actions of the victims of these injustices. I agree that explaining how 
the oppressed come to contribute to their own oppression can help us understand why oppression 
is so enduring. However, I believe that it is equally important to analyze the role of privileged 
agents in reproducing oppression. As Lukes makes clear, theorists of oppression tend to take for 
granted that members of privileged groups will contribute to the reproduction of oppression 
because it is in their interest to do so. However, if the goal is to explain what makes oppression so 
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enduring, it is also important to account for their active and passive role in maintaining oppression. 
Moreover, many members of privileged groups would deny that they intentionally contribute to 
the reproduction of oppression. In the particular case of structural racism in the United States, 
which is the focus of this dissertation, many white people would deny their participation in the 
maintenance of racial oppression. They would certainly not accept that they seek to maintain racial 
oppression in order to continue to benefit from it.   
In light of this, I will focus on explaining the causal mechanisms that lead members of 
privileged groups to lend their support (active or passive) to the reproduction of oppression. In 
particular, I will explain how racially oppressive social structures motivate privileged agents to 
participate in social practices that ensure the durability of racial oppression. My explanation of the 
durability of oppression differs from Cudd's in that I focus on the actions of the privileged rather 
than those of the oppressed. However, just like Cudd, I am interested in developing an explanation 
of how oppressive social structures influence agents to act in ways that sustain oppression. Cudd 
is interested in how oppressive social structures constrain the agency of the oppressed to the point 
of effectively coercing them to reproduce their own oppression. By contrast, I am interested in 
how oppressive social structures motivate privileged agents to contribute to the maintenance of 
oppression. Both of these explanations are important in explaining the endurance of oppression. 
Cudd is certainly right that "oppression by choice" contributes to the endurance of oppression. 
However, in this dissertation, I focus my attention on the equally important explanatory role of 
privileged agents' contribution to the maintenance of oppression.  
Where I disagree with Cudd is on her claim that "oppression by choice" is the key to 
answering the endurance question of oppression. Ultimately, as with any explanatory question, it 
is an empirical matter whether the endurance of oppression is best explained by the actions of the 
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privileged or the oppressed. In most cases, including the gender pay gap, both play a key 
explanatory role. Women's constrained choice of quitting their job after having a baby may 
contribute to the reproduction of the gender pay gap, but so does gender inequality in hiring, 
promotion and retention, as well as a workplace culture that permits and even rewards sexist 
behavior. The fact that these well-known contributing factors to the gender pay gap continue to be 
paramount in most workplaces points to a generalized lack of concern to close the gender pay gap 
among men in positions of power. In fact, many men dislike and even actively resist recent 
advances in implementing gender-based affirmative action and addressing long-standing sexist 
practices in the workplace. Men tend to regard these efforts as unfair and unnecessary, when in 
fact they merely seek to address the privileges men have held in the workplace for so long. The 
pervasiveness of this defensive reaction suggests that many men are committed to the continuation 
of the gender pay gap—not necessarily, because they seek to harm women, but because they 
benefit from it. In other words, men have a positional interest in maintaining the gender pay gap, 
and are therefore motivated to oppose attempts at bridging the gap (see 2.5 and 6.3.3). Thus, a 
complete explanation of the durability of women's economic oppression must also explore the 
causal role that men (i.e. the privileged group) play in the reproduction of the gender pay gap. 
Importantly, men's causal role is not limited to their participation in re-enacting gender inequality 
in hiring, promotion, and retention, or in maintaining a sexist workplace culture. Men also 
contribute to the endurance of the gender pay gap when they resist (or fail to support) policies aim 
at bridging the gap.  In chapter 6, I will advance a similar explanation of the endurance of racial 
inequality that focuses on the active role of the beneficiaries of structural racism.  
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3.4. The Normativity of Oppression 
I will end this chapter with a brief explanation of the normativity of oppression. Earlier I 
mentioned that oppression is a normative concept—it denotes a structural injustice. As Cudd 
defines it, oppression is a structurally caused harm that targets a social group, while simultaneously 
benefitting another social group. However, this by itself does not suffice as a definition oppression. 
We also need to explain what makes oppression unjust. Cudd's coercion condition fulfills this 
normative requirement. In her view, the harms of oppression are unjust because they stem from 
unjustified force or coercion. This requirement brings to mind the image of the tyrant who 
exercises violence (i.e. force) or the threat of violence (i.e. coercion) on their subjects. However, 
coercion and unjustified force may take other forms. In particular, Cudd is interested in oppression 
that results from social structures that coerce oppressed people into making choices that reinforce 
their subordination.  
 According to Cudd, coercion involves cases where agents make choices that are not fully 
free or voluntary due to the unacceptability of other available options.82 The paradigm case of 
coercion is that of a victim of a mugging. The victim has can choose to give the mugger their 
money or to fight back and risk losing their life. When the victim chooses to give their money to 
the mugger, they (rightly) feel that they were compelled to act in that way by the unacceptability 
of their other options. Coerced agents are put in a situation where they had "no choice" but to act 
as they did.  
According to Cudd, the vicious cycle laid out in Lisa's example is unjust because women 
in her position are coerced to act in ways that reinforce their economic oppression. In other words, 
Lisa's choice to quit her job after having a baby is not voluntary, but coerced—she was compelled 
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to act in that way by the unacceptability of her other choices. For Cudd, coerced choices are unjust 
because they violate the autonomy of the agent, as well as principles of justice.83 The vicious cycle 
whereby women's coerced choice to quit their job after having a baby reinforces sexist stereotypes 
that reproduce the gender pay gap harms women's autonomy because it leads to fewer and worse 
life choices for them.84 In addition, Larry and other men in a similar social position do not have to 
face the same set of constraints on their agency; and in fact, they benefit from these constraints 
insofar as they coerce women into maintaining the gender wage gap and the male privileges that 
stem from it. This gender-based asymmetry in available life choices and power violates egalitarian 
principles of justice and further explains the oppressive nature of coercion.85  
I will now recap my account of oppression as a structural, relational, and durable 
phenomenon. Oppression denotes an intergroup relation whereby a social structure (or a system of 
social structures) harms one group (or groups), while simultaneously benefitting another group (or 
groups). The harms of oppression include exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural 
imperialism, violence, among others. Moreover, oppressive harms are always unjust insofar as 
they are inflicted through unjustified violence or coercion. Relatedly, oppression often entails 
asymmetrical power relations between the groups involved. This results from the unequal 
distribution of harms and benefits in the intergroup relation, which congeals into relations of 
dependence and subordination—as in the economic dependence of unemployed and 
underemployed women on their men partners.  
While agential accounts of oppression focus on individual agents abusing their power to 
intentionally harm others, my structural account of oppression highlights the mechanisms whereby 
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social structures distribute harms and benefits among social groups in ways that generate 
asymmetrical power relations between the groups. However, it would be a mistake to ignore the 
role that individual agents play in the functioning of these structural mechanisms. Earlier, I defined 
social structures as networks of social relations that are recursively reproduced by individual 
agents through their participation in social practices. If social structures arrange intergroup 
relations so as to distribute harms and benefits unequally, it is only because individual agents who 
participate in those structures organize themselves in this way. Individual agents create and 
recreate oppressive social relations by participating in social practices that harm one group, while 
simultaneously benefiting another group. Lisa's boss contributes to gender oppression by 
instituting inflexible working hours, which makes it impossible for her to take care of her baby 
without having to quit her job. Lisa's constrained choice to quit her job also contributes to gender 
oppression by reinforcing sexist stereotypes that underlie the gender way gap. Of course, as Lisa's 
example makes clear, agents' role in reproducing oppressive social structures are often mediated 
by the effects of already existing social structures on their agency. In Lisa’s case, her decision was 
influenced by sexist social structures that constrained her agency by limiting other available 
options.  
Thus, a full-fledged account of structural oppression requires an explanation of how social 
structures recreate oppressive social relations through the actions of individuals. In other words, 
we need an analysis of the mechanisms whereby social structures influence individual agents to 
act in ways that reproduce oppressive social relations. As I suggested earlier (see 2.5), philosophers 
have so far focused on the mechanism of structural constraint (i.e. Lisa’s constrained choice to quit 
her job) and to a lesser extent on structural enablement (i.e. the gender pay gap that enables men 
to exercise asymmetrical power in heterosexual partnerships). One of the distinguishing 
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contributions of this dissertation is to explore a third mechanism—namely, how oppressive social 
structures motivate members of social groups that benefit from oppression to act (or fail to act) in 
ways that sustain these structures in order to safeguard the benefits they derive from them. In 
chapter 6, I build on this mechanism of structural motivation in order to explain the durability of 
racially oppressive social structures. We now turn to chapter 4, where I will draw on the conceptual 
tools I developed in chapters 2 and 3 (i.e. social structure and oppression) to offer a full-fledged 







Chapter 4: What is Structural Racism? 
The aim of this chapter is to develop my account of structural racism as racially oppressive 
social structures. In chapters 2 and 3, I clarified the concepts of social structure and oppression. 
Thus, at this point, we have a good understanding of what oppressive social structures are. These 
are long-lasting networks of oppressive social relations that are recursively reproduced by 
individual agents through their participation in social practices. Social relations are oppressive 
when one or more social groups suffer from structurally caused harms, which at the same time 
benefit a privileged group within the structure. The last piece of the puzzle is to explain what 
distinguishes structural racism from other oppressive social structures. In other words, the focus 
of this chapter is to articulate the distinctly racial nature of racially oppressive social structures.  I 
will discuss three salient features that make racially oppressive social structures distinctly racial 
phenomena, and which distinguish them from other kinds of oppressive social structures:  
1. In racially oppressive social structures, hierarchical racial schemas are central in framing 
how agents interpret and respond to the world. Central to these schemas is the doctrine of 
racialism, which forms the basis for the racialized practices of categorization and 
differential treatment that produce racial hierarchy.  
2. In racially oppressive social structures, the influence of the hierarchical racial schemas 
described in (1) fundamentally transforms the relations among socially positioned agents 
within the structure. As a result, the social positions that make up the structure become 
embodiments of racial hierarchy. In other words, they become racialized positions.  
3. Racially oppressive social structures reproduce oppressive social relations between social 
groups defined on the basis of the hierarchical racial schemas in (1). 
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4.1. Structural Racism and the Centrality of Hierarchical Racial Schemas 
Structural racism results from recurring racialization processes whereby the concept of race 
becomes a significant category for sorting human populations and organizing social life.86 Drawing 
on Omi and Winant, Bonilla-Silva argues that racialization processes “[extend] racial meaning to 
a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group.”87 According to one well-
accepted historical narrative, the modern concept of race became a significant category for 
classifying human populations in the context of European projects of colonization, imperialism 
and slavery. In this context, racial categories such as 'Negro' and 'Indian' were created and 
mobilized to justify these domination projects. According to the pseudo-scientific doctrine of 
racialism, human groups could be classified into smaller groups called ‘races’, where members of 
a ‘race’ were thought to share “certain fundamental, heritable, physical, moral, intellectual and 
cultural characteristics with one another that they did not share with members of any other race”.88 
Racialism attributed a shared biological essence to members of a racial kind, which was supposed 
to explain similarities in visible characteristics (e.g. skin color, hair, shape of face) as well as 
behavioral, cultural, and moral tendencies. Moreover, these racial essences were regarded as fixed, 
passed on through bloodlines, and as the basis for justifying the oppressive treatment of some 
‘races’ such as “Negros” and “Indians”. 
 It is important to dwell on the claim that racial kinds originate from racial ideologies 
developed in the context of European projects of domination. Science has shown racialism to be a 
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false doctrine insofar as there are no shared biological racial essences that can explain the shared 
characteristics attributed to ‘races’. Race eliminativists like Appiah infer from this fact that ‘races’, 
understood as human populations sharing the aforementioned biological essences, do not exist. 
One possible implication of race eliminativism is that we should give up race-talk altogether. The 
concept of race is not only harmful but it fails to refer to anything in the world, and thus we should 
consign it to the dustbin of history. Although race eliminiativism is correct that 'races' as defined 
by the doctrine of racialism do not exist, it is not clear that we should give up race-talk altogether. 
A guiding assumption of this dissertation is that race continues to matter today despite the falsity 
of racialism.  
According to Laurence Blum, there is a sociohistorical consensus among philosophers of 
race that there exist social groups that roughly correspond to the 'races' of racialism.89 Blum calls 
them 'racialized groups' and clarifies that they are not the biological 'races' advanced by racialism. 
And yet, racialized groups are "genuine intergenerational collectivities characterized by distinctive 
historical and social experiences, and generally current social locations."90 Furthermore, these 
groups were and continue to be deeply affected by the doctrine of racialism. While racialized 
groups do exist, they are not biological groups, but social groups. Their unity does not stem from 
a shared biological essence, but from a shared sociohistorical experience. However, racialism 
continues to wrongly characterize members of racialized groups as sharing a racial essence that 
determines their behavioral, cultural and moral tendencies. For non-white racialized groups such 
as blacks, their alleged racial essence is often linked to claims of inferiority in mental and other 
important human capacities, which are used to justify race-based hierarchies. Thus, the racial 
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schemas of racialism have a dual effect: they form the basis for the categorization of human beings 
into racialized groups, and they justify racial hierarchy under the auspices of the alleged inferiority 
of non-white groups. Racialism has these effects in the social world even if is a false doctrine.  
Michael Hardimon's account of 'socialrace', which corresponds to 'racialized groups' in 
Blum's framework, sheds light on this point.91 Hardimon distinguishes between 'racialized race', 
which is the concept of 'race' according to the doctrine of racialism, and 'socialrace'. 'Socialraces', 
just like Blum's racialized groups, are social groups falsely thought to be racialist races. 
'Socialraces' are the result of a widespread societal belief that there exist racialist races. Even 
though there is no referent for racialist races in the natural world, racialist thinking still manages 
to create social groups that roughly correspond to racialist races. This is because the widespread 
belief that some groups are racialist races leads society (i.e. individuals and social structures) to 
treat people differently on the basis of their putative racialist race. For example, the schemas of 
racialism include the beliefs that black people are violent, lazy, and simple-minded. Guided by 
these schemas, individuals and social structures treat black people differently. In the context of 
policing, the widespread stereotype of black people as violent makes them subject to increased 
scrutiny by other (primarily white) citizens, as well as more likely to suffer from violent and even 
deadly encounters with the police. In the context of employment, the widespread stereotype of 
black people as lazy and simple-minded makes them subject to race-based discrimination in hiring, 
as well as more likely to face difficulties in securing promotions and avoiding terminations due to 
downsizing.  
                                                 




Thus, racialism creates socialraces by influencing society to categorize human beings into 
social groups that correspond to nonexistent 'racialized races' and to treat them differently on the 
basis of that categorization. While this categorization relies on false beliefs (e.g. the existence of 
racial essences), it still manages to create socialraces "through the differential treatment their 
members are given because they are believed to be members of racialist races."92 Moreover, once 
the social construction of socialraces takes place, people will be likely to continue to believe that 
racialist races do exist. The existence of socialraces will make it appear as if racialist races exist 
because it will give them an illusory referent in the social world. The referent is illusory because 
racialist races refer to biological kinds whereas socialraces refer to social kinds. Still, this illusion 
would be enough to ensure the persistence of the belief in racialist races.  
Moreover, even if the widespread belief in racialism starts to wane (which seems to be the 
case today), the practices of categorization and differential treatment that create socialraces will 
be likely to continue as they have already become entrenched in society. This is not only a matter 
of social inertia, but also a result of the hierarchical nature of the racialization process. As I 
mentioned earlier, the doctrine of racialism is founded on the assumption that there is a natural 
hierarchy among racialist races that stems from the racial essences of each group. Whites are 
thought to be superior in important human capacities (e.g. intellectual, characterological, moral, 
aesthetic) which warrants their position at the top of the racial hierarchy. By contrast, non-whites 
are thought to be lacking in these important human capacities, which explains their inferiority to 
whites. According to racialism, this alleged racial hierarchy at the level of biology justifies 
organizing the social world following the same racial hierarchy, with whites at the top and non-
whites at the bottom. To return to an earlier example, Europeans drew on the alleged biological 
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inferiority of blacks, and Native Americans to justify the imposition of a racially ordered colonial 
society in the Americas, with whites at the top and blacks and Native Americans at the bottom. 
While the biological racial hierarchy advanced by racialism is false, the social racial hierarchy that 
ensued from it is very real. Several centuries after the end of the colonial projects in Latin America 
and the United States, these societies maintain an unequal distribution of economic, political and 
symbolic resources that benefit whites and disadvantage blacks and Native Americans. Thus, the 
transformation of an illusory biological racial hierarchy into a social racial hierarchy brings with 
it an array of advantages for the privileged social group (i.e. whites). As a result, whites acquire a 
positional interest that motivates them to defend this social racial hierarchy in order to safeguard 
their race-based advantages they derive from it (see 2.5 and 6.3.3). This positional interest—
whether implicit or manifest—is key for explaining the resilience of race-based social hierarchy 
in post-colonial societies in the Americas. Whites not only have a doxastic motivation (i.e. the 
belief in racialism) to engage in practices of racial categorization and differential treatment. In 
addition, they have a positional interest—an interest that stems from their position of racial 
privilege in the social racial hierarchy—in participating in these practices in order to ensure the 
continuation of racial social hierarchy from which they benefit. Thus, even if widespread belief in 
racialism is on the wane, the process of racialization—which includes practices of racial 
categorization and differential treatment—is likely to continue because of the material and 
psychological rewards that result from any social racial hierarchy.  
Moreover, as many racial theorists have argued, racialism is not really on the wane. Instead, 
the content of racialism has changed in order to adapt to a shifting political, cultural and economic 
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context, as well as to shed its now debunked biological claims.93 Today, it is helpful to distinguish 
between classical biological racialism and contemporary cultural racialism. Cultural racialism 
maintains the key claims of classical racialism—namely, that racialist races have a shared essence, 
that this essence determines the behavioral, moral and cultural tendencies of members of racialist 
races, and that these essentialist difference among racialist races justifies the existence of a racial 
hierarchy. However, unlike classical racialism, cultural racialism argues that the shared essence of 
racialist races is grounded on culture rather than biology. Cultural racialism relies on cultural 
narratives (e.g. black cultural pathologies, the disintegration of the black family) and stereotypes 
(e.g. blacks' lack of individual motivation) about non-white groups to justify the persistence of a 
racial hierarchy. While its content is different from classical racialism, cultural racialism plays the 
same role of justifying practices of categorization and differential treatment that reinforce racial 
hierarchy.    
4.2. Structural Racism, Racialized Groups and Racialized Positions 
 The second distinctly racial feature of racially oppressive social structures is that they 
impact individual agents differently in virtue of their membership in racialized groups and their 
racialized positions within the structure. Here, I will make a distinction between racialized groups 
and racialized positions. Racialized groups are social groups in Cudd's sense of collections of 
people who share socially imposed constraints on their action. As discussed in the previous section, 
racialized groups are the result of recurring racialization processes whereby human agents are 
categorized into hierarchically ordered races and subject to differential treatment on the basis 
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thereof. From now on, I will use 'racialized group' to refer to 'races' as socially constructed social 
groups. I choose Blum's 'racialized groups' over Hardimon's 'socialrace' to describe this 
phenomenon because it makes explicit the link between the social construction of race and the 
processes of racialization. These social groups result from processes of racialization whereby 
human agents become subject to practices of racial categorization and differential treatment 
justified by the doctrine of racialism.  
To use Cudd's terminology, racialized groups are non-voluntary social groups insofar as 
membership in these groups is socially rather than internally imposed. Thus, to be a member of a 
racialized group has nothing to do with whether one identifies with or is even aware of one's 
membership in the group. To recall the example from 3.2.1, the black Caribbean immigrant is a 
member of the racialized group "black" in the United States in virtue of being categorized as black 
and being subject to differential treatment on the basis thereof—including being more likely to 
suffer from a violent or even deadly encounter with the police. Whether he personally identifies as 
black or is even aware of the subtleties of racial categorization in the United States will not affect 
his membership in the group and its concomitant effects on his life chances.  
 In this definition, the concept of racialized group only accounts for the external features of 
racial identity. To be black is more than being classified as black and being subject to various 
forms of unjust and unequal treatment. Being black may also entail "identifying oneself as black 
and to make choices, formulate plans, and express concerns in light of one's identification of 
oneself as black".94 These and other internalist features of racial identity are certainly important, 
but my account of racialized groups does not intend to capture them. Here, I am specifically 
interested in the external (i.e. socially imposed) impact that oppressive social structures have on 
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agents that are socially categorized as black, white, and so on. As I show later, racialized group 
membership can have substantial effects on the social position of individual agents within the 
various social structures of society.   
 Paul Taylor also offers an externalist account of racialized groups. He defines racialized 
groups such as black and white as “probabilistically defined populations that result from the white 
supremacist determination to link appearance and ancestry to social location and life chances.”95 
For Taylor, to be black amounts to being more likely to live in substandard or overcrowded 
housing, or lack health insurance, or be unemployed, than someone who belongs to the racialized 
group white. For Taylor, racialized groups amount to human populations defined by statistical 
correlations with respect to the distribution of resources, differential treatment and other measures 
of racial stratification. Racially oppressive social structures reproduce racialized groups when 
agents within these structures engage in practices of racial categorization and race-based 
differential treatment that cause the aforementioned statistical correlations.   
Taylor's contribution is to theorize the differential treatment that stems from racialization 
in terms of probabilities. This is helpful because it clarifies what it means to be subject to 
differential or unequal treatment because of one's racialized group membership. For example, what 
do mean when we claim that black people in the US lack access to good-quality affordable 
housing? It certainly cannot mean that every black person lives in substandard or overcrowded 
housing. By and large, middle-and-upper-class blacks will not have this problem.96 Rather, we 
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mean that for those who are already at risk of not securing good-quality affordable housing (e.g. 
the poor), being black will increase their chances of living in substandard or overcrowded housing. 
Even among the black poor, some will be able to secure good-quality affordable housing. 
However, the point remains that, at the aggregate level (i.e. the level of statistical probabilities), 
being black decreases one's chances of securing good-quality affordable housing. Thus, the impact 
of racially oppressive social structures on racialized groups must be analyzed in terms of statistical 
correlations between racialized groups (e.g. whites, blacks) and the distribution of resources and 
differential treatment in the major social structures of society. 
 The actual racialized groups that compose a racially oppressive social structure, as well as 
the tenor of their social relations, vary according to historical and geographical context. In this 
dissertation, I focus on structural racism in the contemporary United States. In this particular 
context, the most relevant racialized populations are Whites, Blacks, Asians, and Native 
Americans, although the list should probably also include ethnic and religious groups (e.g. Latinxs, 
Muslims) which do not correspond to racialist races, but which are nevertheless subject to 
processes of racialization in the American context. 
 Let us now turn to racialized positions. Unlike racialized groups, racialized positions are 
not social groups. Rather, racialized positions refer to social positions within a social structure, 
whose relations to other social positions are heavily influenced by social practices of racial 
categorization and differential treatment based on racialism. I have previously established that the 
stability of networks of social relations partially stems from agents' tendency to act in accordance 
with the schemas of the social practices in which they participate (2.4). When the schemas of 
racialism influence agents' social practices, their social relations (and consequently, the social 
positions within the structure) are likely to reflect patterns of race-based differential treatment. 
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While racialized groups help us understand the statistical effects of structural racism at a society-
wide level, racialized positions allow for a nimbler theorization of how race affects individual 
agents in specific social structures, and social practices within those structures.  
In this context, it is important to remember that racialized groups are actually existing 
social groups subject to racial categorization and differential treatment. Apart from their 
ontological status, racialized groups also serve a methodological purpose. Racialized groups are 
the social groups that fulfill Cudd's second and third conditions of oppression. Non-whites 
constitute the many groups that suffer the harms of racial oppression (social group condition) and 
whites are the social group that benefits from racial oppression (privilege condition). By contrast, 
racialized positions (like social positions) are theoretical constructs. They help us capture the 
nuances of the social relations that obtain among members of varying social structures and social 
practices. Racialized positions shed light on the myriad ways in which members of racialized 
groups can be affected (positively or negatively) within specific racially oppressive social 
structures. Racialized positions account for the fact that the effects of racial oppression on 
members of racialized groups will vary according to their participation and social positioning in 
the many social structures that make up society.  
To illustrate this concept, I will return to the running example of chapter 2—a school. A 
school is a social structure that is made up of a network of relations among social positions (e.g. 
teacher, student, parent, administrator), as well as relations between social positions and the 
structure's material resources (e.g. students' relation to their desks or the blackboard). Qua social 
structure, a school is also a network of interconnected social practices, which include the practice 
of classroom learning, the practice of disciplining students, the practice of organizing class 
schedules, among others. Agents who occupy positions within the structure participate in these 
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practices by following the schemas that govern each of these practices and coordinating their 
collective behavior accordingly. For example, the practice of disciplining requires students to 
follow the schemas of good classroom behavior, such as getting to class on time, not having private 
conversations, and respecting the instructor. In turn, instructors are expected to enforce these rules 
by calling out students who violate them and taking disciplinary action suited to the student's 
misconduct. The proper functioning of the practice of disciplining relies on the students and the 
instructor reliably acting in accordance with the duties and prerogatives attached to their social 
positions, as well as the schemas that govern the practice.  
Let us now focus on the practice of school discipline in order to unveil the theoretical value 
of racialized positions. As we will see, race plays a key role in how the practice of school discipline 
unfolds in many schools in the United States today. Notice how my focus has narrowed down not 
just to the level of a school structure, but even to the level of one of the many practices that take 
place in schools—namely, the practice of school discipline. Earlier I offered an idealized 
description of this practice as a social coordination effort among agents socially positioned as 
students and teachers. Students follow the rules of good classroom behavior and teachers enforce 
these rules by disciplining students in accordance with their degree of misconduct. The scenario I 
depicted earlier is idealized insofar as it bracketed the ways in which racial schemas (to take only 
one kind of identity-based prejudices) influence the behavior of agents who occupy social positions 
in the practice.  
In order to show the impact of race on the practice of school discipline, I will draw on a 
recent sociological case study of the racial achievement gap at Riverview High, a U.S. high 
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school.97 Among their many findings, Diamond and Lewis document and explain the racialized 
nature of the disciplinary practices at Riverview High. They found that "racial dynamics play a 
key role in both (a) who gets selected for discipline, and (b) how punishment is processed, with 
black and Latina/o students being disciplined more often and differently than white students."98 
One of the reasons for the racialized differences in who gets selected for discipline is that the 
teachers at Riverview High operate with the tacit racialized schema that black and Latinx students 
are more likely to misbehave and break the rules.99 As a result, when they do misbehave—even 
with small infractions—their behavior is interpreted as transgressive and in need of intervention. 
By contrast, teachers have a different racialized schema for white students. Rather than being seen 
as inherently suspect, they are seen as inherently innocent. Thus, when white students misbehave, 
their behavior is often seen as silly and at worst a minor annoyance. In this case, the source of the 
racial inequality is that the rules are not enforced equally. Teachers whose role is to monitor 
students' adherence to the rules operate with racialized schemas that lead them to ignore the 
transgressions of white students, while remaining hyper vigilant of the transgressions of black and 
Latinx students. In this case, the racially oppressive harm lies in the racially biased application of 
the rules of the practice. White students at Riverview High have a positive privilege (i.e. a 
prerogative) to engage in bad behavior with a low risk of being disciplined—a privilege that is not 
extended to black and Latinx students. Black and Latinx students were not only more likely to be 
sanctioned for bad behavior, but also received harsher punishment. In 2009, black students in 
particular represented roughly 65% of school suspensions even though they only made up 35% of 
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the school population.100 Moreover, white parents were more likely to advocate for their kids and 
to exhibit a sense of entitlement when navigating the disciplinary process.  
Racial schemas a key role in the disciplinary practices at Riverview High. This is evident 
not only from the racially unequal outcomes of the practice, but also from the relations between 
agents who occupy positions within the structure. To take one example, the racialized schemas 
[black student  inherently suspect] and [white student  inherently innocent] have a significant 
impact on agents who occupy the position of student in the practice of discipline at Riverview 
High. In fact, from a methodological point of view, it is best to think of 'black student' and 'white 
student' as the actually existing social positions within the Riverview High structure. In other 
words, the fact that racialized schemas guide the practice of disciplining means that the social 
position 'student' is too general to accurately describe the network of social relations at Riverview 
High. While the social position 'student' may have been helpful in my ideal-theoretical description 
of a school structure, once we turn to the non-ideal project of theorizing the effects of racial 
schemas on the practice of disciplining at Riverview High, it is more insightful to account for 
multiple racialized positions (i.e. 'white student', 'black student', 'Latinx student'). The relation 
[teacher - white student] is different from the relation [teacher – black student]. In the first relation, 
the teacher does not correct most of the white students' misconduct and in fact may not even 
identify them as such. By contrast, in the second relation the teacher is hyper vigilant of any 
possible rule-breaking by black students and is likely to punish them more severely. The disparity 
in these racialized student-teacher relations is not the result of a particular teacher failing to fulfill 
their role in the practice. Rather, this racial disparity is systematic at Riverview High and follows 
from the pervasiveness of the racialized schemas mentioned above, as well as racially biased rules 
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for the identification and punishment of student misconduct. Of course, these racialized schemas 
and racially biased rules do not need to be explicit in order to guide the behavior of teachers and 
other participants in the practice. In fact, the implicit (perhaps even unacknowledged) nature of 
these racially oppressive rules and schemas may even contribute to the endurance of the racialized 
practice of discipline at Riverview High.  
  The disciplinary practices at Riverview High shed light on how racialized positions work. 
When the relations among socially positioned agents are significantly affected by race, it is best to 
theorize the structure's social positions in terms of racialized positions. In light of the racialized 
disciplinary practices at Riverview High, racialized positons such as 'white student', 'black student', 
'white parent', and so on, are key theoretical devices for explaining how racial oppression works 
in the particular context of school discipline. In this context, the specificity of racialized positions 
is an advantage over racialized groups for theoretical purposes. The racialized schemas and racially 
biased rules that explain the disciplinary racial disparity at Riverview High does not harm all 
members of the racialized group black. Rather, it harms members of the racialized group black 
who occupy the racialized position of 'black student' at Riverview High. Of course, slightly 
modified versions of the racialized schema [black student  inherently suspect] are pervasive in 
other social structures in the U.S. One may even argue that the racialized schema [black  
inherently suspect] harms all black people. However, we would still need to turn to racialized 
positions in order to get a detailed analysis of how this schema harms black people in specific 
social structures. In chapter 6, I will offer a more thorough analysis of racial oppression drawing 
on racialized positions. For now, I will turn to the third distinctly racial feature of racially 
oppressive social structures.  
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4.3. Structural Racism Reproduces Oppressive Relations between Racialized 
Groups 
The third distinctly racial feature of racially oppressive social structures is that they 
reinforce oppressive relations among racialized groups. As I discuss in chapter 3, social relations 
among social groups are oppressive when one or more social groups suffer from a structurally 
caused harm, which at the same time benefits a privileged group within the structure. Applied to 
the domain of race, oppressive relations among racialized groups entail the existence of structural 
harms for members of non-white racialized groups, which also benefit agents socially positioned 
as white. Another way to put the same point is that racially oppressive relations are social relations 
of privilege and disadvantage between whites and non-whites. In fact, a common claim among 
anti-racist activist is to describe structural racism as a system that privileges whites to the detriment 
of non-whites. According to Charles Mills, white supremacy—which corresponds to structural 
racism in my account—is a social system whose end is the illicit differential advantage of whites 
as a group with respect to non-whites.101 According to Mills, white supremacy (i.e. structural 
racism) contributes to the reproduction of social relations among racialized groups whereby whites 
are privileged vis-a-vis non-whites. These racially conferred privileges range from material 
benefits, differential moral/legal/social treatment, and differential rational expectations of 
economic success, to cultural and aesthetic recognition, first-class citizenship and full 
personhood.102 These social relations of white privilege are, by the same token, relations of non-
white disadvantage. Just like whites as a group systematically benefit from their social position in 
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a racially oppressive social structure, non-whites are systematically disadvantaged by the same 
structure. 
Michael Brown and David Wellman explain the link between white privilege and non-
white disadvantage through their theory of racial accumulation and disaccumulation, according to 
which the cumulative effects of past racial discrimination and exclusion have resulted in the 
accumulation of race-based advantages by Whites at the expense of Blacks.103 As they show, even 
very small economic and social advantages compound and can, like an investment, have large 
cumulative effects over many generations. Conversely, the concepts of “disinvestment” and 
“disaccumulation” point to the ways in which exclusion from economic and social opportunities 
can compound over time and result in inter-generational disaccumulation. In pre-civil rights 
America, labor market discrimination, as well as an array of discriminatory federal social policies 
(e.g. veterans’ programs, federal housing policy, and welfare policy) resulted in White 
accumulation of economic advantage while contributing to Black disaccumulation through lack of 
access to secure and well-paying jobs, segregation and the disaccumulation of wealth.104 Since the 
dismantling of Jim Crow did not include policies that redressed the inter-generational effects of 
the twin processes of White accumulation and Black disaccumulation, Blacks continue to be 
systematically disadvantaged vis-a-vis Whites in their competition for resources and 
opportunities—including in employment and education. As Dalton Conley shows, the higher 
levels of White wealth that result from inter-generational accumulation translate into educational 
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and labor market advantages, which in turn (partly) explains the endurance of racial economic 
inequality more generally.105 
So far, I have described racially oppressive relations in terms of social relations of white 
privilege and non-white disadvantage. However, when the harms inflicted on the oppressed 
racialized group are especially severe, racially oppressive relations may take the form of relations 
of domination. Thus, in my view, relations of domination correspond to extreme cases of 
oppressive relations. Following Lovett, we can claim that a racialized group (or a member thereof) 
is dominated when it is dependent on a social relationship in which another racialized group (or a 
member thereof) wields arbitrary power over it (or over its members).106 For instance, New World 
slavery was a social system in which Black slaves were dominated by White slave-owners insofar 
the latter wielded arbitrary power over the former—there was little that a slave-owner was not 
permitted to do to a slave in his possession. Moreover, Black slaves were dependent on this 
dominating relation insofar as their material survival depended on the will of the White slave-
owner. 
 Anti-racist activists also press the claim that the social relations among racialized groups 
in the contemporary United States (in particular, the relations between whites and blacks) can be 
described not only as relations of privilege and disadvantage, but also as relations of domination.107 
There are at least two ways of interpreting this claim. A weak version of the claim merely seeks to 
make explicit the causal and conceptual link between contemporary racialized social systems and 
historical projects of racial domination such as transatlantic slavery, colonialism and imperialism. 
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However, I think that anti-racist movements often intend to make the stronger claim that the 
contemporary American social system continues to instantiate relations of racial domination today.  
Insofar as Lovett’s definition of domination requires that the dominant group wield 
arbitrary power over the dominated, it may prove difficult to argue that non-whites are currently 
dominated by whites. After all, slavery has been abolished, race-based discrimination has been 
outlawed, and there exist constitutional protections for victims of race-based violence. Given that 
the rule of law currently protects (at least in principle) members of non-white populations from 
the arbitrary actions of whites, it seems that whites cannot exert power over non-whites 
arbitrarily—that is to say, without being “externally constrained by effective rules, procedures, or 
goals that are common knowledge to all persons or groups involved”.108 However, Lovett seems 
to acknowledge that once we consider non-ideal conditions, it may be possible to describe the 
American criminal justice system as instantiating relations of domination insofar as racial profiling 
grants police officers arbitrary powers to subject non-whites to random stops and searches.109 In 
the same vein, the sordid regularity with which unarmed Black people are murdered at the hands 
of police officers with little to no consequences, suggests that they possess arbitrary power over 
Black people’s lives. Examples of this kind suggest that describing the institution of policing as 
instantiating relations of race based domination, and therefore as an instance of structural racism, 
is entirely appropriate.110 
 There is an alternative way to defend the stronger claim that the U.S. social system 
continues to instantiate relations of racial domination. In Race: A Philosophical Introduction, Paul 
                                                 
108 Lovett, Theory of Domination, 96. 
109 Ibid., 98, fn. 21. 
110 Here I am assuming that the institution of policing also fulfills conditions (1) and (2) as described in my definition 
of racialized social systems. 
101 
 
Taylor elaborates on Howard Winant’s concluding remarks in The World Is a Ghetto: Race and 
Democracy Since World War II (2002) regarding the recent shift in the world racial system from 
domination to hegemony. According to Taylor, in the present post-racial situation, racialized social 
systems have minimized the cost of maintaining themselves by accommodating and co-opting the 
resistance that results from their negative disparate impact on communities of color. For Taylor, 
this strategy of accommodating and co-opting anti-racist resistance marks “the shift from 
domination, or rule by force, to hegemony, or crudely, rule by consent.”111 The shift from force to 
consent is marked by assimilating voices of dissent into the status quo. For instance, civil rights 
activists became legislators and politicians seeking to reform the system to advance their anti-
racist causes. However, in doing so they acquired a positional interest in maintaining the system 
that they originally intended to abolish. Moreover, their participation and investment in the system 
grants it a veneer of legitimacy, which obscures the ways in which the system continues to be 
implicated in the problem of the color line. According to Taylor, the shift from domination to 
hegemony allowed the U.S. racialized social system to garner the consent of the oppressed as a 
way to stabilize itself along with its reproduction of hierarchical racial relations.  
 To recap, the third distinctly racial feature of racially oppressive social structures is that 
they enforce oppressive relations between racialized groups. These oppressive relations can take 
the form of relations of domination and relations of advantage/disadvantage. While some cases of 
structural racism may not reach the level of racial domination, relations of race-based privilege 
and disadvantage are constitutive of all instances of structural racism. As a result, structural racism 
has differential consequences on the life chances of individuals depending on their position in the 
structure—that is, depending on whether they belong to a subordinate (i.e. non-white) or 
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superordinate (i.e. white) racialized group. In chapter 6, I will explain one way in which racially 
oppressive social structures reinforce relations of race-based privilege and disadvantage. In 
particular, I will show how structural racism explains the durability of the racial achievement gap 




Chapter 5: Structural Racism and Other "Racisms" 
5.1. What is Racism? A Second Approximation to the Debate 
  As I have discussed throughout this dissertation, thinking of racism at the level of social 
structures is crucial for making sense of the mechanisms that reproduce racial inequality. However, 
thinking of racism in structural terms is not common in philosophy. Save for a few exceptions, 
philosophical debates on the concept of racism tend to focus on whether particular individuals (or 
their beliefs, acts, intentions, etc.) may be considered racist. In other words, there is an individualist 
bias in philosophical discussions of racism that obscures the ways in which racism operates at the 
level of social structures. This individualist bias in the philosophical literature on racism is 
correlated with a focus on the moral implications of racism. A widely shared assumption in the 
literature is that an adequate theory of racism ought to capture the strong moral condemnation 
associated with the concept. As a consequence, the discussion tends to revolve around whether 
various forms of race-related wrongs that fall short of explicit racial bigotry deserve the label of 
racism, along with its negative moral implications. This tendency, which is not exclusive to 
philosophy, fits what sociologist Loïc Wacquant has called the “logic of the trial” in discussions 
of race—that is, a tendency to focus on convicting or exonerating this or that person, institution or 
society from the sin of racism, rather than on identifying the mechanisms behind the reproduction 
of racial domination (1997). As a result of these individualist and moralist biases in philosophical 
discussions of racism, attempts to theorize racism as a structural phenomenon are often dismissed. 
To be clear, I am not making the implausible claim that an account of racism can stay clear from 
making normative judgments. Racism is inevitably a normative concept. The issue with the “logic 
of the trial” is not the emphasis on morality per se, but rather the narrow focus on individual 
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culpability and blameworthiness, at the expense of other normatively salient features, such as the 
persistence of social relations of race-based oppression.  
 In chapter 4, I articulated an account of structural racism in terms of racially oppressive 
structures. In so doing, I focused on how structural racism contributes to a better explanation of 
the reproduction of racial inequality. While I think that structural racism plays a fundamental 
causal role in the maintenance of racial inequality, my explanatory account would be incomplete 
if I ignored the causal role of other racist phenomena. Moreover, talk of racist individuals, racist 
beliefs, racist intentions and racist actions is part of our common-sense talk about race, and 
therefore cannot be easily abandoned. These other concepts of racism do pick out important 
features of how race works in the contemporary world. Just because individualist conceptions of 
racism do not fully capture the sources of racial injustice, it does not mean that we ought to discard 
them and replace them with a structural conception.112 As I argued earlier, I favor a pluralistic 
stance on the second-order question of how to assess different accounts of racism. In some contexts 
and for certain projects, a focus on individual racism may be preferable (e.g. if the point is to assess 
individual responsibility for racist actions). However, even for my project, which focuses on 
explanation and social structures, it is crucial to make explicit the interaction between social 
structures and individuals.  
In spite of the inevitable disagreement over its extension, ‘racism’ has become, for better 
or worse, the preferred term to express people’s intuitions about what the “race problem” amounts 
to. On the one hand, conservatives conceptualize racism as explicit racial prejudice and bigotry, 
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and point to the decline of these attitudes as evidence that racism is a thing of the past.113 On the 
other hand, anti-racist movements conceptualize racism as an ongoing structural problem. On the 
structural racism view, racially oppressive social structures explain the persistent disadvantage that 
people of color face in their interaction with the various institutions of society (e.g. criminal justice 
system, health care system, education system, financial institutions, housing market, etc.). Thus, 
part of the disagreement over how to conceptualize racism stems from different ways of analyzing 
racism as a social problem—or in other words, what Du Bois called the “problem of the color 
line”. In my view, when anti-racist movements insist on using the term racism to describe the 
structures of racial privilege that systematically disadvantage people of color, they are implicitly 
insisting on expanding our understanding of the problem of the color line beyond the level of 
individual prejudice. Thinking of racism in structural terms rejects the post-racial discourse that 
racism is over by highlighting that this social problem will not disappear until we address the social 
structures that reproduce race-based disadvantage. 
5.2. Racism: Ideological, Individual, Institutional, and Structural 
 Earlier, I argued that the concept of structural racism—as it is used by anti-racist 
movements and critical race theorists—should be understood as a particular conceptualization of 
the long-standing problem of the color line. In order to appreciate this thought, it would be helpful 
to describe at some length three major alternative ways for conceptualizing racism as a social 
problem—namely, ideological racism, individual racism and institutional racism. As we will see, 
all of these alternatives propose a particular diagnosis of racism as a social problem and identify 
the locus of racism accordingly. That is to say, racism has also been conceptualized as a problem 
having to do, first and foremost, with ideologies, individual-level phenomena and institutions. It’s 
                                                 
113See Dinesh D’Souza, The End of Racism (New York: Free Press, 1996).  
106 
 
often thought that these ways of conceptualizing racism are at odds with one another. This point 
is most often made with respect to individual and institutional accounts of racism. For instance, 
Glasgow argues that individual (or what he calls, agent-based) accounts of racism cannot handle 
some cases covered by institutional accounts of racism, and vice versa.114 However, this is a false 
dilemma. Ideological, individual and institutional racism are not in conflict—in fact, they all pick 
out important aspects of the problem of the color line. Not only that, but all three conceptions of 
racism are also crucial for understanding the workings of structural racism. In order to understand 
how structures of racial disadvantage operate, it is crucial to understand how individual prejudice 
and behavior figures in them. Similarly, the stability of structural racism depends on the 
legitimizing function of racist ideologies and the institutional mechanisms for reproducing racial 
disadvantage. Rather than delving into the endless debate over how to best conceptualize racism, 
my aim is to show that the most important alternatives that have been advanced (i.e. racism as 
ideological, individual and institutional phenomena) are not only compatible with, but actually key 
for understanding the nature of structural racism. This is because the phenomena picked out by 
individual, ideological and institutional racism are jointly constitutive of the structures of racial 
disadvantage that I refer to as structural racism. 
 In order to show this, I will primarily draw on Tommie Shelby’s work on racism, which 
makes explicit the connection between ideological, individual and institutional racism. Shelby’s 
project is congenial with the one I develop here given that, although he favors an ideological 
conceptualization of racism, he is open to the possibility of ascribing racism to phenomena other 
than ideologies. However, my project also differs from Shelby’s in that I am not primarily 
interested in showing the conceptual connection between various forms of racism. Whereas Shelby 
                                                 
114Joshua Glasgow, “Racism as Disrespect,” Ethics 120, no. 1 (2009): 71-77. 
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goes to great lengths to show that an ideology-first account of racism can accommodate individual 
and institutional conceptions of racism, I am more interested in the connections among the 
phenomena to which those conceptions refer. In particular, my aim is to show that the phenomena 
picked out by ideological, individual and institutional conceptions of racism are all implicated in 
the sustained reproduction of structural racism. In other words, my project is an exercise in social 
ontology, rather than one in conceptual analysis. 
 My argument proceeds as follows. First, I rely on Shelby’s conceptual analysis of 
ideological racism in order to delimit the phenomena to which that term refers (5.2.1). In doing so, 
I propose some changes to his view in order to improve on his conceptualization of the phenomena. 
Second, I give a description of the phenomena that individualist conceptions of racism are 
supposed to capture (5.2.2). To perform this task, I draw on individualistic accounts of racism in 
philosophy (viz. cognitivism, behaviorism and non-cognitivism) and the social sciences (viz. 
racism as individual prejudice). Third, I do the same descriptive work with the concept of 
institutional racism (5.2.3). Here, I rely once more on the work of Tommie Shelby—in particular, 
on his distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic institutional racism. Finally, I bring together the 
phenomena picked out by ideological, individual and institutional racism and show how they 
jointly constitute and maintain structural racism (5.2.4). 
5.2.1. Ideological Racism 
 According to Shelby, racism is fundamentally a type of ideology. Shelby defines ideology 
as “a widely held set of loosely associated beliefs and implicit judgments that misrepresent 
significant social realities and that function, through this distortion, to bring about or perpetuate 
unjust social relations.”115 Although Shelby identifies ideologies primarily with sets of beliefs, he 
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also claims that ideologies often become deeply entrenched in discourse and cultural products 
(slogans, jokes, film, music, art, television programming, advertisements, etc.), as well as in 
society’s “common sense.” By this I take him to mean that ideologies alter the schemas through 
which individuals make sense of social reality and their social identities. In other words, ideologies 
include not just sets of beliefs, but also the conceptual repertoires that color people’s experience 
of the world. Ideologies that become part of a society’s background assumptions not only distort 
the way social actors perceive the social world; they also affect how they organize their lives and 
coordinate their actions in the context of their social practices.116   
 Shelby identifies three properties that all ideologies share.117 First, ideologies are 
epistemically flawed. Most ideologies are not simply false; in fact, because ideologies distort the 
way we perceive reality, the observed “facts” often appear to confirm the content of the ideology. 
Secondly, ideologies serve a hegemonic function insofar as they contribute to the (re)production 
of unjust social arrangements, which are often rooted in oppressive social relations that benefit a 
hegemonic group. The most common way in which ideologies perform this function is through 
legitimation—that is, by creating the appearance that the unjust social arrangements are justified. 
Finally, ideologies have a genetic component insofar as they are adopted with a false 
consciousness. In non-Marxist language, ideologies become widely accepted because of the 
influence of non-cognitive motives, such as the desire to maintain a positive self-conception or a 
dominant social position. Importantly, the agent that adopts the ideology need not be aware that 
she is doing so out of non-cognitive motives because these motives often operate behind our backs. 
                                                 
116Recall Haslanger’s claim that ideologies are schemas that partially constitute social practices that reproduce 
relations of domination and subordination. 
117The following is drawn from Tommie Shelby, “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory,” The Philosophical 
Forum 32, no. 2 (2003): 157-160. 
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 Building on his account of ideology, Shelby defines ideological racism as “a set of 
misleading beliefs and implicit attitudes about “races” or race relations whose wide currency 
serves a hegemonic social function.”118 As a kind of ideology, racism has epistemic, functional 
and genetic properties that call for criticism. To take up a previous example, classical racialism 
consists of a set of beliefs, central to which is the (biological) concept of race. The race concept 
underlies the hierarchical sorting of human populations according to phenotypical traits, hereditary 
lines, and continental origin. Classical racialism is epistemically flawed because of the pseudo-
scientific basis upon which this sorting is justified. Classical racialism can also be criticized on 
functionalist grounds insofar as it was used to justify projects of racial domination, such as the 
transatlantic slave trade, European colonialism and New World slavery. The illusory belief in the 
natural inferiority of Blacks and Native Americans functioned to legitimize the oppression and near 
extermination of these populations. Finally, classical racialism is also subject to genetic criticism. 
As Shelby points out, the slave-holding aristocracy of the American South accepted the ideology 
of classical racialism not out of truth-conducing reasons, but because it benefited their social 
position in the local slave economy.119120   
So far I have described the properties of ideological racism by referring to classical 
racialism. However, ideological racism is not static. Its content changes in response to shifting 
cultural, political and economic contexts, as well as in response to social criticism.121 For instance, 
classical racialism, with its now debunked doctrine of whites’ biological superiority, has been 
                                                 
118Shelby, “Racism, Moralism, and Social Criticism,” 66. 
119Shelby, “Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social Theory,” 182. 
120 For a discussion of how antebellum slave-owning families clung to racist ideologies in order to preserve the 
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replaced by cultural racism. Unlike its predecessor, cultural racism relies on non-biological 
concepts, such as black cultural pathology, the disintegration of the black family and blacks’ lack 
of individual motivation, to explain away the persistence of racial inequality. Despite the change 
in content, cultural racism serves the same hegemonic function as classical racialism; namely, to 
rationalize a social structure of racial disadvantage (i.e. structural racism).  
5.2.2. Individual Racism 
 When philosophers theorize racism as an individual-level phenomenon, they do so in 
cognitive, behavioral or non-cognitive terms.122 According to the cognitivist model, racism refers 
to cognitive attitudes (e.g. beliefs) towards a particular set of morally problematic propositions in 
the domain of race. In an influential account, Appiah cashes out the content of racist beliefs in 
terms of (1) “racialism” (i.e. there are racial essences that allow us to divide individuals into races) 
and either (2a) “extrinsic racism” (i.e. it is justified to treat people differently on the basis of race 
because racial essences are correlated with differences in morally relevant qualities, such as honor, 
courage and intelligence) or (2b) “intrinsic racism” (i.e. it is justified to differentiate morally on 
the basis of race because each race has an intrinsically different moral status).123 In Appiah’s 
cognitivist picture, racism refers to a combination of false propositions (e.g. racialism, and 
extrinsic racism or intrinsic racism) and a cognitive disposition to resist a rational revision of those 
beliefs in the face of countervailing evidence. 
                                                 
122 Luc Faucher and Edouard Machery, "Racism: Against Jorge Garcia's Moral and Psychological Monism," 
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Conceptions"; Glasgow, "Racism as Disrespect"; Levy, "Am I Racist?" 
123Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Racisms,” in Anatomy of Racism, ed. David Goldberg (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1990), 3-17. 
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 The second individualist model for understanding racism is behaviorism. According to this 
model, racism involves individuals behaving or being disposed to behave in a way that is harmful 
to the members of a racial group.124 In this model, racism picks out the likes of discriminatory and 
disrespectful behavior, as well as behavior that contributes to systematic racial disadvantage, 
exclusion, or domination. For instance, Michael Philips defends a behavioral account according to 
which racism refers primarily to what he calls “basic racist acts”, which he defines as follows: “P 
performs a Basic Racist Act by doing A when: (a) P does A in order to harm Q because Q is a 
member of a certain ethnic group; or (b) (regardless of P’s intentions or purposes) P’s doing A can 
reasonably be expected to mistreat Q as a consequence of Q’s being a member of a certain ethnic 
group.”125 
 The last major individualist framework for theorizing racism is non-cognitivism. 
According to this framework, racism refers primarily to non-cognitive states such as volitions and 
emotions. Jorge Garcia’s influential account of racism advances a volitional model. For Garcia, 
racism refers primarily to a morally vicious ill-will or disregard towards members of another race. 
His account is volitional insofar as it treats racism as primarily a matter of what what a person 
wills for others in light of their race. In other words, on Garcia’s view, racism picks out “the content 
of a person’s will”.126 When the content of the person’s will is hatred, ill-will or disregard, then 
that person is properly described as racist. Although Garcia prefers to describe his account as 
volitional, the phenomena that his conception of racism picks out seems to also involve emotions. 
                                                 
124 Faucher and Machery, "Racism," 45. 
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This is most evident with respect to hatred and ill-will, but disregard may also have emotional 
elements insofar as it can involve a lack of empathy vis-a-vis members of another racialized group. 
 Affective accounts of racism also fall within the non-cognitive framework and they identify 
racism with certain negative emotions (or a disposition to have such emotions) towards members 
of other races. In their defense of the relevance of psychology to debates on racism, Faucher and 
Machery defend an affective model, according to which racism refers primarily to an array of 
emotions ranging from hatred, hostility, anger and disgust, to fear, jealousy, envy, pity, and 
indifference. Drawing on a sociofunctional approach to emotions, they argue that the plurality of 
emotions evoked by particular racial groups corresponds to the problems that the group is seen as 
posing (e.g. if African-Americans elicit mostly fear among whites, it is because they are seen as a 
problem for property and security). Thus, Faucher and Machery argue that in order to understand 
the nature of racism, we ought to pay attention to the plurality of racist emotions, the cultural 
representations of the problems that racial groups are seen as posing, and the stereotypes associated 
with particular racialized groups.127 
 Part of what drives philosophers towards these individualist models for theorizing racism 
(i.e. cognitivism, behaviorism and non-cognitivism) is that they reflect our common-sense 
understanding of racism. In many cases, philosophers are explicit in their commitment to a 
conceptualization of racism that captures the ways in which the term is employed in ordinary 
everyday discourse.128 In light of this, it is not a surprise that philosophers’ individualist accounts 
of racism are compatible with the traditional model for understanding racism in the social 
sciences—namely, as individual racial prejudice. 
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 In his influential On the Nature of Prejudice, the psychologist Gordon Allport defined 
prejudice as “antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization”.129 Allport’s definition 
highlights the affective and cognitive components of racism as racial prejudice. Today, 
psychologists theorize racial prejudice as an individual-level attitude with cognitive, behavioral 
and affective components.130 The concept of stereotype captures the cognitive component of 
prejudice. Stereotypes are associations and beliefs about the characteristics of a group and its 
members, which shape how people think about and respond to the group. The concept of 
discrimination (i.e. behavior that maintains or reinforces advantage for some group and its 
members over another group and its members) captures the behavioral component. Finally, and 
somewhat confusingly, ‘prejudice2’ also refers to the affective component of ‘prejudice’ qua 
individual-level attitude.131 Prejudice2 picks out the same phenomena as affective accounts of 
racism in philosophy—namely, emotions such as fear and hatred towards members of another 
group. These emotions are thought to shape the affective side of people’s reactions to other groups 
and their members. 
 Hence, racial prejudice qua individual-level attitude captures all the phenomena present in 
cognitivist, behavioral and non-cognitivist models of racism. Moreover, the psychological account 
of racism as racial prejudice explains the connection between these phenomena; prejudices2 and 
stereotypes (the cognitive and affective components) are thought to cause discriminatory behavior. 
Importantly, racial prejudice was traditionally understood as as an explicit attitude consisting of 
conscious and deliberate processes. More recently, it has been proposed that racial prejudice can 
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also consist of implicit attitudes (also known as implicit biases) in which the aforementioned 
cognitive, affective and behavioral processes can be unintentionally activated or operate outside 
of conscious awareness. 
 Despite its traditional hold on social scientific analysis of racism, the individual prejudice 
model has recently come under attack. Anti-racist social movements and radical race scholars are 
dissatisfied with its individualistic framework, which conceptualizes the problem of racism as 
simply a matter of overt and irrational racial attitudes among white Americans. According to its 
critics, the individual prejudice model provides an impoverished assessment of the problem of 
racism. For one thing, the model’s focus on overt and crude racism left out those individuals who 
do not externalize their racist beliefs and emotions, whether it be because these remain implicit or 
because they have found ways to express their racial views in race-neutral language. Another 
criticism raised against the individual prejudice model is that, by theorizing racism as an irrational 
phenomenon (or as the effect of universal intrapsychic processes, as it’s theorized in implicit bias 
research), it obscures the ways in which the problem of racism is linked to Whites’ group-based 
interest in maintaining the privileges that stem from racial oppression.132 Finally, the emphasis on 
individual-level attitudes prevents understanding the problem of racism as also a matter of social 
institutions that reproduce systematic racial disadvantage, even in the absence of racial prejudice 
among their members.133 This latter line of criticism gave rise to the concept of institutional racism, 
to which I turn now. 
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5.2.3. Institutional Racism 
 Kwame Ture and Charles Hamilton in Black Power first introduced the concept of 
institutional racism in Black Power: The Politics of Liberation. At a time when individual 
prejudice was the dominant framework for understanding American racism, Ture and Hamilton 
argued that ‘institutional racism’ was a necessary tool for understanding the effects of racism on 
the lives of Black people in the United States. From its inception, institutional racism had an 
explanatory aim—namely, to improve our understanding of how racial subordination is 
reproduced. At a time when explanations of racial disadvantage were strongly influenced by 
Allportian models of individual prejudice, Ture and Hamilton argued that a complete account of 
the mechanisms that kept Black people in an inferior position should include the institutions that 
reproduce systematic racial disadvantage. As they put it, the problem of racism is not just a matter 
of “individual whites acting against individual blacks.”134 Without denying the gravity of acts of 
individual racism, Ture and Hamilton highlighted the much more subtle workings of institutional 
racism, which can be observed in “the lack of proper food, shelter and medical facilities... [as well 
as] the conditions of poverty and segregation in black communities”.135 Unlike individual racism, 
which is deplored by the majority of whites, government institutions whose policies lock black 
people in an inferior position garner the support of whites, who oftentimes benefit from them. In 
introducing the concept of institutional racism, Ture and Hamilton sought to make clear that such 
institutions were no less destructive of human life than acts of racial bigotry, and should therefore 
be opposed as much as individual racism. In my opinion, their use of the language of institutional 
racism to describe this institutionalized reproduction of racial disadvantage was meant to highlight 
                                                 




that this phenomenon is central to an explanatory account of the social problem that in everyday 
talk goes by the name of racism. 
 Tommie Shelby picks up Ture and Hamilton’s concept of institutional racism and renders 
it amenable to philosophical analysis. Shelby distinguishes between two types of institutional 
racism: intrinsic and extrinsic. Although Shelby’s distinction is extremely helpful, his discussion 
of institutional racism is brief and opens the door to potential objections.136 Therefore, I will fine-
tune the distinction and illustrate it with some examples of my own. According to Shelby, 
institutions are intrinsically racist when their constitutive features are infected by a racist 
ideology.137 Shelby identifies three levels at which racism can infect an institution. First, the goals 
of an institution may be racist if it aims to harm the members of a racialized group and such aims 
are justified or rationalized by a racist ideology. Such racist goals need not be explicit or public; 
in fact, institutions that appear to have race-neutral goals may be covertly designed to subordinate 
a racial group. An institution so designed will be intrinsically racist even if it fails to attain its ends. 
Thus, whether an institution is intrinsically racist is not necessarily a matter of its effects. 
 An institution can also be intrinsically racist if the content of its rules and/or criteria for 
assigning roles to its members contains racial bias or is racially discriminatory. Shelby conceives 
of institutions as social practices—that is, as “formal system[s] of roles and rules that enable and 
regulate sustained cooperative action for some specified purpose.”138 To function appropriately, 
an institution requires its members to enact the role assigned to them and follow the rules 
associated with the role. Institutional rules and role criteria need not be explicitly racist. All that is 
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needed is for racially biased or discriminatory rules and role criteria to be operative in the 
institution, even if only at an implicit and informal level. The Ferguson Police Department is an 
example of an institution with racist rules. The US Justice Department Ferguson Report found that 
that one of the implicit common-sense rules followed by police officers was to treat Black citizens 
as “criminals” and as “lacking personal responsibility”. These racially biased rules that undergird 
the practice of policing in the FPD make the institution intrinsically racist.139    
 Finally, racist ideology can make an institution intrinsically racist if it infects the 
application of its procedures. Even if the goals of an institution are non-racist and its rules and role 
criteria are free of racial bias, an institution may be intrinsically racist if its members systematically 
fail to apply those rules and role criteria equally and consistently because of personal prejudice. 
The pervasive racially discriminatory application of institutional procedures may be conscious or 
unconscious, but is always the result of individual actions informed by a racist ideology. For 
instance, even if the FPD purged its implicit and explicit rules from racial bias and discrimination 
it would still remain intrinsically racist so long as it does not address the police officers’ implicit 
biases, which lead them to use excessive force against Blacks.140 Insofar as police officers would 
systematically fail to apply the correct (non-racist) rules for the use of force when dealing with 
Black citizens—and insofar as this systematic misapplication of the rules of policing would stem 
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from the workings of racist ideology via the psychological mechanism of implicit bias—the FPD 
would continue to be intrinsically racist. 
 Insofar as ‘intrinsic institutional racism’ picks out institutions whose constitutive features 
are infected by racist ideology, this type of institutional racism is (in most instances) reducible to 
an individualistic model of racism. This is most clear in the case of intrinsically racist institutions 
in which members fail to apply institutional rules equally and consistently due to individual 
prejudice. Although less evident, the same applies for most cases of institutions whose goals and 
rules are infected by racist ideology. In most cases in which an institution’s goal is to harm people 
of color, it is possible to trace back that goal to an individual or group of individuals with racist 
intentions. Similarly, when institutions have racially biased or discriminatory rules, it is possible 
to trace those rules back to racially prejudiced individuals who first set those rules—whether or 
not they did so consciously. Whereas ‘intrinsic institutional racism’ is (for the most part) reducible 
to an individualistic model of racism, ‘extrinsic institutional racism’ elides this kind of reducibility 
and is therefore closer to Ture and Hamilton’s formulation of institutional racism as picking out 
institutions that perpetuate black disadvantage. According to Shelby, extrinsically racist 
institutions are racist not because of their constitutive features, but “solely in virtue of their 
policies’ effects.”141 An institution that is not intrinsically racist may be extrinsically racist to the 
extent that it “perpetuate[s] the negative effects of ongoing or past racist actions and thereby 
encourage[s] racist attitudes and stereotypes.”142 This formulation captures the kind of impact-
based instances of institutional racism that Ture and Hamilton and other radical race theorists are 
intent on theorizing. 
                                                 




 Unfortunately, Shelby‘s claim that an institution counts as extrinsically racist solely 
because of its policies’ effects has the potential to create unnecessary confusion. In particular, it 
feeds into individualists’ criticisms that ‘institutional racism’ lacks conceptual clarity. For 
instance, Jorge Garcia’s rejection of impact-based accounts of institutional racism rests precisely 
on this point.143 Garcia argues that talk of institutions having “racist impact” and “racist outcomes” 
conflates racism with the effects of past racism, which to him are separate phenomena—just like 
warfare is separate from the lingering effects of warfare. For this reason, Garcia argues that we 
should reserve the term ‘institutional racism’ for cases in which the vice of racism infects 
institutions’ constitutive features—in other words, to what I described above as intrinsic 
institutional racism. 
 I agree with Garcia that having a negative impact on people of color is not a sufficient 
condition for an institution to be racist—extrinsically or otherwise. Social dynamics are highly 
complex and many institutions—even those with anti-racist constitutive features—may at one time 
or another have the unintended consequence of contributing to the reproduction of racial 
inequality. However, unlike Garcia, I do not endorse an account of institutional racism that is 
ultimately reducible to individual-level phenomena.144 Note that this is compatible with Garcia’s 
claim that ‘vice-based individual racism’ and ‘extrinsic institutional racism’ pick out different 
phenomena. My aim is precisely to vindicate the use of the label ‘racism’ to also refer to 
institutions that fall under some version of an impact-based account of racism. To do this, however, 
I need to identify a further requirement for categorizing as (extrinsically) racist those institutions 
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that have a negative impact on people of color.  In my view, that further requirement is that such 
institutions stand in a certain relation to racist ideology. I will spell out the precise nature of this 
relation in the following section, in which I show how the phenomena picked out by ideological, 
individual and institutional racism work together to constitute and maintain structural racism. For 
now, I would like to clarify that, in my view, an institution is extrinsically racist if and only if a) it 
systematically harms people of color and b) it stands in a (yet to be defined) relation R to 
ideological racism. 
  Before turning to the next section and clarifying the nature of R, let us turn to an example 
that illustrates the concept of extrinsic institutional racism. Word-of-mouth hiring is a widely used 
practice whereby employers channel job offerings through the social networks of current 
employees. This practice gives employers a better chance of hiring a good candidate because 
current employees tend to refer people who they are willing to vouch for and who they think would 
be a good fit for the organization. In most cases, this recruiting technique has a race-neutral 
purpose; namely, to increase the odds of hiring a good candidate. However, even if this social 
practice is not intrinsically racist, it has the effect of erecting an institutional barrier to employment 
for Blacks. Due to formal and informal segregation, Blacks are often excluded from White personal 
networks, which due to past and present racist practices, tend to have more social capital. Blacks’ 
exclusion from White personal networks that channel job offerings through word of mouth bars 
them from one of the most important mechanisms for success in the labor market145 and is arguably 
an important cause for the White-Black unemployment gap.146 In this way, companies that hire 
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through personal connections fulfill one of the necessary conditions for being extrinsically racist 
insofar as they have a negative impact on Blacks that stems from past (formal residential and social 
segregation) and present racist (informal residential segregation and exclusion of Blacks from 
White social circles due to racist prejudices) practices.147  
5.2.4. How Are Ideological, Individual and Institutional Racism Involved in the Reproduction of 
Structural Racism 
 Earlier I claimed that the phenomena picked out by accounts of ideological, individual and 
institutional racism contribute to the stability of structural racism. I have also claimed that, while 
each of these accounts identifies different phenomena as the locus of the social problem of racism, 
they are fully compatible with one another and with my account of structural racism. Now that I 
have described in some detail each of these alternative accounts of racism, I can finally substantiate 
these claims by showing how the phenomena picked out by ideological, individual and institutional 
racism are recursively implicated in the reproduction of racially oppressive social structures. 
 As the reader may recall, social structures consist of networks of social relations, which 
are recursively recreated by individual agents in the context of their social practices. In turn, social 
practices are collective solutions to coordination or access problems with respect to a resource. 
Moreover, social practices consist of sets of interdependent schemas and resources when they 
mutually imply and sustain each other over time. Finally, schemas count as ideologies when they 
structure our social practices such that we reproduce unjust social relations, or value the wrong 
things (or in the wrong way). For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on the first kind of 
ideological schemas—namely, those that organize us in unjust social relations. Haslanger argues 
that schemas are ideological in this sense when they organize us in relations of domination and 
                                                 
147On the role of segregation in perpetuating racial inequality, see Elizabeth Anderson, The Imperative of Integration.  
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subordination. In light of my discussion of structural racism, I would add relations of privilege and 
disadvantage to the list of unjust social relations that are backed up by ideological schemas. With 
this framework in mind, we can think of structural racism as a network of social relations of racial 
domination and/or racial privilege, which is reproduced by the recursive social practices of human 
agents guided by ideological schemas. 
 This description of structural racism highlights the fact that its maintenance is causally 
dependent on an array of social practices—specifically, those social practices whose effect, 
whether intended or not, is the reproduction of relations of racial domination and racial privilege. 
Anti-racist movements and critical race theorists often refer to practices that have this negative 
impact on people of color as racist practices. However, in this dissertation, I employ a narrower 
definition of racist practices. Mirroring my discussion of extrinsically racist institutions in section 
4.2.3, I contend that having this kind of impact is not sufficient to ascribe racism to a practice; in 
addition, that practice must also stand in a certain relation to racist ideology. This should not be a 
surprise given that racist institutions are a subset of racist practices—namely, racist practices 
whose impact is greater because they are particularly enduring and widespread across a range of 
social interactions.148 Moreover, institutions are social practices that manage highly important 
resources (e.g. access to education, access to health care, safety) and therefore play a key role in 
the differential allocation of advantages and disadvantages along racial boundaries. Given their 
impact in the allocation of resources at a societal level, racist institutions are among the most 
important mechanisms for the reproduction of structural racism. This is why accounts of 
                                                 
148Here I am drawing on Giddens’ account of institutions as deeply-layered social practices. See Anthony Giddens, 
Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure, and Contradiction in Social Analysis (London: Macmillan 
Education Ltd, 1979), 65. 
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institutional racism are compatible with my account of structural racism—in fact, analysis of racist 
institutions is essential for explaining the stability of racially oppressive social structures.  
 Having shown the key role that racist institutions play in the reproduction of structural 
racism, I will tie up the loose ends regarding the kind of relation to racist ideology in virtue of 
which some institutions (or more generally, social practices) may be considered extrinsically 
racist. Earlier (5.2.3), I argued that an institution is extrinsically racist if and only if a) it 
systematically harms people of color and b) it stands in a (yet to be defined) relation R to 
ideological racism. I can now specify the nature of R, and in so doing, I will also explain the role 
that ideological racism plays in the reproduction of structural racism. In a nutshell, the relation R 
between extrinsically racist institutions (or practices) and racist ideology can take three forms: 
racist ideology may inform, legitimize or accommodate such institutions (or practices). Moreover, 
it is in virtue of this relation to extrinsically racist institutions that racist ideology performs its 
hegemonic function of sustaining an unjust social order rooted in social relations that benefit a 
hegemonic group. In other words, racist ideology fulfills its hegemonic function by informing, 
legitimizing and accommodating institutions (or practices) that reproduce structural racism. Before 
explaining this in more depth, I will make some additional points about racist ideology. 
 Earlier, I discussed Shelby’s account of ideology in terms of sets of beliefs and conceptual 
repertoires that frame people’s experience of the world and affect the way their organize their lives 
and coordinate their actions in the context of their social practices. Shelby uses ideology in a 
pejorative sense; thus, for him ideologies are subject to criticism insofar as they are epistemically 
flawed, serve a hegemonic function and become widely accepted out of non-cognitive motives, 
such as a desire to maintain a positive self-conception or a dominant position. We can now see that 
Shelby’s account of ideology can be easily cashed out in terms of ideological schemas. That is, 
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racist ideologies refer to the schemas that function to inform, legitimize or accommodate practices 
that reproduce relations of racial domination and/or racial privilege. Or what is the same, racist 
ideologies are the schemas that guide human agents when they participate in practices that 
reproduce structural racism. 
 Importantly, racist ideologies are racist not only in virtue of serving this hegemonic 
function. For instance, ideological schemas that frame the unemployed as lazy, incompetent and 
choosing to live off government handouts legitimize draconian economic policies that lock the 
unemployed into poverty. In so doing, these ideological schemas reproduce relations of racial 
disadvantage—and thus, structural racism—insofar as a disproportionate number of the 
unemployed are black. However, this effect, by itself, is not sufficient to count these ideological 
schemas as racist. What makes ideological schemas about the unemployed racist is the additional 
fact that the aforementioned stereotypes are racialized. That is to say, in the American imagination, 
the stereotype of the lazy and incompetent jobless “moocher” is often associated with brown and 
black people. This can be easily confirmed if we reflect on the “controlling images” of the African 
American welfare queen or the lazy Mexican taking a siesta.149 While these ideological schemas 
do not make reference to the racist doctrine of whites’ biological superiority over non-whites, they 
tap on similar publicly shared meanings that can be traced to the evolution of racist thinking as 
grounded in cultural rather than biological differences. Therefore, ideological schemas are racist 
if and only if a) they function to inform, legitimize, or accommodate practices that contribute to 
the reproduction of structural racism, and b) their semantic content affirms ideas of white 
superiority and non-white inferiority, whether grounded in biology or in culture. 
                                                 
149 Patricia Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment (New 
York: Routledge, 2000).   
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 Racialized stereotypes of the unemployed constitute an example of how racist ideologies 
function to legitimize social practices that stabilize relations of racial domination and racial 
privilege. In addition, racist ideologies can also inform individuals’ participation in practices that 
reproduce structural racism To return to the discussion of the practice of policing in the Ferguson 
Police Department (4.2.3), individuals who participate in that practice under the role of police 
officer will tend to follow the common-sense rules associated with their role. These rules (or 
schemas), which include automatically treating Black citizens as “criminals” and as “lacking 
personal responsibility”, inform the actions of police officers in the context of the practice of 
policing. Thus, these racially stigmatizing schemas may help explain officers’ disproportionate 
use of violence against—and sometimes outright killing of—Black citizens while on duty.150 As I 
suggested earlier, insofar as the practice of policing in the United States grants (mostly white) 
police officers arbitrary power over the lives of Black people, it instantiates relations of racial 
domination, and thus contributes to structural racism. Therefore, the racist ideology of black 
criminality plays a role in the reproduction of structural racism by informing the participation of 
police officers in the practice of policing. 
 Finally, racist ideologies can contribute to the maintenance of racially oppressive social 
structures by accommodating social practices that reproduce relations of racial domination or 
racial privilege. A good example of a racist ideology that performs this accommodating role is 
colorblind ideology. In public discussions about race, color-blindness often appears as an ideal or 
as a policy proposal.151 As an ideal, color-blindness aspires for a society in which people do not 
draw racial distinctions. The ideal of color-blindness opposes the use of racial distinctions for the 
                                                 
150The frequency of cases of off-duty police officers shooting unarmed black people suggests these racist schemas 
inform the behavior of police officers even outside the context of the practice of policing. 
151See Anderson, The Imperative of Integration, ch. 8. 
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purposes of justifying inequality, stigmatization and discrimination. Defenders of color-blindness 
as a policy argue that it is the best means to fight against racial injustice. They contend that race-
conscious policies should be avoided because they are inherently morally objectionable and have 
bad consequences.152 Color-blind ideology shares many of the features of color-blindness as an 
ideal and as a policy, but it distorts them and puts them to the service of stabilizing relations of 
racial disadvantage. Instead of asserting the need for a society in which racial distinctions no longer 
ground unjust inequality, discrimination and stigmatization, colorblind ideology depicts our 
society as one in which this ideal has already been realized. Colorblind ideology infers from the 
reduction of overt racist attitudes and the dismantling of state-backed discrimination that racism is 
a thing of the past, even if past racial harms remain without rectification. In so doing, it obscures 
the impact that past racial discrimination has in the persistence of racial inequality today, as well 
as the need for institutional measures to rectify past racial harms.153 
 Like other schemas, colorblind ideology frames people’s interpretation of the world. In 
particular, colorblind ideology frames people’s understanding of racial inequality as a matter of 
individual dispositions and choices, rather than structural constraints to black improvement. 
Instead of showing the operation of color-blind, seemingly non-racist practices—such as word-of-
mouth hiring—in the context of a society with unaddressed racial harms as a key mechanism for 
the reproduction of racial inequality, colorblind ideology explains racial inequality in terms of 
Blacks’ lack of individual motivation and personal responsibility. In so framing our perception of 
the mechanisms behind systemic racial inequality, colorblind ideology masks the injustice of a 
                                                 
152See the aforementioned chapter for Anderson’s refutation of the criticisms of race-conscious policies, including a 
point-by-point treatment of their alleged bad consequences; namely, that they are divisive, stigmatizing, inefficient, 
depress motivation and harm their intended beneficiaries. 
153Ronald Sundstrom, The Browning of America and the Evasion of Social Justice (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2008), 43. 
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system whose institutions employed racial categories to disadvantage Blacks for hundreds of years, 
only to declare itself blind to race at a moment when race categories are necessary to explain the 
enduring effects of racial subordination and to ground race-conscious policies aimed at rectifying 
past racial harms. 
 Thus, colorblind ideology performs its accommodating function by framing our perception 
of practices that are race-neutral and yet, given a background of unaddressed racial harms, work 
to sustain relations of racial disadvantage (e.g. word-of-mouth hiring). For those who see through 
the lens of colorblindness, practices like word-of-mouth hiring fulfill the requirements of justice 
insofar as their constitutive features are race-neutral. As a result, these practices’ involvement in 
the reproduction of systematic racial disadvantage is not seen as a violation of equality of 
opportunity, but as the unfortunate outcome of Blacks’ individual choices in a just (because 
colorblind) free market. By preventing those under its spell from understanding the disparate 
impact of such practices as rooted in a history of unaddressed racial harms, colorblind ideology 
obscures the need to overhaul such practices as a matter of justice. In so doing, colorblind ideology 
ensures that such practices continue to perpetuate the negative effects of past racial discrimination 
with little to no opposition from those under its spell. This is how colorblind ideology 
accommodates racist practices that, although race-neutral, contribute to the reproduction of 
relations of racial disadvantage, and a fortiori to the reproduction of structural racism. 
 I have thus clarified the nature of the relation between racist ideology and racist institutions 
and practices. An institution (or practice) is extrinsically racist if and only if a) it contributes to the 
reproduction of relations of racial domination or racial privilege, and b) it is informed, legitimized 
or accommodated by racist ideology. Additionally, institutions (and practices) may also be 
intrinsically racist if their constitutive features (i.e. goals, rules, and application of rules) are 
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informed by racist ideology (e.g. the Ferguson Police Department). By the same token, racist 
ideologies perform their hegemonic function by informing, legitimizing or accommodating racist 
practices and institutions that reproduce relations of racial domination or racial privilege. Together, 
racist ideology and racist institutions (and practices) work to maintain structural racism. 
 Of course, there is one crucial piece that is missing from this picture of the reproduction of 
structural racism—namely, agency. It is individual agents who collectively and recursively 
constitute the social practices and institutions that reproduce relations of racial domination and 
racial privilege. If racist ideologies inform, legitimize and accommodate racist practices and 
institutions, they do so only insofar as they have an impact on the actions of individuals who take 
part in such practices and institutions. Thus, the last element of my account of the reproduction of 
structural racism has to do with the phenomena picked out by individualist accounts of racism. As 
I laid out in 5.2.2, individual accounts of racism make reference to an array of individual-level 
phenomena, such as beliefs, associations, actions, volitions, emotions, and prejudice. From the 
perspective of explaining the reproduction of racially oppressive social structures, the actions of 
individuals are of primary importance. It is through their actions that individuals collectively give 
rise to and maintain the practices and institutions that reproduce structural racism. To recall my 
discussion of the ontology of social structures, social structures are constituted through recursive 
social practices and institutions, which are the effect of collective human action drawing on 
interdependent sets of schemas and resources.   
 With all the important elements in place, I can finally provide a summary of how the 
reproduction of structural racism works, and of how the phenomena picked out by individual, 
ideological and institutional racism contribute to it. Racially oppressive social structures (within 
the U.S. context) organize individual agents in oppressive social relations that harm non-whites, 
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while simultaneously benefitting whites. These oppressive social relations are recursively 
reproduced by individual agents through their participation in racist social practices and racist 
institutions. As we know, when individuals partake in a social practice, they draw on the schemas 
and resources specific to that practice. In the case of racist practices and racist institutions, the 
schemas on which participants draw may also be described as racist ideologies. Moreover, racist 
ideologies function to stabilize structural racism insofar as they inform, legitimize and 
accommodate racist practices and racist institutions. With the backing of racist ideologies, racist 
practices and racist institutions contribute to the reproduction of relations of domination and racial 




Chapter 6: How Structural Racism Explains Durable Racial 
Inequality 
6.1. The Individualism-Holism Debate 
 The goal of this chapter is to substantiate the following explanatory claim: structural racism 
explains the durability of racial inequality in the United States. Importantly, this explanatory claim 
is a structural explanation. In order to clarify what I mean by that, I must first address some 
important issues in the individualism-holism debate. First, we must distinguish between two 
separate individualism-holism debates—a methodological one and an ontological one. The dispute 
between methodological individualists and methodological holists is at heart a dispute over 
whether individuals (and their desires, beliefs, intentions, etc.) or social structures should be the 
foundation of social explanation. By contrast, the ontological individualism-holism debate 
revolves around the ontological status of social structures and their relation to individuals. The 
methodological debate is of particular interest here because it deals with questions of social 
explanation. However, the ontological debate is also relevant to the extent that it sheds light on the 
pre-theoretical intuitions of methodological individualists and methodological holists. 
6.1.1. The Ontological Individualism-Holism Debate 
Let us start with the ontological debate. The fundamental question in the debate is whether 
social structures exist over and above individuals.154 Ontological holists affirm that they do, 
whereas ontological individualists deny it. There are many ways to spell out the claim that social 
structures exist over and above individuals. An ontological holist may argue that social structures 
                                                 
154 Julie Zahle and Finn Collin, "Introduction," in Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate: Essays in the 
Philosophy of Social Science, eds. Julie Zahle and Finn Collin (New York: Springer, 2014), 2-3.  
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have causal powers in their own right. Dave Elder-Vass defends this position with his account of 
emergence. He argues that social structures have emergent causal powers, which means that they 
have causal effects on the world that the agents that compose the structure would not have if they 
did not participate in the structure.155 He illustrates this claim with the causal power of a company 
to dismiss an employee.156 To be sure, the company attributes this causal power to the individual 
agent who occupies the position of manager. However, the manager would not be able to dismiss 
the employee unless both occupied the relevant positions within the company structure. The 
company has a causal effect on the world (i.e. the dismissal of an employee) that the agents that 
compose it would not be able to produce outside the context of the company. For Elder-Vass, this 
emergent causal power indicates that the company exists over and above individuals. Other 
attempts at vindicating the ontological status of social structures focus on showing that they are 
more than the sum of their parts (i.e. more than a collection of individual agents), that statements 
about social structures cannot be translated into statements about individuals, and that certain 
groups can qualify as agents in their own right.157   
 So far, I have described the ontological individualist's position in purely negative terms. 
To be an ontological individualist is to reject the existence of social structures over and above 
individual agents. To complement this view, I will draw on Philip Pettit's positive account of 
ontological individualism. According to Pettit, the ontological individualist is also committed to a 
particular picture of human beings as autonomous agents.158 For Pettit, this picture of human 
beings stems from our experience of ourselves as more or less rational agents guided by intentional 
                                                 
155 Dave Elder-Vass, The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 66.  
156 Ibid., 73.  
157 Zahle and Collin, "Introduction," 3.  
158 Philip Pettit, "Three Issues in Social Ontology" in Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate, 78.  
132 
 
attitudes like beliefs and desires. Moreover, this folk psychological view of human beings as more 
or less rational autonomous agents is a condition for the possibility of interpersonal interactions 
and other social practices that are essential to life in community.159  
 This key commitment of ontological individualism is a reaction to the prospect of structural 
determinism—or the claim that social structures can determine human agency in a way that 
conflicts with the assumptions of human autonomy and rationality. The reality of structural 
determinism would entail that we are not the autonomous rational beings we take ourselves to be, 
but rather pawns of unrecognized social forces. Pettit endorses ontological individualism. He is 
mainly concerned with theoretical projects in the social sciences that posit social laws that 
contradict the folk psychological view of ourselves as autonomous rational beings.160 Petttit's 
commitment to his version of ontological individual seems to be hermeneutically based. He 
believes that the folk psychological view of human beings as rational autonomous beings is 
necessary to render our actions and others' actions intelligible. In other words, this folk 
psychological view is central to how we make sense of ourselves. Pettit defends a positive 
ontological claim about human beings—we are rational autonomous agents. At the same time, this 
ontological claim has explanatory implications. It is because we are rational autonomous agents 
that our actions must be explained in terms of our rationally consistent beliefs and desires, rather 
than in terms of social laws that bypass our agential control. In other words, Pettit's ontological 
individualism is linked to a particular way of explaining human action. In order to fully develop 
the implications of this position, I will now turn to the debate between methodological 
individualists and holists.  
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6.1.2. The Methodological Individualism-Holism Debate 
The ontological debate between individualists and holists is about the ontological features 
of social structures (do they exist over and above individual agents?) and human beings (are we 
rational autonomous agents?). By contrast, the methodological debate revolves around social 
explanation. Should social explanations focus on individuals (and their beliefs, desires, intentions, 
etc.) or should they focus on social structures? For the methodological individualist, individuals 
are the foundation of social explanation. Individuals are autonomous agents who shape the world 
around them. The social world, including social structures, is the product of the beliefs, desires, 
intentions and actions of individuals. On the other hand, methodological holists focus on social 
structures in order to account for the features of individuals. For the holist, the explanation of 
action does not end at the level of individuals. There is a further question—namely, how do 
individuals get the beliefs, desires and intentions that they have? For the holist, the answer to this 
explanatory question must make reference to social structures.  
Notice how the methodological individualist's position relies on a key claim of ontological 
individualism—that human beings are rational autonomous agents. We can explain the social 
world in terms of individuals and their beliefs and desires because we can draw on psychological 
theories that explain all human action as following rationally in light of individuals' beliefs and 
desires. In addition, social explanation can focus exclusively on individuals because their 
autonomy means that no factors outside their psychological states can constrain their agency. In 
other words, individuals are not the product of society; they are free agents that shape the social 
world. Social structures cannot interfere with their sphere of rational autonomy, and therefore 
cannot be explanatory. The folk psychological view of human beings as autonomous rational 
agents adds explanatory plausibility to methodological individualism. However, its biggest 
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contribution is its common sense appeal. As Pettit makes clear, thinking of ourselves as rational 
autonomous agents (and here the claim of autonomy is perhaps the most important) is key to our 
self-understanding. I bring up this point because the assumption of human autonomy and the 
common sense appeal it grants to methodological individualism is rarely acknowledged in the 
debate. Moreover, the individualist's commitment to individual autonomy also helps explain her 
distaste for holist explanations.  
Methodological individualism is the position that the social world can be fully explained 
in terms of individuals, and their beliefs, desires, and intentions. For the individualists, all 
explanations that make reference to social structures must be dispensed with. This is because holist 
explanations, also known as structural explanations, are redundant. The claim that structural 
explanations are redundant is often framed in terms of intertheoretic reducibility.161 
Methodological individualists claim that all social scientific explanations that appeal to social 
structures are reducible to claims about individual psychology. As mentioned earlier, individualists 
believe that all social structures are the creation of human agents. In addition, they reject that social 
structures can interfere with the autonomy of individual agents. Whatever effect social structures 
have on the social world, they are completely due to the autonomous agency of the individuals that 
bring them to life. Thus, any structural explanation is reducible to an individualist explanation by 
translating all references to social structures in terms of individuals, and their beliefs, desires and 
intentions. As such, structural explanations are redundant and must be dispensed with. Only 
individualist explanations are needed to make sense of the social world. 
Methodological holists argue that social structures play a non-redundant explanatory role 
in social explanation. They reject the individualist's claim that social explanation must stop at the 
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level of individuals. Rather, they seek to explain the ways in which social structures shape the 
beliefs, desires, and intentions that form the basis of individual agency. There are two positions 
available to the methodological holist.162 First, she could adopt a strong methodological holism 
(SMH) that mirrors the methodological individualism position. According to this view, there is no 
need for individualist explanations because individuals' beliefs, desires, intentions, and actions are 
fully determined by social structures.163 In this view, the rational autonomous agent that forms the 
basis of methodological individualism is a mere illusion. Human beings are not free agents who 
shape the social world in accordance with their beliefs and desires. Rather, their beliefs and desires 
are a result of their position in social structures. Individuals and their intentional properties are the 
consequence, rather than the cause, of the social structures in which they participate. According to 
SMH, individualist explanations are not only redundant, but also misleading. They posit 
autonomous agents as having explanatory power, when in fact they are mere pawns of social 
structures, which is where the real explanatory lies. Every aspect of the social world can be 
explained in terms of its position in the totality of social structures. Individualist explanations must 
be dispensed with.  
The second option is weak methodological holism (WMH). In this view, individuals and 
their beliefs, desires, and intentions are influenced, rather than determined, by social structures. 
Like SMH, WMH rejects that individuals are the end of explanation. We must examine the ways 
in which social structures shape the beliefs, desires, and actions of individuals. However, WMH 
does not deny that these features of individuals can play a self-standing role in social explanation. 
This is because individual beliefs, desires and actions are not fully determined by social structures. 
                                                 
162 I get the distinction between and strong and weak methodological holism from Ibid., 5.  
163 The following description of strong methodological holism draws extensively from Susan James, The Content of 
Social Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 79-117.  
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For any given individual, it is possible that their position in a social structure will not be predictive 
of their beliefs, desires and actions. Since the influence of social structures is not all-encompassing, 
individuals retain a constrained autonomy. Their actions may be constrained or motivated by their 
position in social structures, but they are still subject to their intentional agency. Because they 
retain a constrained autonomy, individuals have the potential to change the social structures that 
shape their agency. Social structures themselves are not the end of explanation. We must also ask 
ourselves how these structures are constantly shaped by the constrained agency of individuals. For 
all these reasons, individualist explanations can be illuminating in their own right and must not be 
dispensed with.  
Although WMH recognizes the validity of individualist explanations, it still puts emphasis 
on structural explanations. This preference for structural explanations is a matter of explanatory 
interest.164 In other words, it is a question of what matters most to us as we try to understand the 
social world. Individualist explanations are mainly interested in understanding individuals as 
autonomous agents whose choices and actions shape the world. (Weak) structural explanations are 
mainly interested in understanding how social structures shape (but not determine) the agency of 
individuals.165 Methodological individualists and strong methodological holists reject the validity 
of structural explanations and individualist explanations, respectively. By contrast, weak 
methodological holists recognizes the importance of both explanatory projects, while choosing to 
focus on structural explanation in light of their particular explanatory interests.  
I endorse weak methodological holism. As stated earlier, my particular explanatory interest 
is to develop the following structural explanation: structural racism explains the durability of racial 
                                                 
164 James, The Content of Social Explanation, 177.  
165 From now on, all references to structural explanation will be of the weak kind. I am not interested in structural 
explanations that posit individuals as fully determined by social structures.    
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inequality in the U.S. We now have a good idea of what structural explanations are—they seek to 
explain how social structures shape the agency of individuals. In light of my explanatory interests, 
it would be helpful to look at structural explanations of a similar kind—namely, those that seek to 
explain how social structures influence agents to participate in the reproduction of durable group-
based inequalities. Thankfully, we have already discussed such an explanation at several points in 
this dissertation—I am referring to the case of Lisa, the working mother (see 2.5, 3.2.2, and 3.3). 
One way to interpret this case is as a structural explanation of how sexist social structures influence 
women in Lisa's position to make choices that reinforce gender inequality. I start the following 
section by taking a deeper look at this structural explanation in order to extract lessons about how 
social structures influence individual agency.  
6.2. What is a Structural Explanation? 
 I first introduced the case of Lisa, the working mother, in the context of a discussion of 
how social structures influence the behavior of individual agents (see 2.5.). There, I argued that 
social structures shapes individual agency in three ways. First, social structures constrain the 
agency of individuals by making certain options unavailable or less desirable. Second, social 
structures influence the agency of individuals by enabling them to perform roles, and have duties 
and prerogatives that would be unavailable to them outside the structure. Third, social structures 
motivate individuals towards particular courses of action in virtue of their position in the structure. 
Now that we know that structural explanations focus on how social structures shape the agency of 
individuals, we can conclude that there are at least three ways in which structural explanation may 
work: via structural constraint, via structural enablement, and via structural motivation. In the 
following section, I will revisit the case of Lisa, the working mother, in order to gain insight into 
how structural explanations work.  
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6.2.1. Lisa's Case Revisited 
As developed by Cudd (see 3.2.2, 3.3), Lisa's situation is a case of structural constraint. 
Lisa's decision to quit her job after having a baby was influenced by her membership in the 
oppressed social group 'women'. As a woman, Lisa faced sexist social structures that constrained 
her other options. The gender pay gap made the option of having her husband quit his job less 
desirable from a household finance perspective. The lack of affordable daycare in her community 
made the option of leaving the baby in daycare practically unavailable. Thus, Lisa's choice to quit 
her job was not fully free—it was constrained by the sexist social structures around her.  
Haslanger's take on the Lisa case sheds further light on how social structures constrain 
individual agency.166 According to Haslanger, structural explanations explain the actions of 
individual agents by situating them within positions in a social structure. Social structures 
constrain the agency of individuals in virtue of the place they occupy within a structure. In light 
of the structural constraints of Lisa's situation (i.e. a gender wage gap, lack of affordable childcare, 
etc.), Haslanger argues that a structural explanation of Lisa’s behavior would be more illuminating 
than an individualist explanation. The individualist explanation would explain Lisa’s quitting her 
job by referring to Lisa’s beliefs and desires that gave rise to her decision to quit her job. Such an 
explanation would go as follows. Lisa quit her job because she decided to do so, and she decided 
to do so because she believed it would be best for her family and she wanted what was best for her 
family. Even if we could fill out more details of the psychological states that led Lisa to quit her 
job, Haslanger argues that this kind of explanation would always remain incomplete. What is 
missing from the individualist explanation of Lisa’s behavior is the social structures that she is a 
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part of and that constrain her agency. In order to fully explain Lisa’s behavior, we should shift the 
focus of explanation to those structures. 
 According to Haslanger, a structural explanation of Lisa’s behavior will start by situating 
Lisa as an occupier of the mother/wife position in a complex social structure of family/work 
relations. This social structure includes facts about human (infant) dependency, a stable framework 
of gender relations, and a particular wage-labor system. Qua occupier of the mother/wife position 
in this highly constraining social structure, Lisa’s options for solving the childcare problem were 
severely limited—only some options were genuine possibilities. For instance, Larry was not going 
to quit his job (because it was it was not in the best interest of the family’s income), her employer 
was not going to provide childcare, and she couldn’t leave Lulu at home alone. These structural 
constraints limit Lisa’s possibility space—her choice architecture—to the point where "quitting is 
[her] only real option”.167 
For Haslanger, this is compatible with her action being rational and autonomous. That is to 
say, this structural explanation is compatible with weak methodological holism. As an individual, 
Lisa was free to choose otherwise (e.g. she could have left Larry and Lulu), but as a mother/spouse 
in a sexist structure of family/work relations, that was not a real option for her. In fact, given the 
structural constraints of her situation, it was rational for her to choose to quit her job. This 
illustrates another benefit of structural explanations; they unveil the unjust effects of social 
structures that make it rational for individuals to make choices that keep them subordinate. In 
making this constrained choice, Lisa not only incurs the harms associated with becoming 
economically dependent on her husband, she also unwittingly contributes to the reproduction of 
the gender pay gap. By quitting her job, Lisa reinforces the stereotype that women are unreliable 
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workers who value family over career. As I discussed in 3.3. Cudd shows that the stereotype of 
women as unreliable workers constitutes a significant obstacle to closing the gender pay gap. 
Moreover, given that most working mothers in our society share Lisa's agential constraints, they 
also tend to make the same constrained choice, which further entrenches the economic oppression 
of women as a whole. Cudd focuses her attention on this vicious cycle whereby women face 
structural constraints that coerce them into making individually rational choices (i.e. quitting their 
job after having a baby) that have suboptimal results for them as a group (i.e. reinforcing the gender 
pay gap). This vicious cycle, which stems from the structural constraints that women in Lisa's 
position face, explains the durability of women's economic oppression.  
Without a structural explanation that highlights the constraints that the social structure of 
family/work relations imposes on women in Lisa's position, we would regard their situation as the 
result of their “free choices” flowing from their beliefs, desires, and personal preferences (e.g. 
women's desire to be caregivers, women's preference for family over career). On such an 
impoverished picture, we would regard the endurance of the gender pay gap as an unfortunate 
effect of women's autonomous agency and see no reason for moral or political concern. By 
contrast, a structural explanation highlights the fact that the gender pay gap is sustained by social 
structures that constrain women's agency. As I discussed in 3.4., insofar as women's subjection to 
these structural constraints qualifies as coercion, the situation described in Lisa's case is oppressive 
and a cause for moral and political concern.  
 According to Haslanger, another benefit of structural explanations is their stability. She 
claims that once we zero-in on structural constraints, it becomes easier to capture significant 
regularities in the behavior of individuals who occupy the same position in a social structure, even 
if their personal histories, psychologies and attitudes differ. That is to say, other women who, like 
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Lisa, occupy the position of wife/mother in the social structure of work-family relations will tend 
to quit their job after having a child because their choice architecture will be similarly constrained. 
Haslanger's structural explanation captures a stable pattern in the choices of similarly situated 
women, even if their individual psychological states differ widely. By contrast, an individualist 
explanation would be unable to explain the stability of this pattern in women’s choices because 
the relevant psychological states (e.g. beliefs, desires, and preferences) will vary widely from 
woman to woman. Therefore, when it comes to explaining stable patterns of individual behavior 
in the social world, the stability of structural explanations make them preferable to individualist 
explanations.  
6.2.2. How do Structural Explanations Work? 
 There are many lessons to be learned from Cudd's and Haslanger's structural explanations 
of Lisa's situation. Both emphasize the role of structural constraint on influencing Lisa's behavior. 
To be precise, they both explain how social structures constrain the agency of women in Lisa's 
situation. This is an important feature of structural explanations. Strictly speaking, they do not aim 
to explain the behavior of individual agents, but rather tendencies in behavior among similarly 
situated agents. Haslanger makes this clear when she argues that the explanatory power of 
structural explanations comes from situating agents within positions in a social structure. Structural 
explanations do not aim to explain the behavior of any particular individual. The explanation may 
be right about Lisa's case, but there certainly are women who face the same structural constraints 
as her and choose not to quit their job. Even if similarly situated agents face the same structural 
constraints, their actions may differ because their agency is shaped rather than determined by the 
social structures that constrain them. As we discussed earlier, it is a fundamental commitment of 
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weak methodological holism that agents retain their autonomy in spite of the pressures exerted by 
social structures.  
Even if structural explanations cannot account for the behavior of any given individual, they can 
still give us insight into how social structures shape the agency of individuals. This is because they 
can explain tendencies in behavior among similarly situated agents. As Haslanger argues, the 
explanatory power of structural explanations lies in unveiling stable patterns of action among 
agents whose personal histories, psychologies and attitudes may differ widely. In other words, 
structural explanations explain the stability of behavioral tendencies among similarly situated 
agents. Not all women in Lisa's situation will quit their job, but by and large, women facing similar 
structural constraints will tend to act as Lisa did. In addition, the stability of women's constrained 
choice to quit their job after having a baby contributes to the stability of the gender pay gap, and 
of women's oppression more generally. Thus, structural explanations also help explain the stability 
of social patterns or arrangements as a result of behavioral regularities among similarly situated 
agents. This insight is key for the structural explanation I aim to defend in this dissertation. My 
structural explanations will explain the stability of racial inequality by showing how racially 
oppressive social structures lead to stable patterns of action among racially privileged agents.  
 Earlier I introduced three possible causal mechanisms of structural explanation: structural 
constraint, structural enablement and structural motivation. Cudd's and Haslanager's structural 
explanations rely on the first of these mechanisms—namely, structural constraint. They explain 
the stability of the gender pay gap in terms of the structural constraints imposed on working 
mothers. This structural explanation is helpful for my purposes because it also explains the stability 
of group-based inequality. While I am interested in the stability of the inequality between 
racialized groups, Cudd and Haslanger are interested in the stability of the inequality between 
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gender groups—that is, between men and women. I find their structural explanations of the 
stability of gender inequality illuminating. However, the Lisa explanation focuses exclusively on 
the mechanism of structural constraint. This explanation does not address the other two 
mechanisms of structural explanation: structural enablement and structural motivation.  
The explanation's emphasis on structural constraint is linked to its focus on the role of women in 
reproducing gender oppression. The explanation unveils how the social constraints that working 
mothers face lead them to act in ways that reproduce their own oppression. Since the explanation 
focuses on the victims of the system, it does not address the role that the beneficiaries of the gender 
pay gap play in its reproduction. For instance, the Lisa explanation has nothing to say about Lisa's 
male partner who got to keep his job and earn economic power over her. Thus, Cudd's and 
Haslanger's structural explanations offer an incomplete picture of how social structures shape 
individual agency. They focus on structural constraint, but do not address the mechanisms of 
structural enablement and structural motivation. In addition, the explanation emphasizes the causal 
contribution of the victims of the system, rather than that of its beneficiaries. This is not a criticism 
of Cudd's and Haslanager's explanations, which never claimed to offer a complete explanation of 
the durability of gender inequality. However, in my own structural explanation of the durability of 
racial inequality, I will explore a different (complementary) approach. Instead of focusing on the 
mechanism of structural constraint that Cudd and Haslanger so aptly lay out, I will focus on 
structural motivation. Instead of focusing on the actions of members of oppressed groups, I will 
emphasize the role that privileged agents play in the reproduction of group-based inequality.  
6.2.3. A Preliminary Overview of my Structural Explanation 
Applied to the domain of race, my structural explanation aims to show how racially 
oppressive social structures motivate agents positioned as white to act in ways that ensure the 
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durability of racial inequality. I am especially interested in the role that "well-meaning" whites 
(that is, whites who identify themselves as non-racist) play in the reproduction of racial inequality. 
Thus, my structural explanation aims to show how structural racism motivates "well-meaning" 
whites to participate in the maintenance of racial inequality. As we will see, privilege plays a key 
role in how racially oppressive social structures motivate "well meaning" whites to partake in the 
reproduction of racial inequality. As we know from our discussion of oppression (see 3, and 
especially 3.2.2), oppressive social structures grant unearned advantages to members of privileged 
groups. The material and psychological benefits that whites derive from structural racism form the 
backdrop of racial inequality. Once racially oppressive social structures create racial inequality in 
this way, whites (whether or not they regard themselves as racist) acquire an interest in maintaining 
the racial inequality from which they benefit. Whites' interest in the maintenance of racial 
inequality stems from their privileged position in racially oppressive social structures. This 
positional interest motivates agents positioned as white in racially oppressive social structures to 
act (or fail to act) so as to ensure the stability of racial inequality. This is my structural explanation 
in a nutshell. Before explaining each of its parts in more detail, I will introduce an example that 
will allow me to illustrate and narrow down my explanation.   
6.3. The Riverview High Case 
 The example I will use to illustrate my structural explanation is drawn from John Diamond 
and Amanda Lewis' recent sociological case study of the racial achievement gap in a Midwestern 
high school—Riverview High.168 Focusing on this example will allow me to narrow down my 
explanation to a particular kind of durable racial inequality in the United States—the racial 
achievement gap. This gap refers to disparities in educational attainments (e.g. test scores, grade 
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point averages, high school and college completion rates) between white students and black and 
Latinx students. To add even more specificity, my structural explanation will focus on explaining 
the resilience of the racial achievement at a particular educational institution—Riverview High. 
This level of specificity will allow me to offer a more detailed description of the causal 
mechanisms whereby structural racism motivates "well-meaning" whites to reproduce the racial 
achievement gap. In other words, in order to show how structural racism explains the durability of 
racial inequality, I will focus on a more specific explanatory claim—how does structural racism 
explain the durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview High? 
At the same time, the explanatory framework that I develop here will also be helpful in 
accounting for the reproduction of other kinds of racial inequality. The role of racial privilege in 
motivating "well-meaning" whites to reproduce racial inequality is not limited to the educational 
context. Moreover, the racial achievement gap has a significant impact on other social structures, 
such as the labor market and the criminal justice system. Racial disparity in educational attainment 
puts black and Latinx people at a disadvantage in a highly competitive U.S. labor market and 
contributes to high unemployment and underemployment rates among these groups. As a result, 
cash-strapped Latinx and black people in the U.S. are at an increased risk of getting involved with 
the criminal justice system—a problem compounded by various racist dynamics within this social 
structure, such as racial disparities in policing, arrests and sentencing. In other words, not only is 
the racial achievement gap an instance of racial inequality, it also contributes to the durability of 
racial inequality in other domains.  
146 
 
 Having explained my reasoning for focusing on the racial achievement gap, I will now 
return to my description of the Riverview High case study.169 Riverview High is a public high 
school located in Riverview, a suburban racially integrated Midwestern town. Riverview is a self-
described diverse and progressive community, whose population is largely middle-class and 
prioritizes public schooling. As a result, Riverview High is a well-resourced school, with great 
facilities and experienced teachers. While the majority of the teachers are white, the share of black 
teachers has grown over the past few decades. The town's school have been desegregated for 
decades, and many families choose to live in Riverview precisely because the schools are diverse. 
90% of the students are black or white, in equal measure. The remaining 10% are mostly Latinx 
along with some Asian students. Not only is the school racially diverse, but students report 
significant cross-race interaction. Over 80% of students report that some or most of their friends 
are of a different race. While black and Latinx families lag behind white families financially, they 
still tend to be much better off than black and Latinx families living in the surrounding urban area. 
Unlike their peers in the surrounding under-resourced urban school district, black and Latinx 
students have access to state-of-the-art facilities, well-trained teachers, and a community of 
instructors and administrators who care deeply about closing the racial achievement gap.  
All of these facts about Riverview High make it an ideal candidate for closing the racial 
achievement gap. However, there has been a consistent racial achievement gap for decades at 
Riverview High. The GPAs of white and Asian students are a full point higher than that of black 
and Latinx students. Standardized test scores follow the same racially disparate pattern. White 
students are more likely to attend college (90%) than black and Latinx students (60%). 
                                                 




Furthermore, only 5% of white students end up in 2-year colleges, while 30% of black students 
and 40% of Latinx students attend 2-year colleges. What could explain the durability of the racial 
achievement gap at Riverview High?  
The explanation that I develop in this chapter is an application of the structural motivation 
explanation that I sketched in 6.2.3. In particular, I will explain the durability of the racial 
achievement gap at Riverview High as the result of a racially oppressive social structure that 
motivates white parents at Riverview High to support school practices that maintain the racial 
achievement gap. The structural motivation of white parents to support these practices stems from 
their position of racial privilege within the structure. Of course, I still need to fill in many of the 
details of this explanation. At this point, I just want to highlight two points. First, the explanation 
I develop here is an example of how structural racism (i.e. racially oppressive social structures) 
can motivate agents who are socially positioned as white to participate in the reproduction of racial 
inequality. Second, my explanation of the durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview 
High is based on the empirical findings of Diamond and Lewis' case study. As such, my 
explanation offers empirical justification to a foundational claim of this dissertation—namely, that 
the concept of structural racism is key to racial theorizing because it helps explain the durability 
of racial inequality.  
6.3.1. Assessing Other Explanations of the Racial Achievement Gap at Riverview High 
Before moving to my structural explanation, I will briefly discuss other prominent 
explanations of the racial achievement gap, which Diamond and Lewis show not to be helpful in 
explaining the racial achievement gap at Riverview High. The first is an explanation that focuses 
on the opportunity inequalities between the average white and black student. As a result of race-
based economic equality and residential segregation, majority-white school districts have access 
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to more resources than majority-black districts. Public schools located in majority-white areas tend 
to offer their students access to better educational facilities, better-trained instructors, and a more 
rigorous curriculum. By contrast, public schools in majority-black areas tend to be under-resourced 
and are thus unable to offer their majority-black student body the same educational opportunities. 
In this account, the racial disparity in educational attainments is a result of the disparities in 
educational opportunities for the average white and black student. In turn, this opportunity gap 
stems from the combined effects of residential segregation and racial inequality on school district 
funding. This explanation of the racial achievement gap counts as a structural explanation in my 
framework. In particular, it is a structural constraint explanation. The racially oppressive social 
structures that cause residential segregation and economic racial inequality also lead to fewer 
educational opportunities for black students. This structurally caused opportunity inequality 
constrains the agency of black students by making it more difficult for them to perform well in 
school.  
Diamond and Lewis highlight the importance of this "opportunity gap" explanation in 
accounting for the resilience of the racial achievement gap in the United States.170 In fact, lay and 
academic discourse often points to this explanation as an example of how structural racism 
operates in the domain of education. While the racial opportunity gap helps explain the racial 
achievement gap in the United States as a whole, it is not useful in the Riverview High case. This 
is because Riverview High is a well-resourced school in a racially integrated community. In 
principle, black and white students have equal access to the outstanding educational opportunities 
that Riverview High has to offer. The fact that there still is a racial achievement gap at Riverview 
High indicates that residential segregation and resource disparities among school districts cannot 
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fully account for the persistence of the racial achievement gap in the United States. A full-fledged 
explanation must also look at the social practices within institutions like Riverview High. In my 
case, I will emphasize the causal role of the tracking system in perpetuating the racial achievement 
gap. It is important to note that the structural explanation I develop in the following sections is 
complementary to the aforementioned "opportunity gap" explanation, which has been shown to 
partially explain the racial achievement gap.  
Diamond and Lewis consider a second prominent explanation of the racial achievement 
gap that may seem better suited to the Riverview High case. This explanation flows from a popular 
narrative that explains the racial disparities in educational attainments as a result of black students 
facing peer pressure not to take school seriously. This so called "acting white" hypothesis contends 
that black students who do well in school face accusations of "acting white" by their black peers. 
In order to avoid this label, black students prefer to disengage from school, which explains the 
racial disparity in educational attainments. The acting white hypothesis has become highly popular 
in lay discourse and is often considered as the explanation for the racial achievement gap among 
teachers and the general public.171 Drawing on the same logic as the acting white hypothesis, the 
"oppositional culture" explanation of the racial achievement gap is prominent in academic 
discourse. As advanced by John Ogbu, the oppositional culture explanation is a structural 
constraint explanation.172 Ogbu argues that black people's experiences of structural exclusion and 
discrimination undermine the black community's commitment to mainstream social structures like 
the education system.173 In response to their systematic experience of oppression, black people 
develop a culture of opposition to school, which they come to see as a "white domain". Due to this 
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oppositional culture, doing well in school is seen as "acting white" among black students. This 
oppositional culture constrains the agency of high-achieving black students, who experience peer 
pressure to disengage from school, lest they be accused of acting white. Faced with these structural 
constraints, black students tend to adopt an anti-school attitude, which ultimately undermines their 
academic success. This pattern of behavior among black students leads to reduced black 
educational achievement and explains the racial achievement gap. Briefly put, the oppositional 
culture explanation understands the racial achievement gap as resulting from the structurally 
constrained choices of black students to disengage from school in order to avoid the social 
penalties associated with being perceived as "acting white" by their black peers.   
Both the acting white hypothesis and the oppositional culture explanation rely on a 
monolithic conception of black culture and the black community as fundamentally opposed to 
schooling. In fact, recent studies show the opposite to be true.174 Black students express interest in 
attending college just as much as white students. Black students also spend the same amount of 
time (or more time) on homework, generally possess more pro-school attitudes than white students, 
and have similar rates of absenteeism compared to white students of the same social class. 
Moreover, black students who do well in school are not socially penalized for "acting white"; 
rather, they tend to be amongst the most popular with their peers. In addition to its flawed 
assumptions about black attitudes on education, there is little empirical support for the explanatory 
power of the acting white hypothesis.175  
Recently, some proponents of the acting white hypothesis have conceded that their 
explanation fails to explain racial achievement asymmetries in general. Instead, they now claim 
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that the popularity penalty associated with "acting white" only activates in integrated schools like 
Riverview. Diamond and Lewis spend an entire chapter showing that the acting white hypothesis 
plays no explanatory role in the racial achievement gap at Riverview High.176 In fact, they find 
that black students at Riverview High are more committed to their educational achievement than 
white students. While black students and parents recognize the prevalence of racial discrimination 
at Riverview, their reaction is to value education as a tool for challenging discrimination. Thus, 
the opposite of the oppositional culture explanation is true at Riverview. The experience of 
systematic racial discrimination leads black students and parents at Riverview to double down on 
their commitment to education attainments. Despite its lack of empirical validation, the 
oppositional culture explanation of the racial achievement gap is prima facie compatible with the 
tracking system explanation I develop in later sections.  
I have now discussed two prominent explanations of the racial achievement gap that fail to 
account for the racial disparity in educational attainments at Riverview High. What do these 
explanations have in common? And how do they differ from the explanation I sketched in 6.2.3? 
First, they are both structural explanations that work via structural constraints. On the opportunity 
gap explanation, the racial disparity in access to educational resources constrains black students' 
capacity to perform as well as white students. On the oppositional culture explanation, the alleged 
anti-school culture in the black community constrains black students' ability to do well in school, 
lest their peers perceive them as "acting white". Both explanations also focus on the causal role of 
black students in reproducing the racial achievement gap. This is not surprising given that most 
academic explanations of the racial achievement gap start from some version of the question "what 
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is going on with the black kids?".177 In this respect, just like Cudd's and Haslanger's explanations 
of the gender pay gap, these explanations center on the victims of the system rather than its 
beneficiaries.  
By contrast, my structural explanation highlights the role of white parents in maintaining 
the racial achievement gap. In doing so, I shift my explanatory focus to the agents who benefit 
from the racial achievement gap at Riverview—white parents and their kids. This shift in 
perspective also leads me to home in on the mechanism of structural motivation. I am particularly 
interested in explaining how social structures motivate Riverview white parents to become 
involved in the reproduction of the racial achievement gap. That said, my explanation of the racial 
achievement gap is perfectly compatible with alternative explanations that emphasize the causal 
role of black and Latinx students and parents. Diamond and Lewis identify two racialized school 
practices that play a key role in the reproduction of the racial achievement gap at Riverview—the 
practice of discipline and the tracking system.178 I have already discussed how the racialized 
practice of discipline works to reinforce the racial achievement gap at Riverview High (see 4.2). 
In the explanation I develop in this chapter, I will focus on the tracking system. What is the tracking 
system and how does it contribute to the durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview 
High?  
6.3.2. The Tracking System and its Role in Reproducing the Racial Achievement Gap at Riverview 
The tracking system refers to the social practice of assigning students to different 
instructional levels. At Riverview High, the tracking system has three instructional levels—basic, 
honors, and advanced placement (AP). Students are placed in each track on the basis of teacher 
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recommendations, grades and test scores. The rationale for this system is that it allows students to 
get placed in the appropriate track based on their academic performance. As a result, each student 
will receive appropriate instruction and support according to their particular academic needs. By 
tailoring the educational experience of students in this way, the tracking system aims to enhance 
the educational attainments of all students.  
Unfortunately, the tracking system at Riverview does not work in this way. The assignment 
of students into different tracks is not made purely on the basis of their academic performance. 
Teachers have lower expectations of black students. As a result, they perceive black students as 
less smart and naturally suited to the lowest track, regardless of their actual academic 
performance.179 In addition, white parents were more likely to successfully contest their children's 
placement in lower tracks. While black parents were less likely to challenge their kids' placement, 
those who did faced resistance from school staff, which was not the case for white parents.180 As 
a result of this racialized process of track placement, Riverview—a seemingly racially integrated 
school—reintroduces racial segregation in its classrooms. Although whites constitute less than 
50% of the student body at Riverview, 90% of AP-class students and 80% of honors-class students 
are white.181 By contrast, two-thirds of the students in basic level classes were black or Latinx. 
This racialized distribution of track placements leads to a racialized distribution of educational 
resources and opportunities at Riverview High. Lower level classes provide a less rigorous 
educational experience. Students in basic classes (the majority of whom are black or Latinx) have 
less experienced teachers and a less challenging curriculum.182 Moreover, since basic classes are 
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majority-black and Latinx spaces, teachers have low expectations of students in this track. 
Research shows that the educational achievement differences between tracks grow over time: 
students in higher tracks benefit from access to enhanced curricula, better teachers and other perks 
(e.g. grade inflation).  
Thus, the tracking system at Riverview has the opposite of its intended effect. Rather than 
enhancing the educational achievements of black and Latinx students, it widens the racial 
achievement gap. Black and Latinx students perform consistently worse than their white peers not 
because of differences in skill or dedication, but because they have access to fewer educational 
resources due to their track placement. As we have seen, initial track placements are not entirely 
based on student performance. Teachers' racialized perceptions of student's academic skills and of 
"who belongs in which track", along with the unequal influence that white and black parents have 
in challenging their kids' placement, lead to a racialized hierarchy in the tracking system with white 
students at the top and black and Latinx students at the bottom. Once black and Latinx students 
are placed in the basic track, they become excluded from having access to the better educational 
resources and opportunities available to mostly white students in the honors and AP tracks. As a 
result, black and Latinx students find it extremely difficult to attain the academic performance 
required to move up to higher tracks. Thus, the tracking system at Riverview largely explains the 
racial achievement gap by locking in the majority of black and Latinx students in lower-level 
classes, thus preventing them from having access to the same educational resources and 
opportunities as their white peers.  
By the same token, the tracking system grants systematic educational advantages to white 
students at Riverview. White students benefit from the racialized process of track placement by 
being disproportionately placed in honors and AP classes. Once they are placed in these higher 
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tracks, they have access to the best educational resources and opportunities Riverview has to offer, 
which allows them to maximize their educational achievements. To apply a concept I developed 
in 3.2.2, white students occupy a racially privileged position at Riverview High. Unsurprisingly, 
white parents at Riverview are highly committed to the tracking system. As Diamond and Lewis 
show, white parents have consistently blocked any attempts at reforming the tracking system 
because they want to maintain the educational advantages that their kids gain from the system.183 
The desire to maintain their children's privileged position within the structure motivates white 
parents to support (and resist attempts at reforming) the tracking system, even if they are fully 
aware that the current system harms black and Latinx students.184 In other words, white parents 
have a positional interest in supporting the tracking system 
6.3.3. Positional Interests and their Application to the Riverview High Case 
As I briefly discussed in 2.5, positional interests are interests that stem from an agent's 
position in a social structure. Like other interests, positional interests motivate human action. To 
be precise, positional interests attach primarily to social positions in a social structure and only 
attach to individuals insofar (and as long) as they occupy a position in a social structure. Thus, 
positional interests can motivate the behavior of individual agents who occupy a social position 
within a social structure. To continue with our current example, the Riverview High structure 
includes social positions such as white student, white parent, black student, black parent, teacher, 
principal, and so on. Each of these social positions have a set of positional interests attached to 
them, which become motivational for agents who occupy each respective social position. Some of 
these positional interests may be in conflict and thus motivate socially positioned agents to pursue 
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conflicting courses of action. For example, white parents have a positional interest in the 
continuation of the tracking system, whereas black parents have a positional interest in abolishing 
or at least reforming the system.  
This example also shows one way in which positional interests motivate individual 
behavior—namely, via material rewards. White parents have a positional interest in preserving the 
tracking system (and are motivated to act on that interest) because the system grants them material 
rewards. Specifically, it ensures that their children have access to the best educational resources 
and opportunities Riverview has to offer. More generally, securing access to material and 
psychological resources (see 3.2.2) is a key source of the motivational power of positional 
interests. Agents who occupy a privileged position in a social structure (and thus benefit from an 
unequal distribution of the structure's resources) have a positional interest in maintaining their 
privileged access to those resources. This positional interest motivates privileged agents to defend 
the social practices that those material rewards. This is precisely what we see in the Riverview 
High case. White parents occupy a social position that grants them and their children privileged 
access to the best educational resources at Riverview. Furthermore, the tracking system plays a 
key causal role in ensuring white parents' privileged access to these resources. Due to their 
occupying this privileged social position, white parents acquire a positional interest in the 
maintenance of the current tracking system, which motivates them to block all attempts at 
reforming it.  
The concept of positional interest is key to the explanation I develop here because it 
explains the stable tendency among white parents at Riverview to defend the tracking system, 
which in turn explains the durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview. What explains 
white parents' enduring support for the tracking system is their positional interest in maintaining 
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the educational benefits their children derive from the system. Having clarified the explanatory 
role of the tracking system and positional interests in accounting for the durability of the racial 
achievement gap, I now move to explain the link between structural racism and the explanation I 
develop here. After all, my explanation of the durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview 
is meant to illustrate the explanatory power of structural racism. So, how does structural racism fit 
into the explanation I have been sketching so far?  
6.3.4. Riverview High, Structural Racism and Emergent Properties 
 The explanatory claim I develop in this chapter could be stated in the following way: 
structural racism explains the durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview High. As I 
argue in chapter 4, structural racism refers to racially oppressive social structures. Thus, a more 
precise version of the explanation I develop here is that Riverview High—insofar as it is a racially 
oppressive social structure—explains the durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview. 
To add even more precision, I will argue that a particular emergent property of the Riverview High 
structure—namely, the positional interests of white parents—explains the durability of the racial 
achievement gap at Riverview High. In clarifying my explanation, I have introduced two new 
important claims. First, Riverview High is a racially oppressive social structure. Second, the 
positional interest of white parents is an emergent property of the Riverview High structure. I will 
tackle each of these in turn.  
 Why should we think of Riverview High as racially oppressive social structure, and thus 
as an instance of structural racism? To answer this question I will look back at Cudd's four 
conditions of oppression and see whether Riverview High fulfills them (see 4). Cudd's first 
condition of oppression is the presence of harm caused by a social structure. Riverview High is a 
social structure insofar as it is a network of social relations between social positions (e.g. teachers, 
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administrators, students, parents), as well as relations between these social positions and the 
material world (e.g. students reading textbooks, a chemistry teacher using lab materials to explain 
a concept). As we saw in 4.2 and 6.3.2, Riverview High is a social structure that harms black and 
Latinx students through its social practices of school discipline and the tracking system. Both of 
these practices have systematically detrimental effects on the racial achievements of black and 
Latinx students. This description shows that Riverview High not only fulfills the structural harm 
condition, but also the social group condition (i.e. the harm is inflicted on a social group whose 
identity exists apart from the oppressive harm). Riverview High inflicts a structural harm on 
members of the racialized groups black and Latinx. Riverview High also fulfills the privilege 
condition (i.e. there is another social group that benefits from the structural harm). At Riverview, 
white students and white parents (i.e. members of the racialized group white) benefit from the very 
same practice that harms black and Latinx students, i.e. the tracking system. Lastly, Riverview 
High fulfills the coercion condition (i.e. there is unjustified coercion or force that brings about 
harm). According to Cudd, a social structure is coercive if it "unfairly limits the choices of some 
group of persons relative to other groups in society".185 As we saw in 6.3.2, the tracking system at 
Riverview High unfairly limits the options of black students to get into honors and AP classes and 
to benefit from the better educational resources and opportunities available to students in these 
classes. Moreover, the limited options of black students to get into upper-level classes is correlated 
with the increased options among white students to get into these classes. In addition, in light of 
the educational disadvantages that students in lower tracks face, the tracking system also unfairly 
limits the options of black students to improve their educational attainments relative to white 
students. In other words, Riverview High via its tracking system unfairly limits the options of 
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black students to bridge the racial achievement gap. Therefore, Riverview High fulfills all four 
conditions of oppression and ought to be considered a racially oppressive social structure.  
 The second claim under consideration is that the positional interest of white parents in 
maintaining the tracking system is an emergent property of the Riverview High structure. In order 
to back up this claim, I must first say more about the concept of emergent properties. According 
to Dave Elder-Vass, emergent properties are properties of entities or wholes that are not possessed 
by its parts apart from their participation in the whole.186 For example, water has properties that 
neither hydrogen nor oxygen possess when they are not combined together to form the whole 
water. We can put out a fire with water, which is not the case for hydrogen or oxygen. Water 
freezes at zero degrees Celcius, whereas hydrogen and oxygen would be gases at that temperature. 
One reason to care about emergent properties is that they allow us to explain how an entity can 
have causal powers that are not just the sum of the causal powers of its parts.187 An entity has 
emergent causal powers (i.e. causal powers in its own right) when its causal powers cannot be 
attributed to its parts independently of their participation in the entity. For instance, putting out a 
fire is an emergent causal power of water insofar as the parts that make up the whole water (i.e. 
hydrogen and oxygen) do not have this power unless they are combined to form water.  
 Elder-Vass applies the logic of emergence to social structures. He argues that social 
structures have emergent properties (i.e. properties in their own right) in virtue of the relations 
among the socially positioned agents that make up the structure. These properties of social 
structures are emergent because they are not possessed by the individual agents apart from their 
participation in the social structure. Moreover, the emergent properties of social structures can 
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have a causal impact in the social world. In particular, the emergent properties of social structures 
can cause behavioral regularities among agents that participate in the structure. In what follows, I 
will argue that positional interests are an example of the emergent properties of social structures. 
As such, the positional interests shed light on the explanatory power of social structures.   
 As I discussed in 6.3.3, positional interests are interests that attach to social positions in a 
social structure. In the Riverview High case, the positional interest in preserving the tracking 
system attaches to the social position 'white parent'. White parents at Riverview have a positional 
interest in maintaining the tracking system because their children derive material rewards from 
that system. In other words, this positional interest is the result of how participants in the structure 
(i.e. teachers, students, parents, administrators) coordinate their management of the school's 
educational resources through social practices like the tracking system. Since the tracking system 
ensures a distribution of Riverview's educational resources that systematically privileges white 
students to the detriment of black students, white parents develop a positional interest in blocking 
any attempts at changing the system. Thus, this positional interest emerges out of the racially 
unequal distribution of educational resources at Riverview—in other words, this positional interest 
is a property of the racially oppressive social structure that is Riverview High. Furthermore, this 
positional interest has causal powers—it ensures a stable behavioral pattern among Riverview 
white parents to defend the tracking system, which in turn contributes to the durability of the racial 
achievement gap at Riverview. Finally, this positional interest is not just a property of the 
Riverview High structure, but an emergent property. That is to say, it is a property that is not 
possessed by the individual agents that make up the structure apart from their participation in the 
structure. This is evident from my definition of positional interests as interests that attach to social 
positions in a social structure. White parents at Riverview have a positional interest in maintaining 
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the tracking system only to the extent that they occupy a social position that benefits from the 
system. If these agents leave Riverview, this positional interest will no longer apply to them. Thus, 
this positional is an emergent property of the Riverview structure and is only a property of 
individual agents insofar as they partake in the structure.  
I have now clarified the two claims I introduced at the beginning of this section. First, I 
argued that Riverview High is a racially oppressive social structure. Second, I argued that the 
positional interest of white parents in maintaining the tracking system is an emergent property of 
the Riverview High structure. With these two pieces, the explanatory puzzle is finally complete. I 
will now be able to connect structural racism to my explanation of the durability of the racial 
achievement gap at Riverview. A more refined sketch of my explanation would go as follows. 
Racially oppressive social structures (e.g. Riverview High) explain the durability of racial 
inequality (e.g. the racial achievement gap) insofar as their emergent properties (e.g. white parents' 
positional interest in maintaining the tracking system) motivate racially privileged agents (e.g. 
white parents at Riverview High) to support social practices that reproduce racial inequality (e.g. 
the tracking system). I develop this explanation in full in the following section.  
6.4. How Structural Racism Explains Durable Racial Inequality: The 
Riverview High Case 
I will unpack my structural explanation of the racial achievement gap at Riverview High 
in two parts. First, I will briefly clarify the explanandum of the explanation—that is, the social fact 
in need of explanation. Secondly, I will unpack the explanans—that is, the set of causal factors 
that account for the explanandum. For this second task, I will bring together all the explanatory 
factors introduced in 6.3 into a complete explanation of how structural racism contributes to the 
durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview High. In this way, I will finally be able to 
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vindicate my explanatory claim that structural racism can help explain the durability of racial 
inequality.  
6.4.1. What is the Explanandum? 
 In 6.2.2, I argued that structural explanations address at least two kinds of explananda: the 
stability of behavioral tendencies among similarly situated agents, and the stability of social 
patterns or arrangements. The explanandum I tackle here is of the second kind. My ultimate aim 
is to explain the stability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview High. In the context of 
explaining the stability of this social pattern, I will also explain the stable tendency among 
Riverview white parents to support the racialized tracking system. As it turns out, structural racism 
explains white parents' reliable support for the tracking system, which in turn explains the stability 
of the racial achievement gap at Riverview. To the extent that my explanation accounts for the 
inequality-supporting behavior of white parents at Riverview, I must emphasize once again that 
structural explanations do not explain the behavior of any given individual (see 6.2.2). Not all 
white parents whose children benefit from the tracking system support and defend that practice. 
Thus, for some white parents at Riverview, it will not be true that their racial privilege motivates 
them to participate in the reproduction of the racial achievement gap. This is the expected result 
given that social structures do not determine individual behavior (see 6.1.2). Instead, structural 
explanations account for behavioral tendencies among agents who share a similar position within 
a social structure. In the Riverview case, my structural explanation accounts for the reliable 
tendency among white parents to support the racialized tracking system. For the sake of the 
explanation, it does not matter whether this or that parent supports the tracking system. What 
matters is that the structure of racial privilege at Riverview motivates a critical majority of white 
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parents to support the tracking system, which in turn explains the stability of the racial achievement 
gap.   
 Notice that the explanandum is the stability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview. 
Thus, I do not seek to explain the origin of the gap—in other words, how it got started. Nor do I 
aim to account for the presence of the gap at Riverview. Rather, my focus is on explaining why 
the gap has endured for so long. In that sense, my explanatory project is similar to Cudd's 
endurance question. My aim is to explain why the racial achievement gap at Riverview is so long-
lasting. The endurance of the racial achievement gap at Riverview is especially puzzling because 
Riverview has the ideal conditions for closing the gap. Riverview is a racially integrated school 
where black students have access to state-of-the-art facilities and well-trained teachers. Despite 
the lack of racial diversity among teachers and administrators, they care deeply about closing the 
racial achievement gap and have taken several steps towards that goal. Moreover, white parents at 
Riverview identify themselves as progressive and committed to racial diversity. They are what we 
would call well-meaning white liberals. Against this backdrop, it is certainly puzzling that the 
racial achievement gap at Riverview has remained stable for decades. My explanation tackles this 
puzzling situation by showing how structural racism motivates agents socially positioned as 
white—including well-meaning white parents—to participate in the reproduction of racial 
inequality. While my explanation here is tailored to explaining the racial inequality in educational 
attainments at Riverview, the same explanatory framework can be used to explain the durability 
of racial inequality more generally.  
6.4.2. What is the Explanans? 
At the most general level, structural racism is the explanans of the durability of the racial 
achievement gap at Riverview High. My task in this section is to spell out the underlying causal 
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mechanisms that allow structural racism to have this explanatory power. As I argue in 6.3.2, my 
explanation will focus on the causal role of the tracking system in reinforcing the racial 
achievement gap at Riverview. The tracking system contributes to the racial disparity in 
educational achievements by instituting a racialized hierarchy in the placement of students into 
different tracks. Although Riverview High is a racially integrated school from the perspective of 
its student body (90% of students are black or white, in equal measure), the tracking system 
reintroduces segregation in the classroom. White students are disproportionately represented in 
honors and AP classes, while black students are disproportionately represented in the basic classes. 
This racialized hierarchy in tracking placements leads to a racialized distribution of Riverview's 
educational resources and opportunities. Students in honors and AP tracks have access to better 
teachers, better facilities, and a more rigorous curriculum than students in the basic track. In 
addition to their privileged access to Riverview's educational resources, (mostly white) students in 
the higher tracks benefit from grade weights, which grants them a half point GPA boost in each 
class they take.188 Relatedly, (mostly white) students in higher tracks also benefit from grade 
inflation because of pressure from (mostly white) parents.189 Given all these educational privileges 
for (mostly white) honors and AP students, it is not surprising that their educational attainments 
are consistently better than those of (mostly black) students in the basic track. Moreover, the 
unequal access to educational resources and opportunity makes it extremely difficult for students 
in the basic track to move to higher tracks. In fact, the tracking system widens the achievement 
gap between black and white students throughout their high school years.   
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The track placement of students is not based solely on prior academic achievement. 
Teacher recommendations play a key role in tracking assignments. However, teachers' decisions 
of who to recommend for higher tracks are racially biased because of their racialized perception 
of black students as less capable and not committed to school. Thus, even high-achieving black 
students face many obstacles to join honors and AP classes. By contrast, even those white students 
who are initially placed in the lower track are likely to be re-assigned to a higher track because of 
parental pressure on school officials. Black parents are less likely to contest track placements, but 
even when they do, they are far less likely to succeed than white parents. The few black students 
who manage to join the higher tracks face many obstacles that prevent them from taking full 
advantage of the educational resources and opportunities therein. Because of the segregated nature 
of the tracking system, black students in honors and AP classes are often the only non-white 
student and tend to experience racial isolation.190 Moreover, it is common for black students in 
upper-level classes to experience microaggressions from teachers and their white peers.191 These 
negative experiences negatively affect the emotional well-being and academic performance of 
high-achieving black students, which further cements the racial achievement gap at Riverview.  
We can now see that racialized nature of the tracking system, as well as its causal 
contribution to the racial achievement gap, is a result of the social practices of socially positioned 
agents (e.g. teachers, white parents, white students, black parents, black students) who make up 
the Riverview structure. Thus, an explanation of the durability of the racial achievement gap at 
Riverview could focus on the social practices of teachers (e.g. their racially biased track 
placements), black students (e.g. their constrained access to upper-level classes and the educational 
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resources therein), and so on. As I have discussed earlier, my explanation centers the role of 
privileged agents in reproducing racial inequality. In particular, I am interested in how white 
parents contribute to the maintenance of the racialized tracking system, and in so doing, ensure the 
reproduction of the racial achievement gap. 
I have already shown that the racialized tracking system explains the durability of the racial 
achievement gap at Riverview. The next step in the explanation is to show what motivates white 
parents to participate in the maintenance of the racialized tracking system. As I show in 6.3.3, 
white parents at Riverview have a positional interest in maintaining the racialized tracking system 
because their children benefit from the system. This interest is positional because it stems from 
white parents' (and their children's) position of racial privilege within a racially oppressive social 
structure—Riverview High (see 6.3.4). White parents at Riverview have this positional interest 
only to the extent that their position within the structure allows them to benefit from the structure's 
racially unequal distribution of educational resources and opportunities. These agents would not 
have this positional interest if they were socially positioned as black parents instead, or if 
Riverview High stopped distributing its educational resources along racial lines. Thus, white 
parents' positional interest in maintaining the tracking system is not a property of the individual 
agents who happen to occupy the social position 'white parent'. Rather, this positional interest is 
an emergent property of a racially oppressive social structure—Riverview High (see 6.3.4). This 
point is important because it entails that whatever causal power this positional interest has, is a 
causal power of the Riverview High structure.  
So what causal power do positional interests have? As I have argued throughout this 
chapter, positional interests are one way in which social structures influence individual behavior. 
For agents who occupy the position 'white parent' at Riverview, the interest attached to that 
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position motivates them to block any attempts at reforming the system. Given my commitment to 
weak methodological holism (see 6.1.2), I deny that the motivational power of positional interests 
can cause any given individual to act in a certain way. Positional interests motivate the agency of 
socially positioned individuals, but it does not determine their choices. Thus, if we are to ascribe 
a causal power to positional interests, it is better to think of them as causing behavioral tendencies 
among similarly positioned agents. The motivational power of positional interests is unable to 
ensure that all individuals act in accordance with their positional interest. However, at the 
aggregate level, their motivational power ensures that most agents will follow the path of least 
resistance and act in accordance with their positional interests.192 In the Riverview High case, the 
positional interest in maintaining the tracking system, which is attached to the social position 'white 
parent', explains the tendency among white parents to actively block any attempts at reforming the 
system. Although this positional interest exerts motivational influence on all white parents, some 
white parents at Riverview choose to go against it and oppose the tracking system. Still, at the 
aggregate level, this positional interest exerts enough motivational influence to ensure that the vast 
majority of white parents follow the path of least resistance and join in defending the tracking 
system.  
The question still remains as to what gives positional interests the motivational power that 
they have. In particular, what motivates white parents to act on their positional interest to maintain 
the tracking system? To answer this question, we must first look at this positional interest in more 
detail. White parents' positional interest in maintaining the tracking systems stems from the 
material rewards their children derive from the system. Under the current racialized tracking 
                                                 




system, the children of white parents have privileged access to the honors and AP classes, as well 
as to the additional educational resources and opportunities that come with them. Thus, what 
motivates white parents to support the tracking system is their desire to protect the educational 
advantages that their kids derive from the system. Given that the educational resources at 
Riverview are limited (e.g. there is only so many well-trained, experienced teachers), white 
parents' motivation to protect their kids' access to the benefits of honors and AP classes entails a 
motivation to exclude black kids from having access to those same resources.193  
This behavioral pattern among white parents at Riverview is consistent with the 
phenomenon of opportunity hoarding. As defined by Charles Tilly, opportunity hoarding is a social 
process whereby a group who gets access to a valuable resource confines use of that resource to 
members of the ingroup, such that outgroups are systematically excluded from having access to 
the resource.194 According to Tilly, opportunity hoarding is a key mechanism for explaining the 
durability of categorical inequalities. He defines categorical inequalities as "inequalities in 
advantages among human beings that correspond to categorical differences such as black/white, 
male/female, citizen/foreigner, or Muslim Jew rather than to individual differences in attributes, 
propensities or performances."195 In this definition, racial inequality is a case of categorical 
inequality. Thus, following Tilly, opportunity hoarding is a key mechanism for explaining the 
durability of racial inequality. The concept of opportunity hoarding fits perfectly with my 
explanation of the durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview. In particular, I argue that 
we should interpret white parents' support for the tracking system as an instance of opportunity 
hoarding. White parents' defense of the tracking system is a form of opportunity hoarding because 
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it seeks to restrict access to Riverview's best educational resources to (mostly white) honors and 
AP students. This process of opportunity hoarding also entails excluding (mostly black) basic-
level students from having access to Riverview's best educational resources. Since any significant 
change to the tracking system would undermine white parents' ability to hoard educational 
opportunities for their children, white parents become invested in the continuation of the tracking 
system. And given the role of the tracking system in the reproduction of the racial achievement 
gap, white parents also become invested in the continuation of the racial achievement gap.  
 In order to unpack the relation between structural racism and the behavioral tendency 
among white parents to support the tracking system, it would be helpful to clarify the causal role 
that race plays in the tracking example. First, the schemas of racialism influence teachers' racially 
biased placement of students into AP, honors and basic classes. Guided by racialist schemas that 
associate black and Latinx students with low academic performance and potential, teachers 
recommend them disproportionately for the lowest track. As a result, the distribution of 
educational resources at Riverview High via the tracking system follows a racially hierarchical 
order, with white students in the advanced tracks, and black and Latinx students in the basic track. 
This racially unequal distribution of educational resources also plays a causal role insofar as it 
provides an incentive for agents whose children benefit from the tracking system (i.e. white 
parents) to support the system and oppose any attempts at changing it.  
Importantly, in my explanation, white parents' support for the tracking system does not 
stem from a sense of white group identity. Rather, the source of their support for the tracking 
system is their positional interest in maintaining their kids' race-based educational advantages. 
These advantages are race-based insofar as they stem from a racialized practice of track placement 
that systematically disadvantages black and Latinx students. Moreover, the aforementioned 
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positional interests attach to the racialized position "white parent"—in other words, a social 
position that is heavily influenced by practices of racial categorization and differential treatment. 
Still, in my explanation, Riverview white parents' are not primarily motivated by a sense of white 
identity, but rather by their material interests, which in this case happen to coincide with the 
reproduction of the racial achievement gap.  
Of course, my explanation does not deny that some Riverview white parents may support 
the tracking system out of a sense of white identity or racial prejudice. However, since my 
emphasis is on explaining why well-meaning whites contribute to the reproduction of racial 
inequality, my explanation focuses on a causal mechanism (i.e. motivated action via positional 
interests) that does not rely on the presence of overtly racist motivations. Once again, my aim here 
is not to offer a full-fledged explanation of durability the racial achievement gap. As I mentioned 
earlier, my explanation complements structural explanations that focus on inter-school opportunity 
gaps, rather than the intra-school opportunity gaps I am describing here. Similarly, my explanation 
of white parents' support for the tracking system can (and should) work in tandem with alternative 
explanations that focus on other racialized sources of motivation, such as irrational cognitive 
biases, ideology, habits, and affect.  
Having clarified all the remaining details of the explanans, I will now proceed to lay out 
the definitive version of my structural explanation of the durability of the racial achievement gap 
at Riverview. Following 6.2.2, structural explanations explains the stability of a social pattern or 
arrangements (i.e. an enduring racial achievement gap at Riverview) as resulting from behavioral 
tendencies among similarly situated agents (i.e. the behavioral tendency among white parents to 
defend the tracking system). The tracking system is a social practice at Riverview that plays a key 
role in reproducing the racial achievement gap. It does so by introducing a racialized hierarchy in 
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tracking placements, which leads to a racially unequal distribution of Riverview's educational 
resources that privileges white students and disadvantages black students. That the tracking system 
has these racialized effects is a well-known fact at Riverview. In fact, teachers and administrators 
have tried to reform the system numerous times. However, the tracking system remains unchanged 
largely because of white parents' opposition to all reforming efforts. In this context, the question 
"what explains the durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview" is tantamount to the 
question "what explains the tendency among white parents to defend the current tracking system?" 
The answer to this latter question lies in the positional interests that attach to the racialized position 
'white parent' at Riverview. In particular, white parents at Riverview have a positional interest in 
securing the educational benefits that their kids derive from the racialized tracking system. This 
positional interest motivates white parents to engage in practices of opportunity hoarding, which 
include blocking all attempts at reforming the current tracking system. The motivational power of 
this positional interest ensures a stable pattern of support for the tracking system among white 
parents. Thus, this positional interest explains the durability of the racial achievement gap at 
Riverview High. Moreover, insofar as this positional interest is an emergent property of a racially 
oppressive social structure (i.e. Riverview High), it is also true that structural racism explains the 
durability of the racial achievement gap at Riverview—which is the explanatory claim I promised 





  My goal in this dissertation was to defend the usefulness of the concept of structural racism 
as a tool for anti-racist theory. The main challenge to this project is the lack of consensus over the 
meaning of structural racism. To address this challenge, I developed an internally coherent account 
of structural racism that incorporates the main insights from academic and political definitions of 
the term. In my account, structural racism refers to racially oppressive social structures. Regarding 
the usefulness of the concept for anti-racist theory, I argued that the distinct contribution of the 
concept of structural racism is its explanatory power. In particular, I argued that structural racism 
helps explain the durability of racial inequality in racialized societies like the United States. Thus, 
my dissertation was organized around two interconnected goals. The first—conceptual—goal was 
to flesh out my definition of structural racism as racially oppressive social structures. The second—
explanatory—goal was to vindicate the claim that structural racism helps explain the durability of 
racial inequality.   
 I devoted the first five chapters to my conceptual project. In chapter 1, I situated my project 
within the broader discourse on racism. I distinguished the public discourse on racism from the 
philosophical debate on racism. Drawing on Shelby's framing of the philosophical debate, I defined 
my project as being primarily concerned with the first-order conceptual question "what is structural 
racism?" I also stated my position on the second-order debates on racism. I defended a pluralist 
approach to the study of racism, according to which the success of any given theory of racism 
hinges on whether it answers the theorist's particular interests. On the question of whether personal 
morality or political morality take precedence when assessing the moral implications of racism, I 
took the perspective of political morality. Finally, on the debate over the explanatory value of 
individual racism vs. structural racism, I favored a structural racism framework, with the caveat 
173 
 
that a full-fledged structural racism explanation of durable racial inequality must incorporate 
individual-level explanations. 
 In chapters 2 and 3, I developed two social theoretical concepts that are key for my 
definition of structural racism—social structure and oppression. I defined social structures as 
networks of social relations that are recursively reproduced by individual agents through their 
participation in social practices. I also discussed the general role of social structures in social 
explanation. In this context, I identified three ways in which social structures shape individuals—
by constraining, enabling and motivating their agency. Building on my account of social structures, 
I defined oppressive social structures as those structures that reliably organize social groups in 
relations whereby one group (or groups) suffers from an unjustly inflicted harm, while another 
group (or groups) benefits from the same harm. I also discussed three key features of oppression: 
its structural nature, its relational nature, and its durability.  
 In chapter 4, I drew on the conceptual tools I developed in chapters 2 and 3 to flesh out my 
account of structural racism as racially oppressive social structures. I addressed three features that 
distinguish structural racism from other kinds of oppressive social structures. First, in racially 
oppressive social structures, hierarchical racial schemas are central in framing how agents interpret 
and respond to the world. In that context, I discussed the doctrine of racialism and its role in the 
racialized practices of categorization and differential treatment that produce racial hierarchy. 
Second, I introduced a distinction between racialized group and racialized position, which was 
useful for my explanatory project. Finally, I clarified the nature of racially oppressive relations as 
relations of race-based privilege and disadvantage. I also identified relations of racial domination 
as an extreme case of racial oppression. In chapter 5, I explored the connection between my 
account of structural racism and other conceptualizations of racism in the literature. I showed that 
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my account of structural racism can accommodate the main insights from existing theories of 
individual, ideological and institutional racism. At the same time, I argued that in order for 
structural racism to explain durable racial inequality, we must account for the causal interaction 
between social structures and individual agents.  
In chapter 6, I shifted my attention to the explanatory project of the dissertation. I briefly 
addressed the methodological individualism-holism debate and I situated my explanation within 
the framework of weak methodological holism—the view that individuals are shaped, but not 
determined by social structures. I also clarified the object of structural explanations. Structural 
explanations may explain the stability of behavioral tendencies among similarly situated agents, 
or they may explain the stability of social patterns or arrangements. Lastly, I substantiated the 
explanatory claim that structural racism explains the durability of racial inequality. In order to 
illustrate my explanatory framework, I focused on a single representative case of racial 
inequality—the racial achievement gap. To add even more specificity as well as empirical support, 
I extracted the empirical facts of my explanation from a recent sociological case study of the racial 
achievement gap at Riverview High. I showed that the durability of the racial achievement gap at 
Riverview is largely explained by the presence of racialized tracking system. I then explained 
white parents' overwhelming support for the tracking system as motivated by their positional 
interest in preserving the educational advantages their children derive from the system. Insofar as 
this positional interest was an emergent property of a racially oppressive social structure (i.e. 
Riverview High), I concluded that structural racism explains the durability of the racial 
achievement gap at Riverview.  
The Riverview High explanation showcases the explanatory power of racially oppressive 
social structures like Riverview High. In so doing, it also vindicates the usefulness of the concept 
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of structural racism as a tool for anti-racist theory. In addition, the Riverview High explanation 
complements Cudd's and Haslangers' influential accounts of structural explanation, which focus 
on the role of structural constraint. My explanation homes in on a different mechanism whereby 
social structures shape individual agency—structural motivation. Relatedly, the Riverview High 
explanation moves beyond Cudd's and Haslanger's focus on how the victims of oppression become 
coerced into reinforcing their own oppression. Without denying the usefulness of this explanatory 
strategy, my Riverview High explanation pushes us to consider the role that privileged agents play 
in the reproduction of racial inequality and other forms of social injustice. In particular, my 
explanation shows how "well-meaning" members of privileged groups can become involved in the 
reproduction of oppressive social relations.  
In the Riverview High explanation, I highlight the role of positional interests and material 
rewards as the motivation for white parents' participation in the reproduction of racial inequality. 
In so doing, I advance a strategic explanation of privileged agents' contribution to durable racial 
inequality. This explanation treats agents as rationally driven by an interest in maintaining their 
race-based advantages. Of course, this is only a partial explanation of what motivates agents to 
support racial inequality. My focus on strategic behavior aims to counter a contemporary narrative 
that casts privileged agents as unwillingly contributing to racial inequality due to irrational 
cognitive biases (e.g. implicit bias). In future work, I will aim to develop a more robust account of 
human action that can a more complete explanation of why privileged agents participate in the 
reproduction of racial inequality. This account of human action will have to explain the interaction 
between rational strategic behavior and other factors that motivate human agency, such as 
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